
Class 

Book — 



COPYRIGKF DEPOSIT 



AMERICAN CITIZEN SERIES 

EDITED BY 

ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, LL.D. 



tl 

a 



PUBLIC OPINION AND POPULAR 
GOVERNMENT 

A. LAWRENCE LOWELL 



^^ 



AMERICAN CITIZEN SERIES 

Edited by Albert Bushnell Hart, LL.D. 



Outline of Practical Sociology ; with Special Reference 
to American Conditions. 

By Carroll D. Wright, President of Clark College. 
With. Maps and Diagrams. Crown 8vo. 

Actual Government as Applied under American 

Conditions. 
By Albert Bushnell Hart, LL.D., Eaton Professor of 
the Science of Government in Harvard University. With 
6 Colored Maps and n other Illustrations and Diagrams. 
Crown 8vo. 

Financial History of the United States. 
By Davis R. Dewey, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Eco- 
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Constitutional Law in the United States. 
By Emun McClain, LL.D., sometime Lecturer on Consti- 
tutional Law at the State University of Iowa. Crown 8vo. 

Principles of Economics; with Special Reference to 

American Conditions. 
By Edwix R. A. Seligman, Ph.D., LL.D., McVickar 
Professor of Political Economy in Columbia University. 
With 6 Colored and 22 other Diagrams. Crown 8vo. 

Organized Democracy; An Introduction to the Study 

of American Politics. 
By Frederick A. Cleveland, Ph.D., LL.D. Crown 8vo. 
Public Opinion and Popular Government. 
By A. Lawrence Lowell. President of Harvard Uni- 
versity. Crown 8vo. 



LOXGMAXS. GREEN, & CO.: NEW YORK 



/ 

V 



ametican Citizen Series 



Public Opinion and 
Popular Government 



BY 

A. LAWRENCE LOWELL 

PRESIDENT OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY 



LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO 

FOURTH AVENUE & 30TH STREET, NEW YORK 

LONDON, BOMBAY, AND CALCUTTA 

1913 



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COPYRIGHT, I913, BY 
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 



THE -PLIMPTON-PRESS 
NORWOOD-MASS-U-S-A 



Preface 

The substance of this volume was delivered in the 
spring of 1909 as the James Schouler lectures of that 
year at Johns Hopkins University, but the pressure 
of other duties has delayed the preparation of the 
book for publication until the present time. The 
contents speak for themselves. 

For the collection of the data relating to the 
actual use of the referendum and the initiative, 
as well as some other matters, I am indebted to 
Prof. Thomas M. Hoover, formerly of Harvard, 
now of the Ohio State University, to Mr. Henry W. 
Cleary, formerly of Harvard College and the Harvard 
Law School, to M. Emil Hligli of Bern, and to my 
colleague Prof. W. E. Rappard of Harvard. I want 
also to acknowledge with gratitude the courtesy of 
the chancelleries of the Swiss cantons for their care 
in verifying the lists and figures sent to them, and 
of the recording officers of the several American 
states for the information they have kindly sent me 
about the voting in their states. 

A. LAWRENCE LOWELL 

Cambridge, June 5, 1913 



Introductory Note 

This volume of the American Citizen Series 
needs no editorial exposition, except to make clear 
its place in the series, and its relation to the other 
volumes. The intent of the various writers is to 
lay hold of those aspects and applications of Amer- 
ican life which affect the organization of society and 
government. Therefore, economics, finance, social 
organization, guiding principles of government, con- 
stitutional forms, the nature of democracy, have 
been discussed in one or another of the volumes 
that have already appeared. President Lowell deals 
with the most difficult and the most momentous 
question of government, — how to transmit the force 
of individual opinion and preference into public 
action. This is the crux of popular institutions. 

As throughout the series the effort of the author 
is to throw aside the husk and find the kernel; to 
penetrate through the current political phrases and 
show the psychological forces which lead to states 
of mind which are finally translated into laws and 
decisions. 

This process inevitably leads to a study both of 
representative action and of the various forms of 
direct legislation. The deductions are backed up 
by two appendices which embody the most complete 
statement of the practice of the initiative and refer- 



viii Introduction 

endum which has so far been made. The pre- 
dictions, guesses and criticisms which are being 
made by the press and by experts can be tested up 
to and through 1912 by the recorded experience of 
sixteen Swiss cantons and thirteen American states. 
The arrangement and subdivision of the work 
make it possible for high school and college classes 
to study the important topics treated in this vol- 
ume; it carries with it a body of facts which 
illustrate the text; and it opens up the whole 

subject. 

ALBERT BUSHNELL HART 



Table of Contents 



Part I 

THE NATURE OF PUBLIC OPINION 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I. Public Opinion Must be Public 

1. Opinion of a Majority not Always Public 4 

2. Unanimity not Necessary 7 

3. Rousseau's Common Will 8 

4. Public Opinion and Universal Consent 9 

5. Consent and Force 10 

6. Numbers and Intensity in Opinion 12 

7. Conclusion 14 

II. Public Opinion Must be Opinion 

8. Opinions are Only in Part Rational 16 

9. Opinions Adopted from Others may be Real Opinions . 18 

10. If an Integral Part of the Believer's Philosophy ... 19 

11. Otherwise an Opinion Must Involve a Personal Judg- 

ment of Facts 22 

12. Importance of Distinguishing the Real Subject of Public 

Opinion 24 

13. Opinion and Desire 26 

III. Conditions Essential for Public Opinion 

14. Doctrine of the Harmony of Interests 28 

15. Growth of Race Feeling 31 

16. Irreconcilables in Politics 32 

17. Homogeneity of Population a Condition of Public 

Opinion 34 

18. Another Condition is Freedom of Expressing Dissent . 36 

IV. Questions to which Public Opinion Can Apply 

19. Limits Imposed by the Necessity that the Opinion be 

Public . . . 41 

20. Benefit of a Written Constitution 44 



x Contents 

CHAPTER PAGE 

IV. Questions to which Public Oplnton Can Apply (continued) 

21. Limits Imposed by the Nature of Opinion 45 

22. Knowledge of Facts Increasingly Difficult 46 

23. Examples 50 

24. Difficulty in Foretelling whether a Public Opinion will 

be Formed 53 



Part II 

THE FUNCTION OF PARTIES 

V. Advertisement and Brokerage 

25. Mobility of Modern Life 57 

26. The Age of Advertisement 58 

27. The Age of Brokers 60 

28. Politicians as Brokers 61 

29. Parties the Means by which Brokerage is Conducted . 64 

30. Parties Enable the Voters to Act in Masses 67 

31. Parties Frame the Issues for Popular Decision .... 69 

VI. The Confusion of Issues 

32. The Motives that Determine an Election are Often 

Obscure 72 

33. But the Confusion is Less than if Parties did not 

Exist 75 

34. In England the People Pass Judgment More on Measures, 

in the United States More on Men 76 

35. Multiplicity of Parties in Continental Europe .... 79 

36. Two Parties a Result of Political Maturity 81 

VII. The Falsification of Public Opinion 

37. Parties Cause a Bias 86 

38. Parties Produce Unnatural Divisions 88 

39. People can Say Only "Yes" or "No" 91 

40. Influence of Moderate Elements 92 

41. Influence of Extreme Elements 95 

42. Parties Prevent Distortion by Popular Vagaries ... 96 

43. Parties an Obstacle to Despotism 97 

VIII. The Abuse of Party 

44. Need of Scientific Study of Party Government .... 100 

45. The Professional Politician 102 

46. The People Attempt too Much 105 

47. Frontier Conditions 109 



Contents xi 



Part III 

METHODS OF EXPRESSING PUBLIC OPINION 

CHAPTER PAGE 

IX. Representation 

48. An Election does not Always Express Public Opinion . 113 

49. Representation of the Whole Nation and of Con- 

stituencies 115 

50. Comparison of England and the United States . . . .117 

51. Remedies Proposed 120 

52. Proportional Representation 122 

53. The Theories of Delegation and of Personal Judgment 124 

54. Comparison of England and the United States .... 125 

X. Loss of Confidence in Representative Bodies 

55. The Rise of Modern Legislatures 129 

56. Recent Distrust of Legislatures 130 

57. Causes of Loss of Confidence 131 

58. The Pressure of Local Interests ' . . . . 133 

59. The Pressure of Private Interests 134 

60. The Lobby 135 

61. Private Influences on Elections 137 

62. Defects of Legislatures Exaggerated 139 

63. Results of the Confusion of Thought 142 

64. Remedies Devised for Legislative Defects 144 

65. The Recall 147 

66. The Direct Primary 149 

XI. Direct Popular Action 

67. The Referendum 152 

68. The Town Meeting 152 

69. The Referendum 154 

70. Reasons for the Referendum 155 

(a) Distrust of the Legislature 155 

(b) Desire to Separate Issues 157 

71. The Sphere of Efficiency 159 

72. Negative and Positive Forms of Popular Votes . . . 162 

XII. The Referendum in Switzerland 

73. Compulsory and Optional 164 

74. The Results 165 



xii Contents 

CHAPTER PAGE 

XIII. The Referendum in America 

75. Referendum on Constitutional Amendments 169 

76. Referendum on Special Legislative Acts 171 

77. The General Referendum 173 

78. Actual Use of the General Referendum 174 

(a) The Emergency Clause 174 

(b) Number of Laws Rejected 176 

(c) Character of Laws Rejected 180 

79. Size of the Vote Cast 184 

80. The Vote Cast in Switzerland 185 

81. The Vote Cast in America . 187 

82. Attempts to Stimulate Opinion 191 

83. The Local Referendum 193 

84. Advantages of the Local Referendum 195 

XIV. The Initiative 

85. The Nature of the Initiative 198 

86. Results in the Swiss Confederation 199 

87. Results in the Cantons 200 

88. Tendencies in Switzerland 201 

89. Results of the Initiative in America 203 

90. Nature of the Laws Enacted by Initiative 205 

91. Nature of Proposals Rejected 207 

92. The Initiative and Public Opinion 209 

93. Complex Subjects Presented by Initiative 211 

94. Close Votes and Public Opinion 214 

95. Stability as Evidence of Opinion 216 

96. Defects of the Initiative 217 

97. Impossibility of Amendment 219 

98. Does the Public Initiate 220 

XV. Reflections on Direct Legislation 

99. Trustworthiness of the Result 224 

100. Delay of Legislation by Popular Votes 226 

101. Indirect Effects of Direct Legislation 228 

102. Measures Suited for Popular Votes 231 

103. Direct Legislation will not Bring the Millennium . . . 233 



Contents xiii 



Part IV 



THE REGULATION OF MATTERS TO WHICH PUBLIC 
OPINION CANNOT DIRECTLY APPLY 

CHAPTER PAGE 

XVI. Representation by Sample 

104. Three Methods of Delegating Authority 240 

105. The Jury a Sample of the Public 242 

' 106. The Object of Rotation in Office 243 

107. The Use of the Lot 244 

108. Selected Samples of the Public 246 

109. Private Bill Committees in Parliament 248 

110. Committee Hearings in America 249 

111. Public Hearings in Massachusetts 250 

112. Public Hearings in Other States 254 

113. The Three Objects that Public Officers Serve are Often 

Combined 256 

114. Selection of Different Kinds of Officers 258 

XVII. Expert Administrators in Popular Government 

115. Lack of Experts in Athens 264 

116. Expert Administrators in Rome 265 

117. Experts in Monarchies and Democracies 268 

118. The Need of Experts To-day 271 

119. Limited Use of Experts in American Government . . 274 

XVIII. Experts in Municipal Government 

120. Cities in America are of Recent Growth 278 

121. The Lesson of European Cities 280 

122. The Model Charter Discourages Experts 282 

123. City Government by Commission 285 

XIX. Control and Recruiting of Experts 

124. Cause of the Distrust of Experts 289 

125. Ignorance of the Relation of Experts and Laymen . . 291 

126. Examples of the Proper Relation 293 

127. The True Relation between Experts and Representa- 

tives of the Public 295 



xiv Contents 

CHAPTER PAGE 

XIX. Control and Recruiting of Experts {continued). 

128. Methods of Creating the True Relation 298 

129. Recruiting Experts for the Public Service 300 

APPENDIX A. Results of the Referendum and Initiative 
in Switzerland 

The Swiss Confederation, 1874-1912 306 

Canton of Aargau, 1893-1912 311 

Canton of Basle City, 1895-1912 315 

Canton of Basle Rural, 1893-1912 318 

Canton of Bern, 1893-1912 . 322 

Canton of Geneva, 1882-1912 328 

Canton of the Grisons, 1893-1910 330 

Canton of Lucerne, 1893-1909 t 333 

Canton of St. Gall, 1893-1912 ' 334 

Canton of Schaffhausen, 1895-1912 336 

Canton of Schwyz, 1895-1910 338 

Canton of Solothurn, 1893-1909 341 

Canton of Thurgau, 1893-1910 347 

Canton of the Valais, 1895-1913 350 

Canton of Vaud, 1902-1910 353 

Canton of Zurich, 1893-1908 353 

APPENDIX B. Results of the Referendum and Initiative 
in America 

Arizona, 1912 368 

Arkansas, 1912 370 

California, 1912 371 

Colorado, 1912 372 

Maine, 1910-1912 376 

Missouri, 1910-1912 377 

Montana, 1912 379 

Nevada, 1908-1912 379 

New Mexico, 1912 380 

Oklahoma, 1908-1912 381 

Oregon, 1904-1912 384 

South Dakota, 1908- 1912 395 

Utah, 1912 . . , 398 

INDEX 401 



Part I 

The Nature of Public Opinion 



Public Opinion and Popular 
Government 



Part I 
The Nature of Public Opinion 



CHAPTER I 

PUBLIC OPINION MUST BE PUBLIC 

"Vox Populi may be Vox Dei, but very little 
attention shows that there has never been any agree- 
ment as to what Vox means or as to what Populus 
means." 1 In spite of endless discussions about 
democracy, this remark of Sir Henry Maine is still 
so far true that no other excuse is needed for study- 
ing the conceptions which lie at the very base of 
popular government. In doing so one must distin- 
guish the form from the substance; for the world 
of politics is full of forms in which the spirit is dead 
— mere shams, but sometimes not recognized as 
such even by the chief actors, sometimes deceiving 
the outside multitude, sometimes no longer mis- 
leading anyone. Shams are, indeed, not without 
value. Political shams have done for English gov- 
ernment what fictions have done for English law. 
They have promoted growth without revolutionary 
change. But while shams play an important part 

1 Maine, Popular Government, pp. 184, 185. 
3 



4 The Nature of Public Opinion 

in political evolution, they are snares for the political 
philosopher who fails to see through them, who 
ascribes to the forms a meaning that they do not 
really possess. Popular government may in sub- 
stance exist under the form of a monarchy, and an 
autocratic despotism can be set up without destroy- 
ing the forms of democracy. If we look through 
the forms to observe the vital forces behind them; 
if we fix our attention, not on the procedure, the 
extent of the franchise, the machinery of elections, 
and such outward things, but on the essence k)i the 
matter, popular government, in one important aspect 
at least, may be said to consist of the control of 
political affairs by public opinion. In this book, 
therefore, an attempt is made to analyze public 
opinion in order to determine its nature, the con- 
ditions under which it can exist, the subjects to 
which it can apply, the methods by which it can 
be faithfully expressed, and the regulation under a 
popular government of affairs to which it is not 
directly applicable. 

Each of the two words that make up the expres- 
sion "public opinion" is significant, and each of 
them may be examined by itself. To fulfil the 
requirement an opinion must be public, and it 
must be really an opinion. Let us begin with the 
first of these qualities. 

1. Opinion of a Majority not always Public 

If two highwaymen meet a belated traveller on 
a dark road and propose to relieve him of his watch 
and wallet, it would clearly be an abuse of terms to 



§ 1] Majority not always Enough 5 

say that in the assemblage on that lonely spot there 
was a public opinion in favor of a redistribution of 
property. Nor would it make any difference, for 
this purpose, whether there were two highwaymen 
and one traveller, or one robber and two victims. 
The absurdity in such a case of speaking about the 
duty of the minority to submit to the verdict of 
public opinion is self-evident; and it is not due to 
the fact that the three men on the road form part 
of a larger community, or that they are subject to 
the jurisdiction of a common government. The 
expression would be quite as inappropriate if no 
organized state existed; on a savage island, for ex- 
ample, where two cannibals were greedy to devour 
one shipwrecked mariner. In short the three men 
in each of the cases supposed do not form a com- 
munity that is capable of a public opinion on the 
question involved. May this not be equally true 
under an organized government, among people that 
are for certain purposes a community? 

To take an illustration nearer home. At the 
time of the Reconstruction that followed the Ameri- 
can Civil War the question whether public opinion 
in a southern state was, or was not, in favor of 
extending the suffrage to the negroes could not in 
any true sense be said to depend on which of the 
two races had a slight numerical majority. One 
opinion may have been public or general in regard 
to the whites, the other public or general in regard 
to the negroes, but neither opinion was public or 
general in regard to the whole population. Examples 
of this kind could be multiplied indefinitely. They 



6 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 1 

can be found in Ireland, in Austria-Hungary, in 
Turkey, in India, in any country where the cleavage 
of race, religion, or politics is sharp and deep enough 
to cut the community into fragments too far apart 
for an accord on fundamental matters. When the 
Mohammedans spread the faith of Islam by the 
sword, could the question whether public opinion 
in a conquered country favored Christianity or 
Mohammedanism be said to depend on a small 
preponderance in numbers of the Christians or the 
followers of the Prophet; and were the minority 
under any obligation to surrender their creed? The 
government was entirely in the hands of the Mussul- 
mans, but would it be rational to assert that if they 
numbered ninety -nine thousand against one hundred 
thousand Christians public opinion in the country 
was against them, whereas if they were to massacre 
two thousand of the Christians public opinion would 
then be on their side? Likewise in Bohemia at the 
present day, where the Germans and the Czechs 
are struggling for supremacy, would there not be 
an obvious fallacy in claiming that whichever race 
could show a bare majority would have the support 
of public opinion in requiring its own language to 
be taught to all the children in the schools. 

In all these instances an opinion cannot be public 
or general with respect to both elements in the state. 
For that purpose they are as distinct as if they 
belonged to different commonwealths. You may 
count heads, you may break heads, you may impose 
uniformity by force; but on the matters at stake 
the two elements do not form a community capable 



§ 2] Unanimity not Necessary 7 

of an opinion that is in any rational sense public or 
general. As Mr. Bryce points out, a great deal of 
confusion arises from using the term sometimes to 
mean everybody's views, that is, the aggregate of 
all that is thought, and sometimes the views of the 
majority. 1 If we are to employ the term in a sense 
that is significant for government, that imports any 
obligation moral or political on the part of the mi- 
nority, surely enough has been said to show that the 
opinion of a mere majority does not by itself always 
suffice. Something more is clearly needed. 

2. Unanimity not Necessary 

But if the opinion of a majority does not of itself 
constitute a public opinion, it is equally certain that 
unanimity is not required. To confine the term 
to cases where there is no dissent would deprive 
of it s all value and would be equivalent to saying 
that it rarely, if ever, exists. Moreover, unanimous 
opinion is of no importance for our purpose, because 
it is perfectly sure to be effective in any form of 
government, however despotic, and it is, therefore, 
of no particular interest in the study of democracy. 
Legislation by unanimity was actually tried in the 
kingdom of Poland, where each member of the 
assembly had the right of liberum veto on any meas- 
ure, and it prevented progress, fostered violence, and 
spelled failure. The Polish system has been lauded 
as the acme of liberty, but in fact it was directly 
opposed to the fundamental principle of modern 
popular government; that is, the conduct of public 

1 American Commonwealth, Ed. of 1910, vol ii, p. 251. 



8 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 3 

affairs in accord with a public opinion which is 
general, although not universal, and which implies 
under certain conditions a duty on the part of the 
minority to submit. 

3. Rousseau's Common Will 

If then unanimity is not necessary to public 
opinion and a majority is not enough, where shall 
we seek the essential elements of its existence? A 
suggestion much in point may be found in the specu- 
lations of the most ingenious political philosopher 
of the eighteenth century. In his Contrat Social 
Rousseau attempts to prove that in becoming a 
member of a state the natural man may remain 
perfectly free and continue to obey only his own 
will. He tells us that in forming a state men desire 
to enforce the common will of all the members; and 
he takes as the basis of all political action this 
common will, which is nearly akin to our idea of 
public opinion. Now, in order to reconcile the 
absolute freedom of every citizen to obey only his 
own volition, with the passing of laws in every 
civilized state against opposition, he says that when 
the assembled people are consulted on any measure, 
their votes express, not their personal wishes upon 
the subject, but their opinions in regard to the 
common will, and thus the defeated minority have 
not had their desires thwarted, but have simply been 
mistaken in their views about the common will. 
All men, he insists, want to give effect to this com- 
mon will, which becomes, therefore, the universal 
will of everyone and is always carried out. 



§ 4] Public Opinion and Universal Consent 9 

4. Public Opinion and Universal Consent 

Though stated in a somewhat fanciful way, the 
theory contains a highly important truth, which 
may be clothed in a more modern dress. A body 
of men are politically capable of a public opinion 
only so far as they are agreed upon the ends and 
aims of government and upon the principles by which 
those ends shall be attained. They must be united, 
also, about the means whereby the action of the 
government is to be determined, in a conviction, for 
example, that the views of a majority — or it may 
be some other portion of their numbers — ought to 
prevail; and a political community as a whole is 
capable of public opinion only when this is true of 
the great bulk of the citizens. Such an assumption 
was implied, though usually not expressed in all 
theories of the Social Compact; and, indeed, it is 
involved in all theories that base rightful govern- 
ment upon the consent of the governed, for the con- 
sent required is not a universal approval by all the 
people of every measure enacted, but a consensus 
in regard to the legitimate character of the ruling 
authority and its right to decide the questions that 
arise. 

The power of the courts in America to hold 
statutes unconstitutional furnishes an illustration 
of this doctrine. It rests upon a distinction between 
those things that may be done by ordinary legisla- 
tive procedure and those that may not; the theory 
being that in the case of the former the people have 
consented to abide by the decision of the majority 



10 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 5 

as expressed by their representatives, whereas in 
the case of matters not placed by the constitution 
within the competence of the legislature, the people 
as a whole have given no such consent. With regard 
to these they have agreed to abide only by a decree 
uttered in more solemn forms, or by the determina- 
tion of something greater than a mere majority. 
The court, therefore, in holding a statute uncon- 
stitutional, is in effect deciding that it is not within 
the range of acts to which the whole people have 
given their consent; so that while the opinion in 
favor of the act may be an opinion of the majority 
of the voters, it is not a public opinion of the com- 
munity, because it is not one where the people as 
a whole are united in a conviction that the views 
of the majority, at least as expressed through the 
ordinary channels, ought to prevail. 

5. Consent and Force 

We have seen that in some countries the popula- 
tion has contained, and for that matter still contains, 
distinct elements which are sharply at odds upon 
the vital political questions of the day. In such a 
case the discordant forces may be violent enough to 
preclude a general consent that the opinion of the 
majority ought to prevail; but this is not always 
true. If they are not, the assumption which lies 
at the foundation of popular government remains 
unimpaired. If they are, the forms of democracy 
may still be in operation, although their meaning 
is essentially altered. It may be worth while to 
dwell on this contrast a moment because it makes 



§ 5] Consent and Force 11 

clear the difference between true public opinion and 
the opinion of a majority. 

Leaving out of account those doctrines whereby 
political authority is traced to a direct supernatural 
origin, government among men is commonly based 
in theory either on consent or on force, and in fact 
each of these factors plays a larger or smaller part 
in every civilized country. So far as the prepon- 
derating opinion is one which the minority does not 
share, but which it feels ought, as the opinion of 
the majority, to be carried out, the government is 
conducted by a true public opinion or by consent. 
So far as the preponderating opinion is one the 
execution of which the minority would resist by 
force if it could do so successfully, the government 
is based upon force. At times it may be necessary 
to give effect to an opinion of the majority against 
the violent resistance, or through the reluctant 
submission, of the minority. A violent resistance 
may involve the suppression of an armed insurrec- 
tion or civil war. But even when there is no resort 
to actual force it remains true that in any case where 
the minority does not concede the right of the 
majority to decide, submission is yielded only to 
obviously superior strength; and obedience is the 
result of compulsion, not of public opinion. The 
power to carry out its will under such conditions 
must to some extent be inherent in every govern- 
ment. Habitual criminals are held in check by 
force everywhere. But in many nations at the pres- 
ent day there are great masses of well-intentioned 
citizens who do not admit the right of the majority 



12 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 6 

to rule. These persons and the political parties in 
which they group themselves are termed irrecon- 
cilable, and when we speak of public opinion in that 
country we cannot include them. So far as they 
are concerned there can be no general or public 
opinion. 

Let us be perfectly clear upon this point. The 
presence of irreconcilables does not mean that the 
government is illegitimate, or that it is not justified 
in enforcing its will upon the reluctant minority. 
That will depend upon other considerations. The 
use of force may be unavoidable if any settled gov- 
ernment is to be upheld, if civic order is to be main- 
tained. But it does mean that the fundamental 
assumption of popular government, the control of 
political affairs by an opinion which is truly public, 
is set aside. Florence may, or may not, have 
been justified in disfranchising her noble families, 
but Freeman was certainly right in his opinion that 
by so doing she lost her right to be called a democ- 
racy, 1 — that is, a government by all the people, — 
and it makes little difference for this purpose whether 
a part of the body politic is formally excluded from 
any share in public affairs or overawed by force into 
submission. 

6. Numbers and Intensity in Opinion 

One more remark must be made before quitting 
the subject of the relation of public opinion to the 
opinion of the majority. The late Gabriel Tarde, 
with his habitual keen insight, insisted on the 

1 Growth of the English Constitution, chap, i, note 14. 



§ 6] Numbers and Intensity in Opinion 13 

importance of the intensity of belief as a factor in 
the spread of opinions. 1 There is a common impres- 
sion that public opinion depends upon and is meas- 
ured by the mere number of persons to be found 
on each side of a question; but this is far from 
accurate. If forty -nine per cent, of a community 
feel very strongly on one side, and fifty-one per 
cent, are lukewarmly on the other, the former opinion 
has the greater public force behind it and is certain 
to prevail ultimately if it does not at once. The 
ideas of people who possess the greatest knowledge 
of a subject are also of more weight than those of 
an equal number of ignorant persons. If, for ex- 
ample, all the physicians, backed by all other edu- 
cated men, are confident that an impure water 
supply causes typhoid fever, while the rest of the 
people are mildly incredulous, it can hardly be said 
that public opinion is opposed to that notion. One 
man who holds his belief tenaciously counts for as 
much as several men who hold theirs weakly, because 
he is more aggressive, and thereby compels and 
overawes others into apparent agreement with him, 
or at least into silence and inaction. This is, per- 
haps, especially true of moral questions. It is not 
improbable that a large part of the accepted moral 
code is maintained by the earnestness of a minority, 
while more than half of the community is indifferent 
or unconvinced. In short, public opinion is not 
strictly the opinion of the numerical majority, and 
no form of its expression measures the mere majority, 
for individual views are always to some extent 

1 Les Transformations du Pouvoir, pp. 42 et seq. 



14 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 7 

weighed as well as counted. Without attempting 
to consider how the weight attaching to intensity 
and intelligence can be accurately gauged, it is 
enough for our purpose to point out that when we 
speak of the opinion of a majority we mean, not the 
numerical, but the effective majority. 

No doubt differences in the intensity of belief ex- 
plain some sudden transformations in politics and in 
ethical standards, many people holding their views 
with so little conviction that they are ready to fol- 
low in the wake of any strong leader in thought 
or action. On the other hand they explain in part 
also cases where a law is enacted readily but enforced 
with difficulty; for the law may be carried through 
by a comparatively small body of very earnest men, 
who produce a disproportionate effect by the heat 
of their conviction; while the bulk of the people are 
apathetic and unwilling to support the effort required 
to overcome a steady passive resistance to the 
enforcement of the law. 

The problem of intensity of belief is connected, 
moreover, with the fact that different ways of ascer- 
taining the popular will may give different results, 
in accordance with the larger or smaller proportion 
of the indifferent who are gathered in to vote. But 
this is a matter that belongs properly to a later dis- 
cussion of the methods of expressing public opinion. 
We are dealing here only with its essential nature. 

7. Conclusion 

To sum up what has been said in this chapter: 
public opinion to be worthy of the name, to be the 



§ 7] Conclusion 15 

proper motive force in a democracy, must be really 
public; and popular government is based upon the 
assumption of a public opinion of that kind. In 
order that it may be public a majority is not enough, 
and unanimity is not required, but the opinion must 
be such that while the minority may not share it, 
they feel bound, by conviction not by fear, to accept 
it; and if democracy is complete the submission 
of the minority must be given ungrudgingly. An 
essential difference between government by public 
opinion as thus defined and by the bare will of a 
selfish majority has been well expressed by Presi- 
dent Hadley. After saying that laws imposed by 
a majority on a reluctant minority are commonly 
inoperative, he adds, "It cannot be too often repeated 
that those opinions which a man is prepared to main- 
tain at another's cost, but not at his own, count 
for little in forming the general sentiment of a 
community, or in producing any effective public 
movement." x 

1 The Education of the American Citizen, chap, iii, p. 27. 



CHAPTER II 

PUBLIC OPINION MUST BE OPINION 

After considering what is meant by "public," we 
must turn to what is meant by "opinion." 

8. Opinions are Only in Part Rational 

It has become almost a commonplace that the 
elder breed of political and economic philosophers 
erred in regarding man as a purely rational being, 
guided by selfish aims; whereas he is really, in the 
main, a creature of suggestion, whose strongest 
impulses are often generous. Later experience and 
modern psychology have started a new train of 
thought, have given us a different standpoint from 
which to study mankind. We are constantly told 
today how small a part of our actions are the 
result of our own reasoning, how small a proportion 
of opinion is personal, how much of it is taken from 
others in whole or in part ready-made. 

The history of religious bodies shows that with 
the vast majority of men creeds are inherited; or, 
to speak more strictly, accepted on the suggestion 
and authority of parents and teachers. It is incredi- 
ble that if everyone really thought out his beliefs 
for himself religious lines would remain from genera- 
tion to generation so little changed as they have, 
for example, among the Catholics and Protestants 
in Switzerland. That such results are not due to 

16 



§ 8] Opinions are Only in Part Rational 17 

a transmission of mental traits in the blood, pre- 
disposing the child to the doctrines wrought out 
by his ancestors, would seem to be clear from the 
case of the Turkish Janissaries; for this great fight- 
ing force of the Ottoman Sultans was composed 
of Christian children taken from their homes in in- 
fancy and brought up in the Mohammedan faith. 
Although they revolted at times in consequence of 
grievances, they never showed any tendency to 
revert to the religion of their parents. In fact it 
would be safe to assert as a general rule that the 
members of every church have accepted its dogmas 
because they belonged to it, quite as much as they 
have clung to the church on account of a belief in 
its creed. Nor is this less true of other spheres of 
thought. It is manifestly the case in politics, where 
party affiliations have no less influence in fixing the 
principles of men, than the principles have in deter- 
mining the membership of the parties. 

Opinions may, of course, be adopted by conscious 
submission to the authority of someone who is better 
informed; and Sir George Cornewall Lewis points 
out that in such a case "The choice of a guide is as 
much a matter of free determination, as the adoption 
of an opinion on argumentative grounds." 1 But he 
does not appear to have perceived to how small an 
extent the selection of a guide is in fact deliberate or 
even conscious. In most of the affairs of life we are 
constantly acting upon suggestions without being 
aware of their origin, or indeed of the fact that we 
did not frame our conclusions unaided. 

1 Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion, p. 63. 
2 



18 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 9 

9. Opinions Adopted from Others may be Real Opinions 

A conviction founded on a conscious deference 
to authority or a wholly unconscious process of 
suggestion, even if unworthy of respect on its merits 
and valueless as evidence of the truth of the prop- 
osition accepted, yet, if prevalent, may be a vital 
factor not to be neglected in politics and legislation. 
A mere blind prejudice of this nature when wide- 
spread must be heeded, but it does not belong to 
the class of opinions which popular government is 
designed to promote. We must, however, distin- 
guish between different kinds of convictions formed 
apparently by the same process. A belief, although 
adopted on suggestion or authority without mature 
consideration, may nevertheless be a real opinion 
and not a mere prejudice or meaningless impression; 
for the line between what is opinion and what is not 
is by no means the same as the line between what 
is personally thought out, or consciously rational, 
and what comes in other ways. The bulk of every 
community accepts without adequate reasoning all 
its fundamental political principles, such as a belief 
in monarchy or in a federal system of government, 
in universal suffrage, in trial by jury, and in many 
other things that the people of a country habitually 
assume as axioms. In fact the reasons popularly 
given for the maintenance of these institutions are 
sometimes almost ludicrously insufficient to justify 
their existence. Occasionally they are quite incon- 
sistent with actual facts or wholly foreign to the 
real benefits received. It is much easier to perceive 



§ 10] When Part of the Believer's Philosophy 19 

fallacies of that kind in another country, or a by- 
gone age, than among ourselves. We smile at the 
divine right of kings as an argument for the British 
monarchy, while we repeat complacently equally 
futile traditions of our own. But all this does not 
mean that the things themselves are not excellent, 
or even indispensable for the objects they really 
serve. Bagehot, indeed, gave a great impulse to 
clear thinking when he pointed out that the merits 
popularly ascribed to the English Constitution were 
for the most part imaginary, and yet extolled those 
very institutions without measure for quite different 
reasons. 

10. If an Integral Part of the Believer's Philosophy 

In the category of opinions not wholly rational 
must be classed the faith of most persons in the 
dogmas of the religious bodies to which they belong. 
In such cases one might suggest that a man has 
in reality an opinion about his church, and not 
about the particular tenets which he accepts on 
its authority. But this is by no means always true, 
because in fact he accepts the doctrines and the 
church itself for much the same reason. Both of 
them form part of what the Germans call his Welt- 
anshauung, his general point of view. They fit 
into his conception of the universal fitness of things, 
and hence they are woven into the very texture 
of his mind and are not easily changed. If held 
universally in a community, or nearly so, they are 
an integral part of the civilization of the people. 
If held only by a considerable portion of the people, 



20 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 10 

they are an integral part of the civilization of that 
portion. 

Experimental psychologists tell us that, as a rule, 
a man cannot by hypnotic suggestion be made to 
adopt an idea inconsistent with his own character 
— a truth of general application to suggestions 
of other kinds, whether presented to individuals 
or communities. The Puritan of the seventeenth 
century would not have believed in predestination 
had it not been consonant with the puritanical tone 
of thought; and the same principle may be con- 
stantly traced in the evolution of political systems, 
for all law and custom embody in the main inherited 
opinions on the fitness of things. The most inter- 
esting aspect, indeed, of political science consists 
in working out the actual relation to one another 
of the various institutions of a nation; in discover- 
ing how far they make up a harmonious system, and 
how the incongruous elements are gradually elimi- 
nated or modified to suit their environment. This 
organic need of harmony makes it impossible to 
predict that an institution that has worked well in 
one country will produce the same results in another; 
and, on the other hand, it makes an innovation often 
hazardous, because, like the introduction of the mon- 
goose into Jamaica, it may modify existing conditions 
to an extent altogether unforeseen. 

Now a community may have a keen sense of the 
incongruity between some policy or practice and 
the rest of its civilization without having a rational 
understanding of either. The people of the northern 
states may have been incapable of weighing fairly 



§ 10] When Part of the Believer's Philosophy 21 

the arguments of the Greek philosophers in favor of 
leaving manual labor to slaves, and yet they came 
to perceive clearly that slavery anywhere in the 
United States could not be permanently in harmony 
with the system of free labor in their own part of 
the country. Again the American people did not 
attempt to study rationally the ultimate effects of 
polygamy and monogamy, but they were perfectly 
well aware that polygamy legally practised in Utah 
would be inconsistent with the principles on which 
their whole social structure was founded. 

The real relation of ideas to each other is by no 
means always perceived at first sight, for the human 
mind is singularly capable of entertaining for a 
time contradictory principles without knowing it; 
but when an old conviction is retained, or a new 
one is accepted, on account of its consonance with 
a code of beliefs already in the mind, although 
without any sufficient process of reasoning or 
knowledge of the facts, it may be regarded as an 
opinion in a very different sense from an impression 
derived from authority or suggestion apart from 
any such connection with existing ideas. The first 
report by a navigator that he had seen the south 
polar ice cap might well give rise to an opinion that 
the pole was covered with ice, because that agreed 
with what was known about the distribution of heat 
over the earth; while a tale by the same navigator 
about meeting a sea-serpent might produce among 
his hearers nothing worthy of being called an opinion, 
because they know too little about marine life to 
estimate the probability of the fact. In one case 



22 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 11 

the report was in harmony with other ideas already 
in the mind; in the other it bore no apparent rela- 
tion to any such ideas. 



11. Otherwise an Opinion must Involve a Personal 
Judgment of Facts 

A conviction, therefore, formed because it is in 
accord with a code of beliefs already in the mind 
is properly classed as an opinion; but many of 
the problems that arise in politics, as in the other 
affairs of life, cannot be solved in this way. They do 
not present a question of harmony with accepted 
principles, but the application of an accepted 
principle to a particular case, or the means to be 
adopted in attaining ~an end universally desired; 
and these things usually require for their determina- 
tion a considerable knowledge of the subject matter. 
In short the question turns not on the abstract 
fitness of things, but mainly on the verification of 
facts, and in doubtful cases on ascertaining facts 
neither on the one hand self-evident nor on the other 
improbable. Take, for example, the grant of a 
street railroad franchise to a private corporation, 
and let us assume for the purpose of the argument 
that it is wise to grant the franchise on securing to 
the public a proper return for the concession, but 
not otherwise. The question presented is whether 
a specific bill does or does not secure such a return. 
To take another illustration: it is generally ad- 
mitted that children should be educated for their 
duties in life at the public expense. To what extent 
are the studies leading to a general education and 



§11] Involves Personal Judgment of Facts 23 

to what extent are manual and industrial training 
best adapted to that end? 

On problems of this kind an opinion worthy of the 
name cannot be formed without both a process of 
reasoning and, what is_ far more difficult, the com- 
mand of a number of facts; although not necessarily 
all the facts in the case. Let us suppose that to 
decide a question it is necessary to ascertain facts 
A, B, and C; that I know A of my own knowledge, 
determine B to my own satisfaction by weighing 
contradictory evidence, and accept C (which is a 
technical matter requiring special knowledge) on 
the authority of an expert. A concrete instance 
will make the problem more clear, and for that 
purpose we may consider the case of the street 
railroad franchise just mentioned. The question 
presented is that of securing a proper return to the 
public, and this, we may suppose, involves the 
further question of a reasonable profit to the com- 
pany. The reasonable profit may in turn depend 
upon what is a fair rate of interest on the capital 
outlay, upon the probable net income from operating 
the road, and upon the deterioration of the plant. 
Being a man of affairs I know what is a fair interest 
on that kind of investment. The probable net in- 
come I calculate by comparing the reports of street 
railroads in other cities and the estimates of various 
experts. For the deterioration I rely wholly on the 
statement of a civil engineer. Clearly it cannot be 
said in such a case that I have no personal opinion 
because I have taken a part of the data on authority. 

If, on the other hand, I take all three facts on 



24 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 12 

authority or suggestion alone; still more if I simply 
accept the conclusion that the franchise bill as a 
whole is good on such a ground; or if I vote for it 
solely because my party is in favor of it, or because 
the promoter has a clear voice and engaging manners, 
or because he was once kind to my mother; obviously 
I have no real opinion of my own on the merits of 
the bill. I may have an opinion on the trustworthi- 
ness of the man on whom I rely, or of the party that 
I follow, but not on the subject itself. Now public 
opinion on a question means an opinion on the 
question itself; and hence in the case supposed, if 
the bulk of the community are in the same state of 
mind that I am, there can be no real public opinion 
about the franchise. 

In order, therefore, that there may be a real public 
opinion on any subject, not involving a simple ques- 
tion of harmony or contradiction with settled con- 
victions, the bulk of the people must be in a position 
to determine of their own knowledge, or by weighing 
evidence, a substantial part of the facts required 
for a rational decision. 

12. Importance of Distinguishing the Real Subject of 
Public Opinion 

It is all the more important to distinguish clearly 
between an opinion on the question itself and on 
something else, because the mass of the people do 
not so distinguish, and may not hesitate to vote 
freely on a question without having an opinion about 
it. Nor is it easy in practice to make the distinction 
without great care in selecting both the questions 



§ 12] Real Subject of Public Opinion 25 

to be submitted to a vote and the form in which 
they are submitted. This is obviously true when 
we try to deduce from an election of public officers 
the popular opinion upon the various matters dis- 
cussed during the campaign; for it is often impossible 
to ascertain on which of the issues involved the 
people have rendered their verdict. A general 
election for Parliament, or for President and Con- 
gress, may be mainly an expression of opinion upon 
some salient measure, or an expression of greater 
confidence in one man or group of men than in 
another, or it may indicate merely an habitual sub- 
mission to the authority of a party, a church, or 
a labor union. We shall have occasion to observe 
hereafter, in spite of frequent assertions to the con- 
trary, that this may be true also of a popular vote 
on particular measures, by means of the referen- 
dum and initiative. The motives for a ballot of 
any kind often differ with different people who vote 
the same way, and are not seldom so mixed in the 
mind of a single individual that he would find it 
hard to disentangle them if he tried, and his own 
analysis would often be mistaken. 

Now it does not follow that, because people have 
no true opinion on a question, they have no opinion 
on the method by which it ought to be decided. 
They may be incapable, and recognize that they are 
incapable, of forming an opinion about an intricate 
point of law, or about the guilt of a man accused 
of crime when the evidence is conflicting; and yet 
they may have a very definite opinion that the 
matter shall be decided by a court of law, and that 



26 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 13 

its decision shall be enforced. The public may 

have no opinion about dealing with an epidemic, 

and yet it may have a very strong opinion that 

it ought to be combated by physicians who have 

proved their competence. This suggests a point 

of practical importance, for it is obviously wise, so 

far as possible, to submit to the judgment of the 

people the questions on which they have, or may 

have, opinions, and not those on which they have 

none. 

13. Opinion and Desire 

It may be observed that nothing has been said 
in this chapter about popular desire as contrasted 
with public opinion. Nor for our purpose is it 
needful to dwell on the distinction. Both are sub- 
ject to the same condition, that the desire, like the 
opinion, must be public, — that is, one which the 
minority feels bound to accept. This is more likely 
to be true in the case of opinion than of desire, 
because the former is more likely to comprise the 
welfare of the whole community in its scope; but if 
the desire fulfils the required conditions it can, for 
political purposes, scarcely be distinguished from 
opinion. It is not of necessity less rational, less 
in harmony with settled convictions, or framed with- 
out a comprehension of hard fact. The two are, 
indeed, always commingled. Nevertheless there is 
truth in Tarde's remark that power founded on 
popular desire is base, while power founded on 
popular confidence or opinion is noble. 1 Nor does a 

1 Les Transformations du Pouvoir, p. 44. He declares that 
popular election is defective because it expresses desire rather than 



§ is] Opinion and Desire 27 

des become noble because shared by many people. 
In saying t lis the word desire is used to mean a sel- 
fish nnpui st ; but desires, and especially the strongest 
ones, are not always selfish. Man at his best is 
a moral being, and it is only as a moral being that 
he is fit for self-government. The great statesman, 
like the great moral leader, is one who appeals to 
the higher emotions, to principle, to self-restraint, 
not to selfishness and appetite. 

opinion, and that the strongest governments in the world have possessed 
some sacred source of authority beside election (p. 45). He says also 
(p. 167) that a free state is one where the desires and opinions of the rulers 
are in harmony. 



CHAPTER III 

CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL FOR PUBLIC OPINION 

Having analyzed the significance of the words 
"public" and "opinion" we have a base line whence 
we can survey the conditions under which public 
opinion can exist and the matters to which it can 
apply. We have seen that an opinion can be public 
only when those who do not share it feel constrained 
by a sense of obligation, and not merely by fear of 
superior force, to accept it; but this has by no means 
been the case in all countries at all times. 

14. Doctrine of the Harmony of Interests 

Rousseau conceived an ideal commonwealth where 
all men had in reality a common will, differing only 
in their opinions about what that will might be; and 
his idea has assumed various forms, some of them 
not very obvious on the surface. It is involved in 
the doctrine of the universal harmony of human 
interests which underlay much of the speculation 
of the earlier political economists. With character- 
istic lucidity that doctrine was expressly stated by 
the French physiocrats of the eighteenth century 
and by some of their compatriots in the nineteenth; 
while it was virtually assumed by the English 
classical school of economists and provided a half- 
concealed foundation for their principles. 

Now, if the interests of all men are ultimately 

28 



§ 14] Doctrine of Harmony of Interests 29 

in accord, any divergence of views cannot be due 
to a conflict of interests, because no such conflicts 
can in fact exist. The divergence must arise entirely 
from a difference of opinion about what the common 
interests of all men are, or how those interests can 
best be promoted. As in Rousseau's ideal state, 
everyone desires the same end, whether we call it 
the common will or the common welfare, and men 
differ only about the means of attaining that end. 
With such a faith it is not surprising that the ad- 
herents of this school of political economy should 
have been optimists. 

Some of the earlier maxims of democracy rested 
upon the same premise and produced in like man- 
ner an optimistic spirit. The maxim, for example, 
that the people as a whole cannot want to injure 
itself, and hence that public opinion when enlightened 
must always be right, is all very well if the people 
have an essential solidarity based upon the fact that 
the true interests of all citizens are identical. But 
if not, the foundation of the maxim crumbles away. 
The majority may desire to injure the minority 
wrongfully; or the people now living may, in pur- 
suit of their own objects, disregard the welfare of 
posterity. 

If there were not some harmony of interests 
among men they would never have become civi- 
lized or lived in communities. Man is a gregarious 
animal, and all creatures that herd together in con- 
siderable groups do so because their common in- 
terests exceed in importance their conflicting ones. 
Most of the carnivora dwell alone or in small 



30 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 14 

families, for the simple reason that their interests, 
especially in the matter of food, are antagonistic; 
and if this had been true of man he would have 
lived forever in the same way. Nevertheless the 
early economists and democrats certainly went too 
far in assuming the absolute truth of their doctrine, 
for the faith in the universal harmony of interests 
has not been verified by experience; or at least 
has not proved to be wholly in accord with the 
controlling impulses of mankind as we see them at 
work in the stress of political life under an ex- 
tended suffrage. In fact the doctrine itself has 
suffered the fate of outworn theories. After dying 
a natural death it has been placed in the pillory 
that men might show how skilfully they could have 
killed it if it were not already dead. Even the 
strongest advocates of popular government have 
discovered, or believe they have discovered, that 
the interests of all members of the community are 
not identical; and although in many cases men 
seek to cloak selfish aims by arguments designed to 
prove that their own objects will promote general 
prosperity, this tribute to virtue is not always paid. 
Labor parties, for example, have arisen in some coun- 
tries, wielding at times great power, and advocating 
frankly the interests of working men alone. 1 

1 After declaring that the test of morality in politics is whether a 
course of action tends to enlarge the domain of sympathy and soli- 
darity, Tarde asserts that every politician who sets before his eyes the 
exclusive triumph of one class or one caste, even if it be the class or the 
caste that is most numerous and most disinherited, is retrograde from 
the start. A socialist party, he says, may be in the great current of 
progress, but a working-man's party cannot. (Les Transformations du 
Pouvoir, pp. 257, 258.) 



§ 15] Growth of Race Feeling 31 

15. Growth of Race Feeling 

Nor are the conflicts of interests that are manifest 
today due entirely to personal or material aims. 
One of the most striking facts of the last half century 
has been the growing intensity of race feeling, often 
in cases where the worldly prospects of the individual 
would be promoted by abandoning the language 
and traditions of his ancestors. The principle 
of the harmony of interests, being primarily an 
economic doctrine dealing with material prosperity, 
left out of the reckoning other motives of unmeas- 
ured power; and in the recent struggles of races for 
existence or supremacy the sentiments of comrade- 
ship, loyalty, and pride of race have often proved 
stronger than the greed of gain. 

Curiously enough this phenomenon is by no 
means confined to races of men very far apart in 
natural qualities, to the great branches of the human 
family found in the different continents. It is acute 
among people of European stock who in the past 
have dwelt peacefully together, and have even 
fought shoulder to shoulder against a common foe. 
Sometimes it is reinforced by religious cleavage, 
sometimes not; but wherever it is bitter it mars 
the smooth working of popular institutions. Occa- 
sionally it takes the form of a genial sentimentality 
of no great political significance, like that which 
would have caused the national emblem of Wales 
to be inserted in one of the quarters of the royal 
standard. In other places, notably in Austria, it 
has become so violent as to dislocate at times the 



32 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 16 

machinery of parliamentary government altogether, 
causing scenes of disorder more befitting the pas- 
sions of a mob than the counsels of a legislative as- 
sembly, and threatening even the stability of the 
state. The different races in such a case are striv- 
ing for objects that cannot be reconciled. So long 
as one of them aims at supremacy and another at 
equality no compromise acceptable to both is pos- 
sible; and the minority is absolutely unwilling to 
accept subordination because the majority so decrees. 
In short a truly public opinion on any matter 
touching the question of race cannot exist in a 
country torn asunder by antagonisms of that kind. 

16. Irreconcilables in Politics 

In countries with a popular or semi-popular 
form of government the conflict of races is the most 
obvious factor that interferes with the formation of 
a real public opinion, but it is not the only one. In 
several nations at the present day there are large 
bodies of irreconcilables who are unwilling for other 
reasons to abide by the decision of the majority on 
the most fundamental of all political questions, the 
form of government and the right of the existing 
authorities to rule. They submit, for the moment, 
because there is no immediate prospect of success- 
ful resistance, but so far as they are concerned no 
general or public opinion can be said to exist in the 
land. 

In his recent book on The France of Today, Pro- 
fessor Barrett Wendell has portrayed one aspect 
of this state of things. Not only is the monarchical 



§ 16] Irreconcilables in Politics 33 

minority irreconcilable, refusing to consider itself 
under any obligation to accept as final the verdict 
of the mass of the French people on the form of 
government, but, as he points out, the dominant 
majority is disinclined to conciliate that minority 
on any question or to take its views into account. 
Its attitude is rather one of repressive hostility. 
The majority, therefore, is not making an effort to 
create a true public opinion, in the sense in which 
we are using the term; and so long as both parties 
maintain such a relation, no opinion of that kind is 
possible. 

Examples of irreconcilables, always more or less 
bitter, may be found in the cases of the Irish Nation- 
alists, of the Clericals in Italy, of the Poles, Danes, 
and Alsatians in Germany, and of the many strug- 
gling races in the conglomerate of Austria-Hungary 
— to speak only of countries that have enjoyed for 
some time representative institutions. We have 
had in America also our own painful experience 
during the period of Reconstruction after the Civil 
War, when the white people of the states under 
carpet-bag rule may be fairly said to have been 
irreconcilable, although in all of those states they 
formed in fact the effective majority of the popu- 
lation. Until the period came to an end it was 
clearly a misnomer to speak of the administration 
of the southern states as government by public 
opinion. 

In a territory recently conquered, like Alsace- 
Lorraine after the Franco-German war, the presence 
of irreconcilables is natural; but they may also 
3 



34 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 17 

thrive in old communities if there are among the 
people deep lines of cleavage based upon race, 
religion, sharp historical conflicts, or upon radical 
changes due to social or economic ills that cannot 
be treated without political surgery. The dissen- 
sions may not touch the form of the government 
itself or the general right of the constituted authori- 
ties to rule. They may relate only to a particular 
policy which a fraction of the people regard as 
wholly inadmissible; yet in such a case, if the parties 
are evenly balanced enough to give to forcible re- 
sistance a fair chance of success, the struggle is 
liable to assume before long a revolutionary form. 
This was true of the quarrel with Charles I over 
ship-money and of the objection by the American 
colonies to being taxed by Parliament without their 
own consent. But even when there is no danger 
of an appeal to arms, the presence of a large body 
of men who are irreconcilable, on questions that 
arise frequently and unavoidably, undermines the 
foundation on which democracy is based, because on 
those questions public opinion, as we have defined 
it, and therefore the direction of political affairs by 
public opinion, is impossible. A community in 
which such a state of things is chronic is obviously 
not completely fitted for popular government. 

17. Homogeneity of Population a Condition of Public Opinion 

One essential condition, then, of public opinion 
is that the people should be homogeneous to such 
a point that the minority is willing to accept the 
decision of the majority on all questions that are 



§ 17] Need of Homogeneity 35 

normally expected to arise. It is, indeed, largely a 
perception of the need of homogeneity, as a basis for 
popular government and the public opinion on which 
it rests, that justifies democracies in resisting the 
influx in great numbers of a widely different race. 
Quite apart from any effect on the standard of life 
of laboring men, Americans and Australians feel 
that Asiatics cannot be assimilated so as to form 
an integral and indistinguishable part of the popu- 
lation. Mr. Bryce tells us that the excellence of 
popular government consists, not in its wisdom, 
but in its strength; this strength depends, however, 
on the fact that the people are so homogeneous that 
public opinion touches them all. 

Differences of race do not always prevent a people 
from being politically homogeneous; a fact abun- 
dantly proved by the experience of Switzerland, 
where three races, professing two creeds, are carry- 
ing on a highly successful democracy in perfect har- 
mony. Race is merely one of the many factors that 
tend to divide a people. The essential point is that 
all elements of the population should be capable of 
common aims and aspirations, should have a com- 
mon stock of political traditions, should be open to 
a ready interchange of ideas, and should be free 
from inherited prejudices that prevent mutual un- 
derstanding and sympathy. This is a matter which 
thoughtful Americans must ponder seriously. If 
the huge masses of immigrants coming yearly to 
the United States can be assimilated within a 
couple of generations so as to be an indistinguish- 
able part of the population, well and good; if not, 



36 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 18 

the peril to popular institutions is real, for without 
homogeneity a nation may be great, but it can hardly 
be a successful democracy. 

A community not homogeneous enough to have a 
public opinion on ordinary political questions, and 
hence ill adapted for popular institutions, might 
seem incapable of any government save one main- 
tained by force. But this is not necessarily true, 
because people who recognize their inability to 
agree and dread the danger of civil strife may 
submit willingly to a ruler who will not allow any 
part of his subjects to oppress the rest. A monarch 
reigning over a mixed people, and not a bigot, tends 
to be cosmopolitan in his sympathies, to have some 
regard for all classes of his subjects. On the other 
hand religious intolerance and racial antipathy, the 
horror of the man with an unfamiliar form of wor- 
ship, the instinctive dislike of the man who speaks 
a different tongue or pronounces his words in a 
strange way, usually increase as one descends in the 
social scale. The result is that deep-seated diver- 
gencies of this kind not only unfit a country for 
popular government, but an attempt to introduce 
it tends to magnify them. The strife of races has 
increased in the Austrian Empire with the growth 
of representative assemblies, and the Irish demand 
for Home Rule became louder with each extension 
of the suffrage. 

18. Another Condition is Freedom of Expressing Dissent 

This brings us to another factor essential to the 
existence of a public opinion, the freedom of the 



§ 18] Freedom of Expressing Dissent 37 

minority to propagate their views by all fair and 
peaceable means. Without the right of persuasion 
the minority would not be satisfied that the policy 
of the government embodied the deliberate wishes 
of a majority, and therefore expressed a real public 
opinion to which they were bound to submit. In a 
modern popular government, where the whole people 
are never within reach of a man's voice, where the 
chief difficulty consists less in making them weigh 
argument than in making them listen to argument 
at all, the right of persuasion involves freedom of 
speech, of publication, and of organization. Hence 
we find these matters wholly free in countries that 
have enjoyed popular government for any consider- 
able length of time. Within the limits of a possible 
public opinion — that is, within the sphere where it 
is conceivable that the majority might be convinced 
and the minority might willingly submit — democ- 
racy does not suppress utterances repugnant to it, 
although it often ignores them. 1 It is partly, as Mr. 
Bryce points out, this very freedom of discussion 
that causes what he calls the fatalism of the mul- 
titude, in contradistinction to the tyranny of the 
majority — a fatalism which, he tells us, helps the 
action of opinion as a governing power, enabling it 
to prevail more swiftly and to acquire a solidity 
that strengthens the whole body politic. 2 

1 While this condition is essential in popular governments, it is by- 
no means confined to them. Tarde (Lcs Transformations du Pouvoir, 
p. 183) remarks that the Roman Empire was greater than all others 
because it opened a field for the competition of the ideas of all the 
little nations comprised within its borders. 

2 American Commonwealth, Ed. of 1910, Chap. Ixxxv. 



38 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 18 

Sanguine enthusiasts for democracy are inclined 
not only to regard it as a panacea for all ills, but also 
to believe that it possesses an infallible power to 
create the conditions needed for its own successful 
operation. They are apt to urge, as the first step 
in a country hitherto despotically ruled, the creation 
of a popular representative assembly, assuming that 
practice in the art of self-government will rapidly 
develop the qualities essential for a genuine public 
opinion. But to throw a child suddenly into deep 
water and expect him to teach himself to keep afloat 
is as irrational as to forbid him to enter the water 
until he has learned to swim. Preparation and 
practice must go on together gradually; and the 
preparation consists largely in the growth of political 
homogeneity and of the interchange of ideas. Eng- 
land was prepared for self-government by the Nor- 
man and Angevin kings who forced upon the people 
a common nationality and a common law, while 
the habit of discussing public affairs was well estab- 
lished long before Parliament acquired supremacy. 
Even in a highly advanced state of civilization a 
representative assembly, set up before the commu- 
nity is capable of a real public opinion, is liable, if 
not a mere sham, to result for a time in the oppres- 
sive rule of a class, — as happened in Prussia for 
the dozen years after the convulsions of 1848 — 
or to develop corruption, such as was used to work 
the parliamentary form of government in France 
under Louis Philippe. For that reason it is un- 
necessary to shed too many tears over the present 
condition of the Russian Douma. The important 



§ 18] Freedom of Expressing Dissent 39 

thing for the moment is not that it should be fairly 
representative, but that it should survive. So long 
as it exists at all, with a few spokesmen for the 
opposition, it is paving the way for popular insti- 
tutions. Those men cannot be effectively muzzled 
within its walls, their speeches are certain in time 
to be allowed a publicity that will entail freedom of 
discussion outside, and when the country has come 
to the point of forming opinions that are truly public 
they will find an utterance that cannot be disre- 
garded. 

Freedom of expressing dissent includes liberty of 
organization, and in order that this may be com- 
pletely effective it must not be confined to purely 
political objects, but must become a part of the 
popular customs, covering all matters in which 
people are interested; a point which France, with 
all her democratic theories, did not reach in anything 
like its fulness until more than a century after the 
Revolution. But while freedom of organization is 
necessary for the formation of a true public opinion, 
if carried too far it is likely to falsify that very 
public opinion itself, as we shall have occasion to 
observe in discussing political parties. Rousseau 
felt the danger so strongly as to assert that a com- 
munity in which parties or factions exist is incapable 
of a common will, because under the influence of 
such bodies a man does not form his own opinions 
freely. The last century has certainly been marked 
by an apparent increase in the power of corporate, 
as compared with personal, motives. A hundred 
years ago democratic theories were individualistic. 



40 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 18 

They treated the state as a sum of equal and inde- 
pendent units. Now we have learned that man is 
a social being, not only in Aristotle's sense, that he 
is constrained by his nature to be a member of a 
state, but also in the broader sense that he is bound 
by subtle ties to other and smaller groups of persons 
within the state. We have learned to recognize 
this; and what is more, with the ease of organiza- 
tion fostered by modern conditions, the number, 
the complexity, and the aggregate strength of such 
ties has increased. No one can have observed 
social life carefully, under any aspect, without 
seeing that cooperative interests have in some 
measure replaced personal ones; that in its conscious 
spirit western civilization has become less individ- 
ualistic, more highly organized, or, if you will, more 
socialistic. This is among the dominant notes of 
our time, and while the change is for the better, 
because it means greater devotion to something 
higher than purely personal objects, that very fact, 
whether the body be a bank, a railroad company or 
a trade union, may cover with a gilding of altruism 
what is after all only cooperative selfishness. 



CHAPTER IV 

QUESTIONS TO WHICH PUBLIC OPINION CAN APPLY 

19. Limits Imposed by the Necessity that the Opinion 
be Public 

The principle that a true public opinion cannot 
exist unless the minority feel bound to acquiesce 
in the decision of the majority not only renders 
government by public opinion imperfect, or even 
impossible, in some countries, but also limits every- 
where the subjects to which it can apply. We see 
this clearly in the case of religion. Everyone of 
Western European stock feels today that the state 
ought not to meddle with his religious convictions. 
The sharp distinction in the Middle Ages between 
the spiritual and temporal powers, with the Pope 
and his hierarchy directing one, and the Emperor 
or King and his vassals conducting the other, laid 
the basis for a distinction between ecclesiastical 
and political functions which bore fruit after diver- 
gencies of creed became profound and widespread. 
The immediate effect of the Reformation in most 
countries was an attempt on the part of the govern- 
ment to enforce religious uniformity, but when this 
failed*, as it did in the more progressive nations, the 
inevitable secondary effect was toleration. 

Nor was it in spiritual freedom alone that men 
gained by the change, for the elimination from poli- 

41 



42 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 19 

tics of a subject on which the minority could not 
conscientiously submit to the decision of the majority 
removed a serious obstacle to popular government 
— that is, to the decision of all political questions 
by an opinion which is really public. It is safe to 
say that if any nation of European origin, with a 
popular form of government, were now to forbid a 
part of the citizens to worship according to their 
consciences, those men would regard the order as 
beyond the sphere where they were under a moral 
obligation to obey. A similar feeling would cer- 
tainly be caused by the proscription of political 
opponents, by laws, for example, which sent them 
to the scaffold or into exile. It might be provoked 
by extreme legislation on other subjects, such as 
the relations of parents and children or a general 
attack on the right to private property. 

G. Lowes Dickinson states this matter lucidly. 
"Government by the majority," he says, "is a con- 
venient means of conducting national affairs, where 
and in so far as there is a basis of general agreement 
deeper and more persistent than the variations of 
surface opinion ; but as soon as a really fundamental 
point is touched, as soon as a primary instinct, 
whether of self-preservation or of justice, begins to 
be seriously and continuously outraged, the demo- 
cratic convention gives way. No minority, for ex- 
ample, even in a compact modern state, either would 
or ought to submit to a decision of the majority to 
prohibit the exercise of their religion. Such a deci- 
sion could only be carried into effect by force, sub- 
ject to the contingency of armed rebellion; and 



§ 19] Limits of Opinion that is Public 43 

orderly government would dissolve into veiled or 
open civil war. ... It is the presupposition of 
all democratic government that certain principles, 
tacitly understood if not precisely formulated, will 
in practice be observed by any party that may be 
in power. . . . And, in my opinion, the realization 
of the political ideal of the extremer Socialists, and 
the attempt by that particular method to effect a 
social revolution, without any fair consideration for 
the claims of owners of property, would simply 
result in the collapse of the whole convention on 
which the possibility of government depends." 1 

Graham Wallas, who is moved by very different 
sympathies, is probably right in thinking that 
property in such a case would resort, not to resist- 
ance by force, but to corrupting the electorate. To 
quote his words: "Popular election, it is said, may 
work fairly well as long as those questions are not 
raised which cause the holders of wealth and indus- 
trial power to make full use of their opportunities. 
But if the rich people in any modern state thought 
it worth their while, in order to secure a tariff, or 
legalize a trust, or oppose a confiscatory tax, to 
subscribe a third of their income to a political fund, 
no Corrupt Practices Act yet invented would prevent 
them from spending it. If they did so, there is so 
much skill to be bought, and the art of using skill 
for the production of emotion and opinion has so 
advanced, that the whole condition of political con- 
tests would be changed for the future." 2 If either 

1 The Development of Parliament during the Nineteenth Century, pp. 
161, 162. 2 Human Nature in Politics, p. 5. 



44 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 20 

of these methods of resistance were adopted, the 
result, for a time at least, would be a destruction 
or demoralization of popular government, which 
would thereby cease to exist altogether or become, 
so far as the obnoxious subjects are concerned, a 
hollow sham. 

Even in the most firmly established democracies 
there are questions touching a chord of feeling so 
deep that the minority would not voluntarily sub- 
mit to the decision of the majority. To such 
matters a genuine public opinion cannot apply, 
and they lie, therefore, beyond the province of pop- 
ular government. What these matters are cannot 
be determined by any universal formula, because 
they vary from place to place and from time to time; 
but it is the part of wise statesmanship to recog- 
nize them and avoid them if possible. Although in 
any nation there may come periods of revolutionary 
change when questions of this kind force themselves 
to the front, yet we must remember that to agitate 
needlessly subjects lying beyond the range of a 
true public opinion tends to undermine the founda- 
tion of popular institutions. A successful democracy 
which pursues its course without shocks, which 
works without violence and without oppression, 
must be one where the limits of a possible public 
opinion are generally understood and observed. 

20. Benefit of a Written Constitution 

We may remark in this connection that one of 
the merits of a written constitution, imposing strict 
limitations on legislative authority, consists in lay- 



§ 21] Limits of Genuine Opinion 45 

ing down in definite terms the "presupposition of 
all democratic government," in the words of Mr. 
Dickinson, "that certain principles . . . will in 
practice be observed by any party that may be in 
power." A constitution, if too difficult to amend, 
may in time cease to be in accord with those prin- 
ciples; it may not keep pace with the change in 
political conditions. Or if, on the other hand, it 
is too elaborate, it may include matters properly 
within the domain of ordinary public opinion, 
where the views of the majority ought to prevail; 
and in that case it may defeat its own object, by 
obscuring the distinction it ought to make clear. 
But errors so committed do not disprove the benefit 
to be gained by an authoritative statement of the 
limits beyond which the prevalent opinion ought 
not normally to be decisive. Among a people 
thoroughly trained in the difficult art of self-govern- 
ment the same result can, of course, be reached by 
mutual forbearance without a written constitution; 
nor is this the sole object of such a document, but 
it is certainly one of its chief advantages. 

21. Limits Imposed by the Nature of Opinion 

Beside the limits placed upon the subjects to 
which public opinion can apply by the fact that it 
must be public, there are others imposed by the 
fact that it must be a real opinion. The people of 
every homogeneous political community, however 
barbarous, are capable of a true opinion on some 
subjects; and no people, however civilized, are 
capable of forming real opinions on all subjects. 

I 



46 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 22 

Whether the opinion of the great mass of citizens is 
the wisest or not, lies beyond the scope of our present 
inquiry, for we are considering not the merits and 
defects of popular government, but the conditions 
under which it can be carried on. Its object being 
to give effect to public opinion, it can evidently 
exist only where such an opinion is possible in regard 
to a considerable number of matters. 

We have seen that a true public opinion can exist 
on a question involving apparent harmony or con- 
tradiction with settled convictions; and that it can 
also be formed where the bulk of the people are 
in a position to determine of their own knowledge 
or by weighing evidence a substantial part of the 
facts required for a rational decision. The first of 
these conditions is true of great moral issues, of 
questions of fundamental policy which require little 
knowledge of particular facts. In such cases the 
popular judgment is often remarkably sound and 
not infrequently generous, that is, contrary, to obvi- 
ous material interests. The second condition is 
fulfilled where the essential facts are matters of 
common knowledge from everyday experience, or 
where they have been so much discussed that 
familiarity with them has been generally diffused. 
When it is not fulfilled, and this is often the case 
with new questions, especially where much detail is 
involved, no real public opinion is possible. 

22. Knowledge of Facts Increasingly Difficult 

Now the rapid evolution of democracy during the 
last century, and the extension of the suffrage to 



§ 22] Facts Increasingly Difficult 47 

larger and larger masses of men, would seem to 
imply that the people were becoming ever more 
capable of mastering the facts needed for an opinion 
on public matters, and hence better fitted to play 
a direct part in deciding the questions of the day. 
No doubt they are, as a rule, far better educated, 
both by the common schools and by political experi- 
ence; but at the same time it is more difficult for 
anyone to become familiar with all the facts required 
for the solution of current problems. With the 
accumulation of human knowledge, with the growth 
of man's control over the forces of nature, with the 
greater complexity of modern transactions and of 
modern society, the amount of information needed 
to form an intelligent opinion upon public affairs 
has been constantly increasing. It has been sug- 
gested, as an explanation of the selection of adminis- 
trative bodies in Athens by lot, that any ordinary 
Athenian citizen was competent to judge whether 
a trireme was seaworthy and properly provided 
with oars, sails, arms and provisions. 1 But the 
ordinary man today, or the ordinary member of 
Congress or of Parliament, is wholly unable by his 
own unaided observation to form an opinion of any 
value on the condition of the hull, machinery, or 
armament of a battleship. In the same way any 
sensible Yankee farmer who found himself two hun- 
dred years ago on a committee intrusted with the 
care of the schools in his town might be capable 
of knowing whether the little red schoolhouse was 
properly built and whether the teacher was quali- 

1 Headlam, Use of the Lot in Athens, p. 161. 



48 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 22 

fied to teach the three R's; while the best equipped 
member of a school board in a large city at the present 
time is unfit for his office if he attempts to decide 
questions either of schoolhouse construction or of 
education without the aid of expert advice. 

It will, of course, be pointed out that if the on- 
ward march of natural science and mechanical inven- 
tion has rendered the problems of modern life more 
complex, it has also enlarged vastly the means of 
diffusing information. We shall be referred to the 
railroad, the telegraph, and above all to the daily 
press. We shall be told that the greater rapidity, 
ease, and cheapness of travel and communication 
have promoted an interchange of ideas and informa- 
tion far more extensive than ever before; that the 
newspapers place within the reach of everyone at a 
trifling cost a daily bulletin of the current events. 
All that is perfectly true, but the question is whether 
these agencies are keeping pace with the grow- 
ing complexity of affairs. It may be doubted, for 
example, whether the newspapers, although more 
voluminous than they were formerly, exhibit on the 
whole greater enterprise and sincerity than they did 
a generation ago in laying before their readers the 
facts needed for an intelligent and impartial opinion 
on public matters; and yet the progress of science, 
of the arts and of business, during that period has 
complicated those matters enormously. 

That the greater facility of obtaining information 
at the present day has not in business affairs kept 
pace with the growing complexity of modern life, 
in the sense of enabling a man to deal as readily 



§ 22] Facts Increasingly Difficult 49 

with problems of all kinds, may be surmised from the 
increasing specialization of occupations. Seventy 
years ago a merchant in America was deemed fit to 
manage a factory or a railroad, but now these pur- 
suits have become professions demanding special 
knowledge and experience. The process has been 
going on in a greater or less degree throughout the in- 
dustrial world, and indeed in all fields of activity and of 
thought. Anyone past middle life can cite instances 
of it in subjects with which he has been brought into 
contact. The progress of specialization means 
that a man of good intelligence and education, with 
all the sources of general information within his 
reach, is less competent than he was formerly to 
decide the questions that arise in a vocation, not 
his own, with which he has had no particular famil- 
iarity. If this is true of business and of the other 
concerns of private life, it may not be less true of 
public affairs, for public work has not only shared 
the growing complexity of all modern life, but the 
government has been constantly expanding its 
sphere of operation by assuming new and delicate 
functions. 

It is not improbable, therefore, that the amount 
of knowledge needed for the administration of public 
affairs is increasing more rapidly than the diffusion 
of such knowledge, and that this is lessening the 
capacity of the ordinary citizen to form an opinion 
of his own on the various matters that arise in 
conducting the government. If so, the range of 
questions about which the public cannot form a 
real opinion tends to enlarge, or at least does not 
4 



50 The Nature of Public Opinion [§ 23 

diminish. This is particularly true where the special 
knowledge of experts is involved, because it is not 
easy for the community at large to weigh expert 
opinion. Few things are, in fact, more difficult, or 
require greater experience; and yet the number of 
questions on which the advice of experts is indis- 
pensable grows with every advance in technical 
knowledge and mechanical invention. 

23. Examples 

That there are limits to the subjects on which a 
genuine opinion can be formed by the public will 
hardly be denied; and it will be readily admitted 
by anyone who asks himself candidly upon how 
many of the current political questions, national, 
state, and municipal, he feels competent to express 
a personal opinion of any real value, without an 
investigation that requires more time than he can 
spare. Again we are met by the impossibility of 
laying down general formulas to determine when a 
public opinion can and when it cannot exist. A few 
suggestions may, however, be ventured about the 
obstacles presented by different classes of matters. 
Owing to the difficulty of mastering the facts required 
for an intelligent decision, the people are, as a rule, 
more capable of forming an opinion on a general 
principle than of applying it to a concrete case, 
more competent to appreciate the policy of legisla- 
tion than the wisdom of a particular statute, better 
judges of grievances than of the choice of remedies. 1 

On account of the same difficulty of becoming 

1 Cf. Lewis, Influence of Authority, chap, vi, pp. 173, 174. 



§ 23] Examples 51 

familiar with the facts, the information needed to 
decide a question involving a considerable amount of 
detailed knowledge is more likely to be possessed 
by the people of a small community than of a large 
one. It is more likely to be possessed by all the 
people when the question touches an interest in 
which they are all engaged than when it touches 
one in which only a part of them are directly inter- 
ested. A farming country is more likely to under- 
stand agricultural questions, a small community 
devoted wholly to the manufacture of shoes is more 
likely to be familiar with the needs of that trade, 
than the people of a huge metropolis are to grasp 
the problems of any particular industry. In the 
former cases the opinion may be more prejudiced, 
but it will probably be more intelligent. In the 
great city, if the people are less biased, they are also 
less competent to form any real opinion at all. It 
follows that, on a question involving a considerable 
amount of detailed knowledge, a true public opinion 
is more likely to exist in a rural district or a small 
town than in a large city where occupations are 
of necessity more diversified; more likely to exist 
in a local community than in a state; more likely 
to exist in a state than in the whole nation. 

The obstacle to the formation of a public opinion 
arising from the difficulty of mastering the facts 
occurs in many kinds of special legislation; in some 
cases, for example, of grants of public franchises. 
The people may well have a decided opinion upon 
the general principles that ought to govern the con- 
ferring or withholding of such privileges and yet 



52 The Nature of Public Opinion [§23 

be quite unable to determine whether the principles 
have been observed in any particular instance. The 
act or grant may seem needlessly liberal or the 
reverse, when in reality it is not so, especially if 
people are inclined to be suspicious of the motives 
of legislators. It is, in fact, the difficulty of forming 
an opinion of any value on such matters, without 
very careful study, that has given unscrupulous 
legislators a free hand and rendered possible many 
cases of improper grants of privileges. Unfortu- 
nately this subject, where a real public opinion is 
least likely to exist, is the very one in which the 
American representative system has proved most 
disappointing. 

The difficulty of forming a public opinion is pecu- 
liarly great also where an act is the result of a com- 
promise. The word has an evil sound, and rightly 
so, when it means a concession to selfish interests or 
sinister motives. But it has also a good side, where 
it signifies a middle path between extreme views 
or the surmounting of serious objections, for com- 
promise in the best sense is the tap root of enduring 
legislation. In that case a compromise measure may 
in reality be in close accord with what the opinion 
of the people would be if they understood the whole 
situation, and yet popular distrust and the opposi- 
tion of extremists on both sides may easily con- 
demn it in public estimation. This is one of many 
cases where inability to learn the facts may make a 
genuine public opinion impossible and an apparent 
one misleading. 



§ 24] Uncertainty of Public Opinion 53 



24. Difficulty in Foretelling whether a Public Opinion will 
be Formed 

While we may indicate the limits of a possible 
public opinion in general terms, it is not always 
self-evident whether or not the conditions obtain 
in a particular case. We have seen that the public 
can form an opinion when a question has been so 
much discussed that familiarity with it is widely 
diffused; and that this is more likely to be true of 
a general principle than of a concrete application 
involving complex facts. But the shrewdest prophet 
cannot always foretell when the public will care 
enough about a subject to discuss it fully. Some- 
times their interest is unexpectedly keen. This is 
often true of personal questions, for the mass of 
mankind has more sympathy with the fortunes of 
an individual than with the fate of a principle, and 
hence are often better qualified to select a man for 
office than to pass judgment on his measures. One 
thing is clear: public interest can rarely be stimu- 
lated artificially. No device except a popular 
assembly has ever been invented whereby the mass 
of the people can be made to expend considerable 
effort on mastering facts that do not touch their 
imagination or affect closely their daily lives. While, 
therefore, they may occasionally pay an unusual 
amount of attention to some particular matter, a 
political system wisely framed will refer to public 
opinion those questions alone on which such an 
opinion can reasonably be expected to exist. 

The fact that on many of the questions arising 



54 The Nature of Public Opinion [§24 

in the administration of a modern state no true 
public opinion is possible does not mean that with 
such questions popular government has no concern, 
or that public opinion cannot control their determi- 
nation. The presence of such matters involves no 
condemnation of democracy, but a consideration of 
its mode of operation. It demands a careful study 
of the subjects to which public opinion is directly 
applicable, and the regulation of others by one 
of the indirect popular methods to be described 
hereafter. 



Part II 

The Function of Parties 



Part II 

The Function of Parties 



CHAPTER V 

ADVERTISEMENT AND BROKERAGE 

25- Mobility of Modern Life 

Democracy, as we see it at the present day, means 
many things. They may not all be of necessity in- 
terdependent or even consistent with one another, 
but we find them linked together in the civilization 
in which we live. In its political aspect democracy 
means popular government, the exercise of power 
by the mass of the people. In its social aspect it 
means equality of opportunity, which was expressed 
by Napoleon in the phrase "la carrier e ouverte au 
talens" and by Pasteur, in a loftier vein, when he 
said that it enabled every man to put forth his 
utmost effort. The enlarged opportunity is fur- 
nished by a greater mobility, due in part to the 
fact that status and property, which were the 
pillars of an earlier society, have been to a great 
extent replaced by contract and credit; and the 
change in social conditions which this implies has 
been accelerated in the last hundred years by the 
advance in mechanical inventions. With the break- 
ing up of former industrial methods, with the huge 

57 



58 The Function of Parties [§ 26 

accumulation of movable capital seeking invest- 
ment, with the vast growth in the means of distrib- 
uting products and spreading information, society 
has lost its rigidity and become far more fluid than 
of old. 

With the increase of opportunity the force of 
habit has declined. Men do not walk in the beaten 
track so much as they did in the days of our great 
grandfathers, but turn aside more freely into new 
paths. They are less addicted to living all their 
lives in the same house, dealing at the same shop 
or with the same people, buying the same wares 
and reading the same newspaper. People are more 
easily brought to change these things; while at the 
same time it has become more than ever for the inter- 
est of tradesmen to induce them to make the change, 
because the declining margin of profit has taught 
men the necessity of increasing the volume of their 
business, of striving to conduct their affairs on a larger 
scale. It has therefore become far easier and more 
profitable than in the past, by catching the attention, 
to win the patronage of great numbers of people. 

26. The Age of Advertisement 

In short, we live in an age of advertisement. 
Lipton's teas, Sapolio, and a hundred other things, 
good, bad, and indifferent, force themselves upon 
you from the front page of your newspaper at 
breakfast, from the calendar and the blotting pad 
on your desk. They glare at you in the street cars 
and from the house tops. They hide the empty 
lots in the city and the landscape from the window 



§ 26] The Age of Advertisement 59 

of the railroad train. Advertisement as an art has 
been brought to a high state of efficiency and yields 
great rewards to those who understand its mys- 
teries. In its lower forms it tends to sensationalism 
in its effort to catch the eye or ear. The profits of 
the daily press are based today, not on the payments 
of the subscribers, but on the advertisements; and 
as these depend on the circulation, there is a ten- 
dency on the part of the managers to lower the price 
of the newspaper, to care less for the real merits of 
the contents, for the solidity of the editorials, for the 
accuracy and value of the news, and more for the 
power of captivating the multitude. 

Even in regions far removed from trade, adver- 
tisement is a potent, if not a necessary, agency. The 
most dignified of our institutions, our universities, 
have felt constrained to resort to it; not blatantly, 
but in insidious and appropriate ways. Moreover, 
for anyone who desires to advocate a new idea, the 
difficulty is not so much to convince as to get a 
hearing, not so much to be judged fairly as to be 
judged at all. The most effective methods of reach- 
ing that goal are to say something sensational and 
startling, or to hold a post that in itself attracts 
attention. This is one of the growing advantages of 
official position of any kind, because the occupant, 
being prominent by virtue of his office, is in the 
public eye and is listened to by a large audience. 
Uttered by one in high office, platitudes become 
oracular. 



60 The Function of Parties [§27 

27. The Age of Brokers 

The same conditions that have caused the great 
development of advertising, where the mass of the 
public must be reached, have fostered another 
agency in the case of transactions which affect a 
smaller class of persons. The mobility of capital, 
with the range of unknown individuals that may 
want to purchase what others are ready to sell, 
has evolved a new profession whose function consists 
in bringing buyer and seller together. Its members 
may affect a trade between single individuals, or 
they may work on a larger scale, for success in the 
huge industrial concerns of our time requires capital, 
furnished in the main by a class of investors beyond 
the reach of ordinary advertisement and attracted 
only by persons in whom they have confidence. 
One of the most lucrative occupations at the pres- 
ent day is that of bankers or brokers with a wide 
clientele, who can persuade many people to embark 
in enterprises; and the business yields enormous 
profits because it is indispensable in large financial 
transactions. On all scales, therefore, large and small, 
from the commercial traveller and the man who 
negotiates the sale of a single plot of land, to the 
great banking house which places millions of bonds 
or prevails upon the security holders of a gigantic 
railroad to consent to a reorganization, the world is 
dependent on the agency of brokers far more than 
ever before. In fact we live in an age of brokers. 



§ 28] Politicians as Brokers 61 

28. Politicians as Brokers 

In politics the extension of the suffrage, coupled 
with the growth in population of the great nations, 
has had a similar effect; for the larger the number 
of individual minds concerned with public affairs 
the greater the difficulty of reaching an agreement, 
or in other words of forming and expressing opinions. 
If all men took a keen interest in public affairs, 
studied them laboriously, and met constantly in a 
popular assembly where they were debated and 
decided, there would be no need of other agencies 
to draw attention to political questions. But in a 
modern industrial democracy, where the bulk of the 
voters are more absorbed in earning their bread 
than in affairs of state, these conditions are not ful- 
filled, and in case no one made it his business to 
expound public questions or advocate a definite 
solution of them they would commonly go by default. 

Moreover, if all men after a short reflection came ' 
to the same conclusion popular government would 
be plain sailing; or if the majority tended to think 
precisely alike the matter would be simple enough. 
But in fact all men, or even the majority of men, 
who think for themselves do not spontaneously 
reach identical conclusions. Their views range 
naturally over the whole gamut of possible solutions, 
and they can unite for action only by the sacrifice 
of a portion of their ideas. The process of forming 
public opinion involves, therefore, bringing men 
together in masses on some middle ground where 
they can combine to carry out a common policy. 



62 The Function of Parties [§ m 

In short, it requires a species of brokerage, and one 
of the functions of politicians is that of brokers. 
Perhaps it is their most universal function in a 
democracy, because, in the caustic language of Sir 
Henry Maine, the mincing of political power into 
very small morsels naturally makes the wire puller 
the leader. 1 The number of statesmen who strive 
to carry into effect a personal policy of their own 
on any large scale by leading and educating the com- 
munity is very small. By far the greater part of 
the work done by public men consists in ascertain- 
ing what the people, or some fraction of the people, 
want; or, to put it in a less invidious way, in finding 
out how far the ideas which they hold themselves 
are shared by the bulk of the voters, how far the 
subjects in which they are interested are ripe for 
treatment, and in what way they can be popularly 
treated. It is, indeed, almost a truism to say that 
the success of a public man depends very much on 
his ability to gauge public sentiment. For this pur- 
pose the professional politician — meaning thereby 
not the man who makes a living out of politics, but 
one who devotes a considerable part of his life to it 
— has a great advantage over the amateur; and that 
explains no small part of the ineffectiveness of many 
reformers in America. 

It is by no means always easy to distinguish the 
leader from the broker, the statesman who really 
guides the nation from the one who perceives and 
gives expression to a general sentiment as yet inar- 
ticulate. We are all prone to admire and follow the 

1 Popular Government, pp. 29, 30. 



§ 28] Politicians as Brokers 63 

man who proclaims a principle that we have felt 
vaguely but never formulated; and on the other 
hand we may fail to recognize the influence of one 
who leads us cautiously. Throughout the earlier 
part of his administration President Lincoln was 
thought by many ardent people to be waiting for 
an impulse from outside, to be merely watching the 
trend of public sentiment and following it; but it 
is now generally admitted that he matured his own 
plans, led the people quietly to his own standpoint, 
and acted as soon as they were ready to support 
him. 

To say that a species of brokerage forms a large 
part of the work of men in public life is not neces- 
sarily a condemnation. It does not mean that they 
are habitually insincere or adopt lines of policy in 
the righteousness of which they have no faith them- 
selves. Some compromises they make, no doubt, 
but every leader must do that. No one can carry 
measures in exactly the form he would prefer. If 
he could, they would express no opinion but his 
own, and in most cases that would be defective. It 
may be assumed that the honest man in public life, 
when he listens for and interprets the whispers of 
popular sentiment, adopts only those suggestions 
that approve themselves to his own conscience. In 
doing so he is performing a service, not, indeed, of 
the highest grade in statesmanship, but one essen- 
tial to popular government — that of crystallizing 
a mass of shapeless ideas into the general public 
opinion required for constructive legislation and 
political action. In his History of the Relation 



64 The Function of Parties [§29 

between Law and Opinion in England, Professor Dicey 
has shown how fully English statesmen of both 
parties have acted in accord with the prevail- 
ing public opinion of the day. This was partly 
because they shared that opinion, partly because 
they followed it, and only to a very small extent 
because they created it. 

In short the function of the broker is as needful 
for political as for commercial life, as proper and 
as honorable. The really serious evil comes when 
the brokerage is not confined to formulating public 
opinion, but degenerates into a traffic in public 
measures without regard to any public opinion on 
the measures themselves, or into a traffic in private 
legislation and in appointments to public office. It 
is these last things that have brought politics in 
America into discredit. It is in these that the boss 
plies his trade. He is essentially a broker, but a 
broker who deals in private benefits, not in public 
opinion. 

29. Parties the Means by which Brokerage is Conducted 

If politicians are largely brokers, party is the 
chief instrument with which they work. The evolu- 
tion of popular government has made political par- 
ties a permanent phenomenon in public life, and 
while many have denounced them, and many more 
have used them, a few speculative thinkers have 
sought to account for them. Their existence has 
been ascribed to several causes mainly of a psycho- 
logical or economic nature. Rohmer, for example, 
an ingenious writer of the middle of the last cen- 



§ 29] The Cause of Parties 65 

tury, attributed them to natural diversities of tem- 
perament corresponding to the different states of 
maturity in man from youth to old age. 1 Youths, 
and men who retain throughout their lives a youth- 
ful spirit, are, he says, by nature, radical. Young 
men are naturally liberal; middle-aged men con- 
servative; and old men absolutist and reactionary. 
More recent writers have ascribed the political parties 
to a conflict of interest between the different forms 
of property, such as land and movable capital ; or 
traced them to the forces that make for indi- 
vidualism and for cohesion. Gabriel Tarde sought 
them chiefly in the contrast between the tendencies 
to imitate traditional customs and to imitate new 
fashions 2 ; while Sir Henry Maine looked for their 
origin in the primitive combativeness of mankind. 3 
Most of these writers, and especially those mentioned 
first, were, like all political philosophers, much af- 
fected by the conditions prevailing at the time in 
their own country, and their theories are mainly an 
endeavor to explain those conditions. We may ob- 
serve, also, that in most cases the explanation is based 
upon the subject matter or principle on which the 
parties are divided, not upon any inherent necessity 
in the working of democracy on a large scale. 

Looking at the present state of affairs in England 
and America, the two large nations where popular 
government has run a free course for the greatest 
length of time, we are justified in saying that the 

1 Lehre von den Politischen Parteien. Summarized in Beutschli's 
Charakter und Geist der Politischen Parteien. 

2 Les Transformations du Pouvoir, pp. 143, 144. 
8 Popular Government, p. 31. 

5 



66 The Function of Parties [§ 29 

existence of parties is not mainly due to differ- 
ences of temperament, to conflicting interests, or to 
the basic forces that create variations of opinion 
and emotion in mankind, but that they are rather 
agencies whereby public attention is brought to a 
focus on certain questions that must be decided. 
They have become instruments for carrying on 
popular government by concentrating opinion. 
Their function is to make the candidates and issues 
known to the public and to draw people together in 
large masses, so that they can speak with a united 
voice, instead of uttering an unintelligible babel of 
discordant cries. In short, their service in politics 
is largely advertisement and brokerage. 

In a small community where people can all meet 
together, or in an aristocracy so limited that the 
members know one another, such a service is much 
less needed. Under those conditions parties would 
probably exist only while there was a sharp issue 
to divide them. They would fulfil, in a way they 
have long ceased to do, Burke's definition of a 
party as a body of men united for promoting by 
their joint endeavors the national interest upon 
some particular principle in which they are all 
agreed, and they would fade away when the issue 
was definitely settled. This actually happened in 
the United States during the "Era of Good Feeling" 
in Monroe's administration. In England also during 
the eighteenth century, and until the Reform Act 
of 1832, the parties were constantly tending to break 
up or degenerate into mere personal intrigues, a 
state of things that makes the political history of 



§ 30] The Means of Concerted Action 67 

the time very hard to follow. Whereas, with the 
extension of the suffrage and the growth of the elec- 
torate, parties in both countries have become per- 
manent, and, although in different ways, much more 
highly organized. 

30. Parties Enable the Voters to Act in Masses 

Perhaps this function of parties can be put more 
clearly in a different form. Some years ago a promi- 
nent reformer urged that it was the duty of every 
good citizen to go to the polls and vote for the man 
he thought most fit for an office, whether other 
people proposed to vote for him or not. A more 
certain method of insuring the victory of bad candi- 
dates could hardly be devised. One might as well 
say that every good soldier ought to fight as he 
thinks best without regard to the manoeuvres of the 
rest of the army. Savage warriors come nearer to 
that ideal than civilized troops. In personal con- 
duct, not involving cooperation, each man may do 
what seems best in his own eyes; but in any move- 
ment which can succeed only through concerted 
action, that is not wholly possible. As men do not 
spontaneously agree exactly, the harmony that is 
needed can be reached only by mutual concessions. 
Here the services of the broker, and in public affairs 
the services of the political leader as a broker, are 
called into play. Here also comes in the function of 
parties as a means of bringing about a workable 
accord. 

Independent expressions of opinion by all the 
citizens on the person to be elected would determine 



68 The Function of Parties [§ 30 

nothing. They might suggest the general trend of 
thought, but they would not as a rule result in a 
majority, or even in a very large minority, for any 
one man. Suppose, for example, that in a country 
where parties did not exist, every voter, without pre- 
vious consultation of any kind, were to write on a 
slip of paper the name of the man he preferred for 
chief magistrate. The slips when counted would 
usually give no idea of the real preference of the 
nation. Save in rare instances there would be no 
approach to a majority for any one man; and the 
name that received the largest number of votes 
might be abhorred by the vast majority of the 
people. Mr. X might have more votes than either 
A, B, C, or D, and yet the supporters of these four 
men, who comprise, let us say, three-quarters of 
the citizens, might prefer any one of the four to X. 
That is the reason that many advocates of pro- 
portional representation urge the adoption of the 
preferential ballot; and it is one of the reasons why 
the direct primaries established by law in many of 
our states often are, and must be, preceded by private 
meetings or conventions which designate candidates, 
or by an expensive campaign on the part of the 
aspirant himself. 

In the case of measures this is certainly not less 
clear. Suppose each member of a protectionist 
Congress were asked to submit, without consulta- 
tion, a draft of a tariff. It would no doubt be 
obvious that a large majority desired protection in 
some form, and yet a plan of a tariff for revenue 
only, being simpler, might be sent in by more mem- 



§ 31] Parties Frame the Issues 69 

bers than any particular protective schedule. In 
fact it is not improbable that no two schedules 
drawn up by protectionists would be precisely alike. 
It is evident, therefore, that collective opinion can 
be ascertained only by submitting a definite propo- 
sition and taking a vote upon it. In short any body 
of men, be it a board of directors, a legislative 
assembly, a mass meeting, or the electorate as a 
whole, can express itself intelligently only by answer- 
ing "Yes" or "No" to a question submitted to it; 
or if, as in the case of most elections, the matter is 
to be determined by plurality, it can only select one 
from a list of candidates presented to it. 

31- Parties Frame the Issues for Popular Decision 

If then any large body of men can express itself 
only by voting "Yes" or "No" on a question sub- 
mitted to it, someone must frame the question or 
present the candidate. In a body of moderate size 
this can be done by individuals, but in a very large 
body a fair chance of success can be obtained only 
by insuring a considerable support in advance, and 
hence concerted action is indispensable. Therein 
lies the main utility of parties in a popular govern- 
ment. It is their business to frame the issues on 
which the people are called upon to give an opinion, 
and to nominate the candidates among whom the 
voters make their selection. No doubt they exer- 
cise other powers, some good and some bad. In the 
United States they have been highly active in dis- 
tributing among their adherents offices that ought 
to have no party character — an abuse as yet 



70 The Function of Parties [§ 31 

checked only in part by the reform of the civil 
service. To some extent also, as Professor Henry 
Jones Ford pointed out years ago, they help to bring 
into harmony the branches of our government that 
were made wholly independent by the Constitution. 1 
But it would seem that their essential function in 
any democracy, and the true reason for their exist- 
ence, is bringing public opinion to a focus and fram- 
ing issues for the popular verdict. Their service is 
like that of the counsel who draw the pleadings 
and argue the case for the jury. In performing it 
they are exposed to the temptations that beset mem- 
bers of the bar, without the strong professional safe- 
guards which restrain abuse; but it must not be 
forgotten, also, that they are open to the exaggerated 
criticism which laymen have always levelled at 
lawyers. 

1 The Rise and Growth of American Politics. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE CONFUSION OF ISSUES 

When we speak of the function of political parties 
in framing the issues for popular decision, we must 
not imagine that those issues are by any means 
simple. It is not always the intention of the party 
to make them so ; nor is it always the aim of a lawyer 
in arguing before a jury to make his client's case 
depend upon the determination of plain facts. 
Mr. Bryce has remarked that opinion is the thing 
with which American party organizations are least 
occupied; that the object of a platform is neither 
to define nor to convince, but rather to attract and 
to confuse; that it is a mixture of denunciation, 
declamation, and conciliation. 1 Nor is this surpris- 
ing when we consider how politicians are always say- 
ing that they need an issue on which to appeal to 
the people, and yet are constantly evading subjects 
deemed vital by many of their supporters. 

Such a condition, however, will appear less incon- 
sistent with the statement that the parties frame 
the issues, if we distinguish carefully between the 
main question which the people must decide and 
the grounds of their decision. The former is usually 
perfectly clear, while the latter are often painfully 
obscure. What was the main question the people 

1 The American Commonwealth, ed. of 1910, vol. ii, p. 334. 
71 



72 The Function of Parties [§32 

of the United States were called upon to decide at 
the presidential election of 1908? It was whether 
Mr. Taft or Mr. Bryan should be President during 
the next four years. That issue was framed by the 
Republican and Democratic parties in nominating 
the candidates, and was settled by the election 
beyond the shadow of a doubt. In the same way 
the British voters decided at the election of 1905 
that they were for the time weary of the Conserva- 
tive administration and preferred to intrust the 
government to the chiefs of the Liberal party. 
This also was purely a party question, and was sub- 
mitted to the judgment of the electorate by the two 
front benches in the House of Commons. 

32. The Motives that Determine an Election are Often Obscure 

Turning now from the immediate issue to the 
grounds of decision, we may ask whether an elec- 
tion really decides anything beyond the choice of a 
man for an office. Sometimes in fact it does not. 
Von Hoist declared that the principal argument 
in the presidential campaign of 1828 was the plant- 
ing of a hickory pole with a hurrah for Andrew 
Jackson. Yet the example shows how a vague 
public sentiment may involve weighty results, for 
that election, far from being a mere choice of a par- 
ticular man, became one of the turning points in 
American history. At times, however, the principles 
professed by the two parties have presented so little 
of a definite issue that the people were unable to 
decide anything in the nature of policy; and on 
this account critics of our institutions charge Ameri- 



§ 32] The Motives are Often Obscure 73 

can parties with a failure to educate the public. 
But such elections are exceptional. Some momentous 
questions are usually debated between the parties, 
the arguments upon them helping to supply the 
motives that determine the popular verdict; and 
yet it is often hard to know how far any one of these 
motives was decisive, because there are commonly 
a number of them operating with unequal force on 
different individuals. Unless some one problem of 
controlling significance — like the free silver issue 
in the presidential election of 1896 — has dominated 
the situation, one cannot be sure that the public has 
passed a judgment on any specific question. 

Sir Henry Maine suggests that "the devotee of 
democracy is much in the same position as the 
Greeks with their oracles. All agreed that the voice 
of an oracle was the voice of a god; but everybody 
allowed that when he spoke he was not as intelligible 
as might be desired." * The difficulty is not con- 
fined to any country or any form of government. 
In England, where of late years a doctrine has 
grown up that Parliament ought to enact no drastic 
legislation without a mandate from the nation, a 
general election always gives rise to a dispute about 
the questions it has decided. Did the people in 1900 
declare for anything but the South African War? 
At the election of 1905, which brought the Liberals 
into power, did the people pronounce in favor of 
secular schools, or Home Rule for Ireland, or merely 
against a preferential tariff? Did they in 1911 ex- 
press an opinion on anything except the veto of the 

1 Popular Government, p. 185. 



74 The Function of Parties [§32 

House of Lords ? No one can be certain, and acri- 
monious debates on the subject habitually take place 
in Parliament. 

An extraordinary situation was brought about 
by the election of 1910. The Lords had rejected 
the budget, and the dissolution took place with the 
distinct purpose of determining whether they should 
be compelled to pass it or not. The election resulted 
in a majority for the Liberals, but only with the 
aid of the Irish Nationalist members who held the 
balance of power. Now the Nationalists disliked 
the provisions of the budget concerning licenses for 
the sale of liquor, and if the issues could have been 
completely separated they would have rejected those 
provisions, which were, however, deemed vital by 
the bulk of the Liberals. Under these conditions 
the desire of the Nationalist members of Parlia- 
ment to sustain the Liberal government and to 
checkmate the House of Lords was so strong that 
they voted for the budget as it stood and forced 
the Peers to accept it. No doubt in so doing they 
had the approval of their constituents, who may be 
assumed to have cared less about the liquor clauses 
than about the ultimate policy of the party. But 
here was an election, turning primarily on the 
budget, which seemed to show that a majority of 
the constituencies did not want it as it stood; and 
yet the exigencies of party politics so complicated 
the issue that the Lords felt constrained to pass the 
budget as a concession to a popular demand. 

A general election is of necessity a judgment upon 
the parties in all their relations, and therefore it is 



§ 33] Parties Lessen Confusion 75 

impossible to isolate the different motives involved, 
such as the personal qualities of the candidates, the 
various measures proposed, and a revulsion of feeling 
against the party in power. One cannot separate 
these things so as to attribute the result to any one 
of them alone. That is the chief reason for taking 
a popular vote on a single measure by means of 
the referendum — an institution whose utility and 
limitations will be discussed in a later chapter. 

33. But the Confusion is Less than if Parties did not Exist 

Although political parties often present questions 
of policy to the electorate in a complex and con- 
fused form, they do at least present the sharp issue 
of a choice between their candidates for office; and 
even the result of the election as a decision on ques- 
tions of policy is much more clear than it would be 
if there were no parties at all. Suppose, for example, 
that no political parties existed in the United States, 
and that some candidates were nominated who 
stood for a more vigorous national control of cor- 
porations and a tariff for revenue only, others who 
stood for a similar control and a protective tariff, 
others for prohibition and restriction of immigra- 
tion, and so on through all the possible combinations 
of political creeds, while some of the candidates 
stood for nothing more definite than personal popu- 
larity. It has already been pointed out that in such 
a case no single candidate would probably receive 
more than a small minority of the total vote, and 
if so what would the result of the election signify? 
What would it tell us about public opinion on any 



76 The Function of Parties [§34 

of these questions; and if we could compute that 
opinion by an elaborate process of adding and sub- 
tracting the votes cast for different programmes, what 
would be the chance that the persons elected shared 
that opinion on a considerable number of points? 
The confusion would certainly be far greater than it 
is today. In short, the function performed by the 
parties in framing the issues for popular judgment 
is not rendered useless by the fact that it is fulfilled 
very imperfectly. 

34. In England the People Pass Judgment More on Measures, 
in the United States More on Men 

We have seen that a general election must of 
necessity involve a number of different questions, 
and sometimes one of these may preponderate, 
sometimes another. We have known elections to 
turn mainly on the personal character of the candi- 
dates; we have known them to turn on one over- 
mastering issue; and we have known them to be 
decided by general party tendencies without a 
marked prominence of anything in particular. In 
this connection it may be interesting to note the 
effects of different forms of popular government, 
and especially of the systems at work in England 
and the United States. If we were seeking for an 
epigram we might assert that under the English 
parliamentary system more emphasis is laid on 
policy, in America more on the men selected. Like 
all epigrams this contains an element of truth. In 
England the party that has a majority in the House 
of Commons must hold together and support the 



§ 34] English and American Parties 77 

cabinet on all important measures, or it will fall and 
be replaced by a cabinet of the opposition. Con- 
versely the cabinet must avoid a policy that divides 
its followers seriously. Hence a general election is 
far less a decision on the merits of individual can- 
didates for Parliament than a judgment on the 
national party leaders who stand on a fairly definite 
policy — a policy known, not solely from electoral 
promises, but from the positive attitude previously 
assumed on one side or the other of the table in the 
House of Commons. ' In America this is much less 
true. President Roosevelt and Congress were by no 
means always in perfect accord, and had we possessed 
the English system of cabinet responsibility, had he 
occupied the position of a British prime minister, 
Congress would have been compelled to follow him 
wherever he chose to lead, or he would have 
been forced to submit to its wishes or resign. In 
the United States people can vote for a President 
because they prefer his personal character, or his 
political views in the aggregate, to those of his 
opponent; and then can vote for a member of Con- 
gress who differs from him on some important 
question of policy. In 1904, for example, congres- 
sional districts could, and did, vote for Colonel 
Roosevelt, and elect at the same time congressmen 
strongly opposed to his plan for increasing the 
navy. 

In England, therefore, the people at a general 
election pass judgment more directly upon the whole 
policy to be followed during the next few years, a 
fact which goes far to explain the new doctrine that 



78 The Function of Parties [§ 34 

Parliament ought not to deal with matters of prime 
consequence unless it can be considered to have 
received a mandate for the purpose at the election. 
But on the other hand the people must accept one 
or other of the party programmes as a whole. They 
cannot support the Liberal ministry because of a 
desire for Home Rule in Ireland, undenominational 
public schools, or disestablishment of the Church 
in Wales, and elect members of the House of Com- 
mons who will vote for preferential duties on colonial 
products. 

In the United States the popular decision on ques- 
tions of policy is less direct and conclusive. Often 
it cannot be known until Congress acts, and Con- 
gress divides much less on party lines than Parlia- 
ment. Thus in England the parties frame the issues 
for popular judgment more definitely than they do 
in America, but the public is less free to express an 
opinion upon each question separately. In America 
the parties perform that function less fully, and 
hence a general election has less the character of a 
popular mandate to the successful party to carry out 
a specific group of policies. This fact in turn helps 
to explain the far greater prominence of the personal 
element in American politics. In England the selec- 
tion of the prime minister and his colleagues is 
made without reference to the electorate, which 
has, indeed, no strong desire to be consulted on the 
subject; whereas all American citizens were pro- 
foundly stirred by the question whether Mr. Taft 
or Colonel Roosevelt should be the Republican 
candidate for President in 1912, and there was a 



§ 35] English and American Parties 79 

vigorous demand that the matter should be decided 
by popular vote in direct primaries. This was not 
due chiefly to the immense power wielded by the 
President, but in the main to the fact that the party 
was not solidly united in its policy. It comprised 
within its ranks sharp differences of opinion; the 
same differences that were again fought over imme- 
diately afterward in the Democratic National Con- 
vention. The prominence of the personal element in 
the determination of policy, as compared with the 
English party solidarity on public questions, makes 
the American government in this respect less nearly 
a direct democracy and more representative; yet if 
the members of Congress, or of a state legislature, 
reflect accurately the views of their constituents, 
their action on any particular measure may be more 
in accord with public opinion on that question 
than a vote in Parliament would be. The difference 
is, of course, merely one of degree. In both countries 
elections turn on measures only in part, and largely 
on the personality of candidates; in both a con- 
siderable amount of discretion is practically intrusted 
to the men who are elected. We are dealing only 
with a difference of emphasis; but that difference is 
not without importance, and has a direct bearing on 
the topics of the following chapters. 

35. Multiplicity of Parties in Continental Europe 

Hitherto we have spoken as if there were only 
two parties to be considered; and that is in fact 
the normal condition in England and America, for 
although in both nations third parties have arisen 



80 The Function of Parties [§35 

from time to time they have usually tended to dis- 
solve, or there has been a process of absorption 
into the two most vigorous bodies. This results 
from the practical nature of politics in those coun- 
tries, from the need of combining to support a 
ministry or elect a president, and from the sense, 
strong among a people accustomed to self-govern- 
ment, of the futility of voting with a hopeless 
minority simply as a protest. 

On the continent of Europe a multiplicity of par- 
liamentary groups has been the rule. There the 
parties are based, not so much on a difference of 
opinion on current public questions, as on political, 
philosophical, religious, racial, or social traditions. 
Sometimes these produce irreconcilable divisions, 
sometimes they do not; but they always make it 
very difficult for a man to transfer his allegiance 
from one party to another. The fact that an 
Englishman voted for the Conservatives in 1895 
from a dislike to Home Rule was no reason why he 
should not vote for the Liberals in 1905 because he 
dreaded a preferential tariff and thought it the more 
important question of the two. A Frenchman, on 
the other hand, who believed in monarchy on prin- 
ciple could hardly have abandoned that faith because 
he did not like the attitude of his party in the Drey- 
fus case. He might stay away from the polls, but 
he could not without apostasy become a Republican, 
and it went against the grain to vote for any Repub- 
lican candidate. This appears to be true to a smaller 
extent even in places like Switzerland, where party 
feeling does not run high, where it is based on political 



§ 36] Parties in Continental Europe 81 

philosophy rather than on the memory of bitter 
antagonisms, and where there are no irreconcilables. 

Such a difference in the basis of parties explains 
why political fluctuations are much less rapid on 
the continent of Europe than in English-speaking 
countries. The frequent alternation in office of 
opposing parties, which is the characteristic phe- 
nomenon of modern popular government in England 
and in the United States, is unknown in most of the 
continental nations. Except in countries like Spain, 
where the government virtually controls the elec- 
tions, a sudden shift of power from one side of the 
house to the other is rare, and the gain or loss of a 
party is often so slow that it must be attributed, 
not to any considerable change of opinion among 
the existing voters, but to the gradual advent of a 
younger generation. 

36. Two Parties a Result of Political Maturity 

Continental writers are generally convinced that 
a multiplicity of parties indicates greater maturity, 
that it is the condition to which all nations are 
tending. We may admit that it is a more natural 
division on subjects of an academic character. Save 
in a case where only two alternatives are possible, 
there will usually be more than two schools of 
thought. If a problem is capable of three or four 
rational solutions some men are likely to be in favor 
of each of them; and where the question is one of 
degree, as, for example, in the amount of control to 
be exerted over private industry, there are likely 
to be groups of men ready to go to different lengths. 

6 



82 The Function of Parties [§ 36 

In that sense a multiplicity of parties may be said 
to express the mind of the nation more accurately 
than a division of all the citizens into two opposing 
camps. But government is a practical art in which 
the currents of popular opinion can be but imper- 
fectly reflected, and this brings another factor into 
the problem. We have already seen that in the final 
decision of a concrete question any body of men can 
consider only two alternatives, for the body can say 
only "Yes" or "No" to the proposal submitted to 
it. At that moment it must divide into two oppos- 
ing parts, and this is true not of specific measures 
alone, but also of matters like the choice of a presi- 
dent or the support of a ministry. Switzerland is 
the only country which, by giving seats in the 
administrative board to representatives of the 
different groups of opinion, has succeeded in avoid- 
ing almost entirely a sharp antithesis between gov- 
ernment and opposition; and it is at least doubtful 
whether the Swiss system could work on a much 
larger scale. 

Assuming, as the most cursory observation of 
contemporary politics certainly indicates, that a 
great democratic country cannot, if it would, avoid 
government by party, the question arises who is to 
select the ruling party and thereby determine more 
or less definitely the policy to be pursued? When 
there are only two parties this is done by the people 
at a general election. The electorate is offered a 
pair of alternatives and chooses between them. The 
issue is Republican or Democrat, Conservative or 
Liberal; it is essentially a case of "Yes" or "No." 



§ 36] Parties in Continental Europe 83 

But where a number of political groups exist no 
question is presented to which the people can answer 
"Yes" or "No." They cannot decide which of the 
groups shall be in power, because that will depend 
upon the combinations or coalitions formed in the 
representative body itself when it meets. In France, 
for example, a new combination of groups, involving 
a profound change in the character and policy of the 
ministry, has often taken place during the term of the 
parliament and without recourse to the electorate. 
With a multiplicity of groups, therefore, the peo- 
ple play a less direct part in determining the party 
that shall rule and the policy that shall be pur- 
sued than they do if only two competing parties 
are in the field. The existence of several groups 
may produce a legislative body that reflects the 
complex state of the public mind better than a 
division into two parties, and that may or may not 
result in wiser legislation, but it does not give to 
public opinion so direct a control over the govern- 
ment. We may observe in this connection a growing 
stability in the coalitions of groups in continental 
assemblies, a greater tendency to cling together in 
blocks, and appeal to the electorate as a combined 
party supporting or opposing the administration of 
the day. 

Of the large nations with a popular form of govern- 
ment it would probably be safe to assert that Eng- 
land is the one in which the people take the most 
direct part in deciding public questions, that they 
do so to a less extent in the United States, and still 
less in France under the group system of political 



84 The Function of Parties [§36 

organization. One might suppose that their direct 
share in government would be least of all in Switzer- 
land, where more than two parties exist and where 
the administrative body is not wholly partisan. This 
would be true, were it not for the practice of taking 
a popular vote on particular measures by means of 
the referendum and initiative; and that is no doubt 
one reason for the adoption of those institutions by 
the Swiss republics. 

The prevalence of a number of groups in conti- 
nental countries is due, not to any preference for 
representative over direct democracy, but to the 
fact that the lines of political cleavage are based 
upon deep-seated traditions rather than upon a 
difference of opinion on current questions. From 
that point of view we may fairly ask whether, in 
large, modern, democratic states, a division into a 
number of political groups may not be the result 
of imperfect homogeneity, of a partial evolution of 
popular government, and of a tendency to regard 
politics more from a theoretical standpoint than as 
a means of solving actual problems. Although the 
adherence of an individual to his party is in all 
countries largely a matter of tradition and of a 
conception of the general fitness of things, yet in 
a popular government that has developed fully the 
parties themselves ought surely to exist for the 
attainment of practical ends. They are not aca- 
demic bodies for the expression of abstract ideas, 
but a part of the machinery whereby the people 
formulate and give effect to their opinions on pub- 
lic questions. While everywhere to a great extent 



§36] Result of Political Maturity 85 

organs outside the domain of positive law, they 
are essentially instruments of government; and it 
is only by regarding them in this light that they 
can be fruitfully studied as a phenomenon in mod- 
ern democracy. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC OPINION 

If parties help to crystallize public opinion by 
framing the issues, they tend also to falsify it, and 
this in several ways, all at bottom connected with 
the fact that the whole system of parties is an arti- 
ficial grouping of men, a device for the practical 
working of a large electorate. 

37. Parties Cause a Bias 

Every voter is more or less attracted or repelled 
by some political party, and usually to such an ex- 
tent that he is unable to form an entirely unbiased 
judgment either on questions of policy or on the 
merits of candidates. No man can free himself 
from the influence of associated ideas. They are 
constantly shaping his opinions without his knowing 
it, and one of the strongest influences of this kind is 
that of membership in an organized body of men. 
It is among the primary, hence among the deepest, 
motives in human nature. It is a part of the gre- 
garious instinct that has made man a social and 
civilized creature instead of a solitary animal. It is 
the link that binds the most savage tribe together, 
and it is far from extinct in the highest state of 
society. When it appears as devotion to one's 
country, we laud it as patriotism. When it takes 
the form of allegiance to party, educated people in 

86 



§ 37] Parties Cause a Bias 87 

America are apt to decry it; unless, indeed, the 
party is a reform association, when it is considered 
a noble expression of public spirit. When it comes 
in the shape of loyalty to a church, or a charitable 
or educational institution, it is deemed excellent; 
while loyalty to a business corporation is popularly 
eyed with suspicion, if, indeed, it is not regarded 
as a cardinal sin. But whether for good or evil the 
influence of membership in an organized body is a 
force to be reckoned with, and its effect on men's 
judgments in all the relations of life is too obvious 
to require elaboration. Doubtless it was a conscious- 
ness of its power which led Rousseau to declare 
that any community in which parties existed was 
incapable of a true common will. 1 

In American municipal government this force has 
been especially disastrous, because the allegiance in 
that case is to a party which has no proper con- 
nection with the questions to be decided. For a 
man to follow blindly in national politics a national 
party that he has learned to trust is not wholly 
without justification, because there is a strong 
chance that it stands for the opinions he would him- 
self hold if he studied the issues involved; but for 
him to obey the orders of a city boss by reason of 
a confidence in the views upon the tariff professed 
by the national leaders of the party to which the 
boss belongs has not the same excuse. Hence the 
outcry against party politics in the elections of our 
large cities, which is as rational as it has usually 
proved ineffective. 

1 Contrat Social, book ii, Chap. iii. 



88 The Function of Parties fS 38 



38. Parties Produce Unnatural Divisions 

Political parties falsify public opinion in another 
way, because they do not correspond accurately to 
the real differences in thought. All party organiza- 
tions contain an element of sham. A party, like a 
broker, tries to simulate a larger amount of agree- 
ment than actually exists. There may be bitter 
factional fights over the selection of the candidate 
or the drafting of the platform, but when they have 
been adopted, unless matters have gone so far as 
to cause an open rupture, a strenuous effort is always 
made to restore harmony, to bury dissensions and 
work as a unit for the election. The party thus pre- 
tends that all its members are more fully in accord 
than they are; and every active politician, in striv- 
ing to win the victory, magnifies the points where 
he approves of the platform and passes over those 
where he does not; so that within the party itself, 
and consequently in the verdict of the electorate, 
public opinion is somewhat distorted. There is 
more sacrifice of the lesser interests to the greater, 
more subordination of personal conviction to party 
concord, than is quite consistent with the real public 
sentiment. 

Such a condition is due to the unreality of party 
lines of cleavage, which are drawn, as we have already 
observed, on the assumption that men are divided 
by nature into two sections, the members of each 
section holding precisely the same views on all 
public questions. If this were true we should have 
two parties with different policies, each wholly at 



§ 38] Produce Unnatural Divisions 89 

unity in itself and separated from any other party 
by a broad gulf. According to the common Anglo- 
American theory of two parties, one in power and 
the other in opposition, that is the case; and accord- 
ing to the continental theory of a multiplicity of 
political groups it is true of each group. But in 
fact such a condition does not prevail anywhere. 
The members of every political party differ among 
themselves profoundly on some questions, and on 
none are their ideas exactly alike. Men are not 
naturally separated by hard and fast lines into two 
or more compact groups, but present every kind of 
combination of opinions, agreeing with some persons 
on one issue and with others on a second. 

Many single questions, moreover, admit of a 
variety of solutions, running from the extremely 
radical on one side to the highly conservative on 
the other; and instead of all men grouping them- 
selves naturally into two compact bodies favoring 
very different solutions, as they ought to do under 
the theory of parties, a large part of the community 
is in fact inclined to a middle course. This is true 
not only of a single subject, but even more of the 
attitude of the public toward the general progress 
of political thought. Most men, in short, hold 
moderate views, inclining to neither extreme, and 
the dividing line between the parties usually cleaves 
these moderate men asunder, including some in one 
camp and some in the other. 

A diagram may help to make the matter clear. 
If we represent the state of the public mind, on any 
question capable of a variety of solutions, or on the 



90 



The Function of Parties 



38 



general trend of politics, by a figure whose thickness 
at any point indicates the number of people naturally 
preferring the opinion corresponding to that point, 
the figure would by no means have the shape of a 
dumb-bell or figure eight, as the theory of parties 
would lead us to suppose. On the contrary, it would 
be thickest near the centre, not far from the very 
place where, the division between the parties comes. 
The normal curve so formed is known to scientific 
men as the integral of probability. 

Figure 1 expresses the condition of public opin- 
ion according to the theory of two parties; figure 
2 according to the theory of groups; and figure 3 
according to the universal scientific principle of the 
distribution of variations from a common mean: 




Fig. 1 

Theory of Two Parties 
Conservative Liberal 



Fig. 2 
Theory of Several Political Groups 




Fig. 3 

Natural State of Public Opinion 
Conservative Liberal 



§ 39] People can Say only " Yes " or " No " 91 

39. People can Say only "Yes" or "No" 

Now this distortion of public opinion by parties 
flows from the fact that the people can act directly 
only by answering "Yes" or "No" to a definite 
question presented to them; or if they act by a 
plurality, instead of by a majority, they can express 
a more general preference for one particular proposi- 
tion or candidate than for any of the others. When 
an election is held for a public office, or a vote is 
taken upon a referendum, or any other attempt is 
made to elicit public opinion by a ballot, the question 
presented to the people is in substance, do you want 
this man or that man for the office? — do you 
approve of this measure or not? On such a ques- 
tion the people must divide sharply on the two 
sides of the line, although many of them might 
prefer to answer a different question which is not 
presented. If the popular decision is to have any 
intelligible meaning, it must be in the form of a 
choice between definite alternatives, propounded by 
someone; and in a large modern democracy this is 
normally done by the political parties. We shall 
have occasion hereafter to consider the effort to 
enable any other body of citizens to present measures 
to the electorate by means of the initiative; but 
we may remark here that to be more than momen- 
tarily effective a political organization must have a 
certain degree of permanence, and any such organi- 
zation which is permanent is properly classed as a 
political party. 

On every popular vote the people must divide 



92 The Function of Parties [§40 

sharply on opposite sides, but it does not follow 
that the line of cleavage will be the same on all 
questions submitted to them. Normally, it would 
not be so, unless the ties of party were strong enough 
to create a strong bias. Yet the election of repre- 
sentatives and public officers on somewhat artificial 
party lines is, in a strictly representative democracy, 
the only authoritative expression of public opinion; 
and even where such a system is tempered by the 
referendum and initiative, election is by far the 
most important act that the people perform. But 
again it does not follow that after the representa- 
tives have been chosen they will differ on all the 
measures that arise as they were divided at the 
polls; that the Republicans will always vote one 
way and the Democrats the other. If they do, they 
will certainly not be reflecting the popular attitude 
correctly, and the distortion of public opinion is 
obviously likely to be greater than if they consider 
each question on its merits and act according to 
their personal convictions. Distortion of public 
opinion from this cause is, therefore, larger in the 
House of Commons than in American legislatures 
where votes are cast, as a rule, far less on party 

lines. 1 

40. Influence of Moderate Elements 

There is still a third way in which parties falsify 
public opinion. This is by giving undue weight, 
either to the elements that are most aggressive or 

1 See A. L. Lowell, The Influence of Party upon Legislation in England 
and America, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 
1901, vol. i, pp. 319-542; summarized in the writer's Government of 
England, vol. ii. 



§ 40] Influence of Moderate Elements 93 

to those whose attachment to the party is least 
strong. We have already observed that opinions 
are weighed rather than counted, and that happens 
within a party as well as in the whole community. 
The fraction that is most active and pushing has 
far more influence than its mere numbers would 
justify, and it is apt to be an extreme fraction, 
because extremists are usually more intense in their 
feelings than persons of moderate views. Yet the 
moderate man will often cling to them rather than 
break the tie of party, when if no parties existed he 
might vote differently; and thus the country may 
for a time be governed by what is really a small 
minority. The classic example of this is found in 
the history of the French Revolution, where the 
control of public affairs passed by successive stages 
into the hands of more and more radical groups, 
until the moderate men rose in disgust and put an 
end to the Reign of Terror by sending the Jacobin 
leaders to the guillotine. 

In a long established popular government the 
tendency of a party to be ruled by an extreme wing 
is usually counteracted in some measure by the 
temptation to give great weight to the elements in 
its ranks that are most easily detached, these being 
normally the more moderate elements. In a coun- 
try, for example, like England or the United States, 
where there are habitually two principal parties, 
the members in each who are nearest in accord 
with the other are more likely to be driven into it 
by dissatisfaction with their own leaders than are 
the extremists whose aversion to their opponents 



94 The Function of Parties [§40 

is much stronger. The party chiefs are therefore 
very careful not to offend people of that type, some- 
times to the exasperation of men of sterner mould. 
In the early part of our Civil War many ardent 
Republicans thought that Lincoln paid too great 
heed to the hesitation of his more timid supporters 
who dreaded, first a violent collision with the South, 
and later a drastic policy about slavery. In the 
same way Mr. Gladstone's cabinet in 1870, out of 
respect to Whig opinion, did not go so far towards 
free public non-sectarian education as the Non- 
Conformists desired. 

Examples of cautious action due to this cause 
might be multiplied indefinitely, for the condition 
is perfectly natural. The extreme wing, the one 
farthest from the opposing party, may grumble and 
scold, but it is highly unlikely to join the enemy; 
whereas the men who stand closest to the oppo- 
sition pass much more easily over the line, and 
must, therefore, be carefully conciliated. Thus in 
a country where only two parties exist there is a 
normal tendency toward what the French call gov- 
ernment by the centres. This is a healthy condi- 
tion, because it makes for moderation, for stability, 
for a policy that comes near to the average view 
of the whole community, and hence for govern- 
ment by public opinion. It is a beneficial offset 
to the other tendency toward the rule by men of 
intense and extreme convictions, and, if it falsifies 
opinion within the party, it helps to prevent party 
from falsifying the opinion of the people. 



§ 41] Influence of Extreme Elements 95 

41. Influence of Extreme Elements 

Occasionally the wing of the party most easily 
detached is not moderate, but extreme. That 
occurs when it consists of men who care more for 
some particular object than for all the other prin- 
ciples that hold the party together. In order to 
promote their ends in such a case they may be 
willing to engage in a triangular fight, or even to 
transfer their support to the other side, which may 
on its part be inclined to trade with them for the 
sake of getting into power. By this process the ex- 
treme wing can sometimes force the hands of the 
party leaders and gain an influence quite out of 
proportion to their numbers, thus bringing to pass 
a result out of accord with true public opinion. To 
some extent the Labor Party holds a position of 
this kind in England today. It is for most purposes 
affiliated with the Liberals, and it has certainly no 
disposition to trade with the other side, but it has 
often nominated an independent Labor candidate, 
even at the risk of giving the seat to a Conservative. 
Both Liberals and Conservatives need the votes of 
working men who are more or less under the influence 
of the labor leaders, and both feel constrained to ob- 
tain that vote by concessions. In 1906, therefore, 
neither party dared to reject the bill to exempt trade 
unions entirely from suits for tortious acts, although 
it is not improbable that the general opinion, both 
in Parliament and in the country, if not distorted by 
party exigencies, would have been against a measure 
so contrary to the spirit of the English common law. 



96 The Function of Parties [§42 

The soundest, although by no means the universal, 
condition of parties is one where they are far enough 
apart to stand for real differences of policy, and yet 
sufficiently controlled by their moderate elements 
to be fairly close together. This is the best con- 
dition, because it is one that brings both of them 
near to the political centre of gravity of the whole 
people, neither of the alternatives offered to the 
voters being very repugnant to the average man. 
In such a case the parties perform their function of 
framing issues for the people, and yet falsify public 
opinion to the smallest extent. 

42. Parties Prevent Distortion by Popular Vagaries 

If political parties always distort public opinion 
in some degree, they also prevent the still larger 
distortion caused by sudden waves of excitement. 
As great ecclesiastical bodies tend to frown upon 
religious excesses, so party organizations are inclined 
to check political vagaries. They are essentially 
conservative, setting their faces against new experi- 
ments. For good or for evil, the Whigs in America 
were out of sympathy with the Free-Soil move- 
ment; and four decades later the regular Demo- 
cratic politician did not like the Populists. Sir 
George Cornewall Lewis remarked that the absence 
of highly organized parties enabled a powerful 
orator to sway the Athenian Assembly much more 
readily than he can a modern legislative body. The 
division of the latter, he tells us, into parties, accus- 
tomed to discipline and guidance, makes it less ac- 
cessible to sudden appeals to emotion, and thus gives 



§ 43] Parties an Obstacle to Despotism 97 

a greater ascendency to calm and prudent counsels 
than in the ancient republics. 1 

43. Parties an Obstacle to Despotism 

Connected herewith is another service rendered 
by parties, that of enabling the people to hold the 
government in check. The constant presence of a 
recognized opposition is an obstacle to despotism. 
An oriental ruler has always become resistless as 
soon as he broke the armed force of his foes, because 
there has been no peaceable means of forming or 
expressing hostile opinion. There has been no man 
or body or organ for discontent to rally around, 
no alternative to submission but insurrection; and 
hence a pacific population has been ready to bear 
much without showing signs of disaffection. The 
same thing was true after the coup d'etat of Louis 
Napoleon. At each of the plebiscites, in which he 
asked the people of France to ratify his assumption 
of power, there was and could be no real expression 
of public opinion, because there was no alternative. 
The citizen was asked to choose between a govern- 
ment that he might not approve and a grim spectre 
of anarchy or civil war. No man who cared for 
law and order could hesitate. Had there been 
another party in the state, with a rival programme 
that could have been quietly carried into effect if 
supported by a majority of the people, the result of 
the vote might have been different. 

A similar situation in a milder form might be 
produced in any country if one of the parties were 

1 Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion, pp. 216-18. 

7 



98 The Function of Parties [§ 43 

to disappear altogether, or if its chances of victory 
were permanently hopeless. The existence of a 
party of opposition, with a programme fairly within 
the limits of a possible public opinion, is a bulwark 
against the tyranny, not only of a despot, but also 
of a fanatical popular majority. It becomes a 
rallying place for sober common sense when a policy 
is carried too far. It is ballast for the ship of state 
and it forces the rulers to justify their conduct in 
the face of constant criticism. In a country gov- 
erned by two parties the utter decay of one of them 
is a peril to the nation; and in fact it is a misfor- 
tune for the other party also, whose members in 
such a case are almost certain in time to get out of 
hand and break up into factions that fight among 
themselves. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE ABUSE OF PARTY 

In America party government has been for a 
generation the subject of severe criticism, some of 
it quite just and some of it exaggerated. We are 
told, for example, that the parties are in fact manipu- 
lated by a small number of politicians, and this is 
undoubtedly true. Government in every land and 
in every period of the world's history, whether of 
a nation, a church, a business enterprise or any- 
thing else, has been habitually conducted by a 
few guiding spirits whatever be the form of organiza- 
tion; and that will continue to be the case so long 
as men differ in ability, in force of character, and 
in the amount of effort they are willing to put forth 
to prevail in their opinions and their desire to rule. 
In the case of our political parties we are told that 
the men in control manage things despotically, with 
a reckless disregard of public opinion; and at the 
same time we hear constant complaints that the 
leaders have their ears to the ground listening for 
popular applause instead of pursuing courageously 
the course that they think right. Contradictory 
as these charges may be, they are both largely 
justified; and both are based on a perversion to 
improper ends of perfectly normal functions. 



99 



100 The Function of Parties [§44 

44. Need of Scientific Study of Party Government 

In politics Americans are a little prone to rely- 
on righteous indignation as a substitute for scientific 
study. Assuming that popular government is a 
simpler art than it has proved to be, and that pub- 
lic opinion when roused is well-nigh infallible, they 
are inclined to believe that institutions can easily 
be devised which will work perfectly. This habit 
of mind, coupled with a long-suffering nature due 
to absorption in other pursuits, tends to produce 
periods of lethargy followed by outbursts of disgust 
with existing institutions, when men are ready to 
accept as a panacea any plausible suggestion for 
reform. The remedies proposed may be salutary 
or they may be mischievous; they may allay or 
they may aggravate the trouble; but the main 
difficulty lies in the fact that they really treat the 
symptoms and not the causes of the evil, although 
their advocates are, of course, firmly convinced that 
they will strike at the root of the matter. 

The result has been a series of experiments, each 
hailed as a new declaration of popular independence, 
and each in a measure disappointing. Some of 
them, like the Australian ballot, are excellent so 
far as they go, but have not succeeded in breaking 
down seriously the power of the party machines ; 
while others, like the conferring of great power upon 
the mayors in cities, have so largely failed to purify 
politics that men are now turning to radically dif- 
ferent plans, such as that of government by com- 
mission. The impulse that gives popularity to a 



§44] Need of Scientific Study 101 

particular reform is often strengthened for a time by 
an immediate improvement in political conditions. 
But in fact the first effects of a reform are not a 
fair test of its permanent value. In times of moral 
awakening any cure for drunkenness will reform a 
number of drunkards, for at such times many men 
are in a state of mind to be cured by anything; and 
in the same way a change in political institutions is 
usually followed for a time by improvement, because 
the public spirit that wrought the change is likely 
to cause the election of good men to office. The 
real test does not come until the enthusiasm has 
faded into the light of common day. Judged from 
that standpoint, our devices for reform have rarely 
fulfilled the expectations they awoke. 

The difficulty comes from a failure to study 
politics scientifically, to investigate the phenomena 
thoroughly. It is much easier to bring a railing 
accusation against men or institutions than to 
ascertain how far they are a natural product of the 
conditions in which they exist. To the scientific 
mind every phenomenon is a fact that has a cause, 
and it is wise to seek that cause when attempting 
to change the fact. 

The need of scientific investigation is as great in 
the case of parties as of any other phenomenon in 
politics. Observation of modern democracies shows 
that parties in some form are almost invariably 
present, and that their activity and persistence are 
roughly in proportion to the size of the electorate. 
Hence they may be regarded as a natural result of 
popular government and must be studied as such. 



102 The Function of Parties [§45 

American reformers have often complained bitterly 
of the "machine," and talked as if party organiza- 
tion were in itself an error, partaking of the nature 
of sin. Their own reform movements were formerly 
sporadic, carried on for the most part by small 
bodies of men, or by temporary expedients based on 
spontaneous ebullitions of feeling; but of late years 
they have learned the value of permanent, concerted 
work, and some of the most effective associations 
for good government today are as highly organized, 
and in fact as completely controlled by a small 
band of leaders, as the political parties in the places 
where they prevail. Moreover, the present effort 
of reformers is not to destroy party organizations, 
but to legalize and regulate them. In fact one of 
the burning issues of the day, that of direct primaries, 
involves a modification, no doubt, but also a recog- 
nition and sanction of party organizations. If, 
therefore, we assume that parties are inevitable, the 
question we ask ourselves should be, not whether 
they are a blessing or a curse, but how they can be 
made to perform their proper function well, without 
being perverted to baneful uses. 

45. The Professional Politician 

The perversion of political parties to improper 
objects is closely connected in America with the 
existence of professionals who make a living out of 
politics. Men of this type have not, indeed, the 
all-pervasive influence commonly attributed to them. 
They are not found in all parts of the country; but 
wherever our politics are unsavory, one may be fairly 



§45] The Professional Politician 103 

certain that the professional politician is at work. 
In his recent suggestive book on The Promise of 
American Life, Mr. Croly has described the reasons 
for the rise of a special class of politicians. 1 He 
points out that according to the theories of the 
Jacksonian Democrats, which became the prevail- 
ing ideas of the nation, the ordinary citizen was 
expected to take an active interest in politics; but 
that, with the increasing complexity of conditions, 
the theory ceased to work. Commerce and industry 
on a large scale became divorced from politics, each 
of them tending to engross the whole of a man's 
attention, thus giving birth to a special professional 
class. He explains how "the American system of 
local self-government encouraged the creation of 
the political 'Boss,' because it required such an 
enormous amount of political business. Someone 
was needed to transact this business and the pro- 
fessional politician was developed to supply the 
need. . . . The ordinary American could not pre- 
tend to give as much time to politics as the smooth 
operation of this complicated machine demanded; 
and little by little there emerged in different parts 
of the country a class of politicians who spent all 
their time in nominating and electing candidates 
to these numerous offices. The officials so elected, 
instead of being responsible to the people, were 
responsible to the men to whom they owed their 
offices; and their own individual official power was 
usually so small that they could not put what little 
independence they possessed to any good use." 

1 Pp. 117-126. ' 



104 The Function of Parties [§45 

Although much keen thought has been turned on 
the boss and his methods of operation, 1 there is still 
abundant opportunity for some political philosopher 
to study his natural history, examine the real extent 
and limitations of his power, and expound more 
fully his relation to the precise conditions in which 
he thrives. If his life is chiefly parasitic, it does 
not seem to his friends vicious. On the contrary 
his influence over the mass of his followers is largely 
based upon their belief that he is the centre of a 
great charitable institution which ministers to their 
wants, relieves their distress, and distributes among 
them the favors of a bountiful public providence. 
That these benefits are conferred to the injury of the 
whole community, and in the long run to the detri- 
ment of most of the persons who receive them, they 
do not see. Nor do they perceive that government by 
favoritism leads inevitably to corruption, and that 
corruption always turns to the profit of rich and un- 
scrupulous men who can pay for the favors they de- 
mand. The alliance between the boss and predatory 
wealth is as natural as it is calamitous. But does such 
a condition exist because the people in a boss-ridden 
community prefer bad government, or because public 
institutions are so ill adjusted that someone must 
perform, well or ill, honestly or corruptly, the func- 
tions which the professional politician has acquired? 

1 See, for example, The Boss, a book written in imitation of Machia- 
velli's Prince, under the pseudonym of Henry Champernown by D. 
McG. Means ; and The American Boss, by Francis C. Lowell in the 
Atlantic Monthly for September, 1900; as well as the discussions in 
Bryce's American Commonwealth; Ostragorski's Democracy and the 
Organization of Political Parties, vol. ii; and Hart's Actual Government 
in the United States. 



§46] The People Attempt too Much 105 

One thing is clear. The boss does not act mainly 
as an exponent of public opinion or frame the issues 
therefor. Unless they affect his power, or private 
interests from which he can derive a revenue, he 
leaves such matters alone if he can. He cares little 
for public policy or legislation relating to the general 
welfare so long as he is allowed to pursue his trade 
in peace; and he deals chiefly in things that public 
opinion cannot reach, the distribution of minor 
offices and the granting of privileges great and small 
which the public can hardly follow. He is, indeed, 
a political broker, but one whose business relates far 
less to the subjects of a genuine public opinion than 
to private benefits. 

46. The People Attempt too Much 

This brings us to another point; for public broker- 
age in private benefits is in no small measure due 
to the form that democracy assumed in America. 
On the connection between the enormous amount 
of political business our system entails and the rise 
of a professional class of politicians Mr. Croly's 
remarks have been quoted, and they are certainly 
justified. The plain fact is that in America democ- 
racy undertakes more work, tries to attend to more 
details for which it is not fitted, than in any other 
country in the world. The excessive burden comes 
mainly from two things: the great number of tem- 
porary offices and the system of special legislation; 
and both are derived from the same source, the dis- 
like of the people to intrust public duties to anyone 
but their direct representatives or to persons who 



106 The Function of Parties [§46 

are kept in touch with public opinion by constant 
fear of removal. The American citizen is far less 
attracted by the idea of experienced public servants 
who retain their positions so long as they are faithful 
and efficient than he is repelled by the dread of 
bureaucracy. A natural result has been the creation 
of a vast number of elective offices and the principle 
of rotation in all offices. But a not less natural 
consequence is the inability of the people to control 
either the selection of men for office or their conduct 
after assuming their duties. It is a simple case of 
being paralyzed by trying to do too much. Every 
man of affairs knows that if he were unwilling to 
commit discretion in his subordinates, if he should 
insist upon considering all the details himself, he 
would be swamped with work, he would be unable 
to see the forest for the trees, and he would lose 
effective control of the general policy of his business. 
It is said that one way in which the bureaucracy in 
Russia has at times outwitted a reforming Tzar, 
anxious to take an active part in administration, 
has been to overwhelm him with detail; and by the 
same process the American democracy has placed 
itself in the hands of the professional politician. The 
growing demand for a short ballot is a recognition 
that the people have ' undertaken to elect to office 
more men than they can judge intelligently; and 
it is a step towards a simplification of popular 
government that ought to be carried far. 

We shall, of course, be referred to the progress of 
civil service reform, which has taken great masses 
of appointments out of politics, and this has no 



§ 46] The People Attempt too Much 107 

doubt proved a vast benefit by removing from the 
political arena a source of temptation and a means 
of corrupting the electorate. But the movement 
has as yet touched elective offices or positions with 
discretionary powers very little, and hence has not 
done much toward lightening the burden of popular 
government, which is still far too great for any 
people to bear. To the relief of members of Parlia- 
ment the last appointments in which they had any 
voice, those of local postmasters, have within a few 
years been withdrawn from their influence; and they 
have thus been left free to devote their whole atten- 
tion to public questions. This is all that people in 
a democracy ought to do. . 

Another product of American democratic ideas 
has been the vast amount of special legislation 
enacted by representative bodies. In other countries 
with a popular government matters of this kind are, 
to some extent at least, removed from politics by 
being placed primarily in the hands of administra- 
tive officials or of an impartial committee. But 
in the United States an attempt is made to bring 
them under popular control by intrusting them to 
the direct representatives of the people. They are, 
however, so numerous and so complex that the 
public cannot effectively control them, and the 
result has been to throw them into politics, to make 
the professional politician a private bill broker, and 
to bring the promoters, including the managers of 
public service corporations, into the political arena. 
This again is a case of democracy obstructing its 
own path by too much baggage. 



108 The Function of Parties [§46 

We suffer from what Marco Minghetti, writing of 
Italy, called the undue interference of parties with 
affairs not properly within their province. But the 
parties deal with them because the people attempt 
to do so. If the people will elect many officers 
someone must nominate them, and that is the 
natural function of parties. If the public prefer to 
have a large number of other officers appointed on 
grounds other than special fitness, experience or 
automatic tests — that is on political grounds — 
the parties are certain to take a hand in the matter. 
If democracy demands special legislation by polit- 
ical bodies professional politicians are likely to 
be attracted to the quarry. The parties were not 
formed for the purpose of spoils or franchises, but 
they quite naturally took upon themselves all the 
work to be done by direct popular agency. The 
conscience of the nation has been aroused, and an 
improvement in the standards of public life will 
bring greater purity in government; yet so long as 
the people as a whole undertake more than they can 
attend to, some individuals will do it, and will be 
under a strong temptation to do it wrongly. Must 
we not strive to reduce popular action, and with it 
the activity of political parties, to those matters in 
which there can be a real public opinion? 

We are told that the cure for the ills of democ- 
racy is more democracy, but surely that depends 
upon the disease from which it is suffering. To tell 
a merchant whose business has outgrown his old 
methods of personal management that the cure for 
his inability to supervise it is more supervision on 



§47] Frontier Conditions 109 

his part, that he ought to pay greater attention to 
details, might be the advice of a country storekeeper, 
but it would not be that of anyone familiar with 
administration on a large scale. Such a person 
would recommend the appointment of trustworthy 
permanent agents to relieve him of detail, and would 
add that if he had in his employ an unusually faith- 
ful and capable man he had better keep him as long 
as possible and make it worth his while to stay. 
The cure for the ills of popular government is more 
attention by the people to the things they under- 
take, and that object is not promoted by undertaking 
too much. There is a limit to the total amount of 
labor the whole people can expend on public affairs, 
and that amount must be divided among the dif- 
ferent matters they are called upon to consider. A 
fraction is diminished by increasing the denominator. 

47. Frontier Conditions 

American democracy has been deeply colored by 
two feelings: one an early aversion to what it con- 
ceived to be the English system of a class privileged 
to rule; the other the distrust of special qualifica- 
tions natural to a simple, homogeneous, pioneer 
community where every successful man must be able 
to turn his hand to anything. Until our own day 
the attitude of the frontier settlement has never 
been absent from America. It began on the Atlantic 
seaboard and travelled slowly across the continent. 
Its sentiments, reinforced by antipathy to anything 
deemed aristocratic, have given a strongly marked 
tone to our conception of popular government. 



110 The Function of Parties [§47 

That conception, although defective and incomplete, 
was formerly not inapplicable to the actual condition 
of the country, but its shortcomings have grown ever 
clearer with the increasing complexity of our civiliza- 
tion, and there is no reason to suppose that they will 
lessen in the future. We are governing a vast and 
intricate community by methods suited to a small 
and simple one. The people must realize that they 
cannot administer so directly as in the past. They 
must find out the limits of what they can do, and 
learn to commit other matters to persons or bodies 
competent to take charge of them, trustworthy and 
so far as possible free from political motives. They 
must learn how to do this without losing control 
over the general policy to be pursued or abandoning 
an effective supervision of the administration. It 
is hoped that in the later chapters useful suggestions 
may be made upon these subjects. 



Part III 
Methods of Expressing Public Opinion 



Part III 

Methods of Expressing Public Opinion 



CHAPTER IX 

REPRESENTATION 

The authoritative methods in common use for 
expressing public opinion are representation and 
direct popular action; and these two forms of 
giving effect to the judgment of a people require 
analysis and scrutiny. 

48. An Election does not Always Express Public Opinion 

All representative government is based upon the 
assumption that an election is a more or less trust- 
worthy expression of public opinion; that while the 
persons chosen may not hold precisely the same 
views as their constituents on all the questions that 
arise, yet they will reflect the general tone of thought 
of the electorate and its party complexion with some 
approach to accuracy. In countries expert in self- 
government the assumption may be safe, but it is 
not so everywhere. In Spain, for example, the cabi- 
net of the day, whatever its politics may be, habit- 
ually carries the elections and obtains a majority in 
the Cortes. This was particularly striking in the 

8 113 



114 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 48 

six troublous years that followed the revolution of 
1868, when the ministries changed rapidly and each 
of them in turn, whether republican or monarchist, 
whatever form of republic it might prefer or who- 
ever it might desire to seat upon the throne, could 
always appeal with a certainty of success to the 
verdict of the people. Such a sudden shifting on 
the most vital of all political questions obviously 
meant, either that the voters had no settled convic- 
tion, or that official pressure prevented them from 
expressing it, and in neither case was an election a 
true gauge of public opinion. The frequency with 
which military revolts have occurred in some of 
the Spanish-speaking countries is, indeed, explained 
by the fact that an election there has not been a 
faithful expression of the popular will, and therefore 
was not to be treated as final — a phenomenon that 
suggests grave reflections about the possibility of 
introducing truly representative institutions rapidly 
among a people unused to them. Nor is a condition 
of this kind wholly confined to states in which pop- 
ular government is a complete novelty. With all 
the experience the French have had, one may still 
observe how great an influence the administration 
has at elections. In the English-speaking countries 
there is a distinct tendency toward a reaction against 
the party in power, commonly called the swing of 
the pendulum, while in France the opposite is true. 
Nevertheless we may assume that, in a community 
fitted for self-government and accustomed to it, 
an election represents with fair accuracy the opinion 
of the people. But that statement does not carry 



§ 49] Representation of the Whole Nation 115 

us very far. Most political generalizations appear 
simple enough until we begin to inquire into their 
real significance; and just as we have analyzed the 
terms "public" and "opinion," so we must ask our- 
selves here what we mean by "the people" and by 
"representation." In short, we must try to form 
in our own minds a perfectly clear conception of 
what people are represented and what relation the 
representative bears to them. 

49. Representation of the Whole Nation and of Constituencies 

Various contradictory theories of representation 
have been advanced in more or less systematic 
form. One pair of these, which meets us at the 
threshold, turns on the question of who are the peo- 
ple represented; in other words whether each mem- 
ber of a legislative body represents the nation as 
a whole, or only the particular constituency that 
elected him. Normally the ambassadors assembled 
at an international congress represent exclusively 
the states that sent them. They are absolutely sub- 
ject to the directions of their home governments; 
and if they consider, not only the interests of their 
own countries, but also those of the whole family of 
nations, they do so because that is in accord with 
the wishes of their sovereigns. A tradition of this 
kind growing out of diplomatic relations among 
distinct, or only partially consolidated, states may 
survive long after the body in which it is found has 
become a national institution. The most familiar 
example at the present day is that of the German 
Bundesrath — the successor of the old Germanic 



116 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 49 

Diet — whose members are still compelled by a 
provision of the constitution to vote in accordance 
with the instructions of their respective govern- 
ments. In theory, therefore, these members still 
represent the component states of the German 
Empire, not the Empire as a whole. But it is 
unnecessary to dwell on a single case of this kind, 
for history is full of similar instances and their 
nature is well known. 

When we pass from bodies composed of the dele- 
gates of separate governments to representative 
chambers filled by popular election, it may be 
doubted whether any example can be found today 
of an assembly where the members are supposed, 
on principle, to represent their constituencies alone, 
in contradistinction to the country at large; or on 
the other hand, where they assume in practice to 
represent the nation as a whole, without regard 
to their constituencies. Nowhere do they consider 
themselves under an obligation to follow the senti- 
ments or interests of one to the exclusion of the 
other. Nowhere would a representative declare 
himself free to disregard altogether the national wel- 
fare if it conflicted with that of his constituents, or 
the welfare of his constituents if contrary to that 
of the nation. This is habitually true even of a 
body that expressly represents the component states 
of a federation. It is as true of the American 
Senate as of the House of Representatives. No 
member of either branch of Congress would venture 
to assert openly that a bill was injurious to the nation, 
but beneficial to his state, and that he should, there- 



§50] England and the United States 117 

fore, vote for it. Nor would lie represent faithfully 
the opinions of his constituents if he stated these 
facts and voted against the bill. He would contrive 
to find good reasons for believing it advantageous 
both for the nation and for his state. 

It is impossible to determine whether a modern 
legislature represents the whole country, on the 
ground that each of its members, although elected 
by one district, holds a national office; or whether 
it does so because, while each member represents 
only his own district, they reflect in combination 
the opinions of the country as a whole. Neither 
principle can be asserted absolutely and neither 
can be entirely denied; for in fact the representa- 
tive has two duties and performs two functions. 
He does not keep them distinct in his own mind, 
and fortunately they are not contradictory enough 
to oblige him to do so; but we may observe that it 
is considered a mark of larger patriotism to talk in 
public about his duty to the nation. 

60. Comparison of England and the United States 

Although neither of these views prevails anywhere 
to the exclusion of the other, a different emphasis 
is laid upon them in different places. In England, 
for example, there is in general a greater tendency 
than in the United States to lay stress upon the 
national, as compared with the local, character of 
a representative, — a fact that finds expression in 
the willingness to elect members of Parliament who 
do not reside in their constituencies — and in an 
article published in the Yale Review in May, 1908 



118 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 50 

(pp. 48-49) . Professor Max Farrand has shown that 
this difference of conception was already well marked 
at the time of the American Revolution. It was, per- 
haps, due to the fact that in New England, at least, 
representation was in early days a device for col- 
lecting local opinion by means of delegates; and in 
fact long after the Revolution a practice still sur- 
vived in Massachusetts of passing in town meeting 
votes instructing, or requesting, the representatives 
in the General Court to pursue a certain course of 
action. 

Whatever the origin of the difference may have 
been, there is no doubt that several factors contribute 
to maintain it. One of these is the absence in Eng- 
land of national appropriations for local improve- 
ments. Another is the elaborate system of private 
bill legislation in Parliament whereby local matters 
are virtually removed from politics, whereas in 
American state legislatures they engross above all 
else the activity of many of the members. A third 
factor is the system of cabinet responsibility which, 
by concentrating attention on the battle between the 
two front benches and forcing the members to follow 
their party leaders keeps them in constant touch 
with national party issues and comparatively free 
from other questions. 

The English system involves grave dangers, for 
the eager light of public interest, constantly focused 
upon the warfare across the table in the House 
of Commons, constrains the leaders in an unusual 
degree to seek immediate popularity. The fact 
that the party in power can be held to absolute 



§50] England and the United States 119 

responsibility for the action of the House offers a 
peculiarly strong inducement to cater to the voters 
who can be won by general legislation; the fact 
that the Member of Parliament is under a tremen- 
dous pressure to vote with his party in critical divi- 
sions tends to make personal opinion subservient 
to political expediency; and these influences work 
on a larger scale than in the United States, where 
the control of a party over its members in the legis- 
lative body is much less effective. 

In America, the chief danger is of a different kind. 
A representative, especially in the state legislatures, 
is tempted to think less of the common welfare, of 
public opinion in the whole community, and even 
of the general policy of his party, than of the way 
his action will affect the particular measure his 
constituents have at heart. Hence he is beset by 
an insidious motive to trade his vote in return for 
support on that measure. If he is not of high 
character, all this helps also to lay him open to the 
other influences that have promoted his election, 
the public service corporation and the machine boss. 
In short, the faults of our legislative bodies that 
bring them into disrepute are closely associated 
with the log-rolling incident to local and private 
acts. 1 In theory we may regard our representative 
as intrusted with the welfare of the community at 
large, but in practice he is far too closely bound 
to the interests of his particular constituents. Of 
course no country has a monopoly of any political 

1 Legislative Shortcomings, by Francis Cabot Lowell, in the Atlantic 
Monthly, March, 1897, pp. 368-369. Cf. Sect. 58, infra. 



120 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§51 

defect. All nations and all peoples are subject to 
the common frailties of mankind. We are speaking 
only of the comparative magnitude of different evils, 
and the contrast in this case between England and 
the United States is noteworthy. 

A Member of Parliament represents the nation 
as a whole largely because he is under the guid- 
ance of the cabinet, or of the leaders of the oppo- 
sition who expect to be ministers in their turn, and 
the present or prospective rulers of a country must 
have a national not a local standpoint. This is 
true also of a chief magistrate elected by the whole 
community. He may be the tool of a party, a 
class, a sect, or even of some special interest, but, 
save under very peculiar conditions, he can hardly 
be the agent of a district; and it is in great part a 
feeling that American legislative bodies represent a 
mass of local and other influences, while a single exec- 
utive officer represents the community as a whole, 
that has caused the increase of his power. Of late 
years the mayors of American cities have had their 
functions increased by law, but the President and the 
governors of states have gained authority in almost 
equal measure through a mere change in public sen- 
timent. Within the last generation they have used 
their veto power much more frequently, and they 
have undertaken with general approval a far more 
active part in shaping the policy of legislation. 

51. Remedies Proposed 

For the tendency of legislative bodies to represent 
a collection of local interests rather than public 



§ 51] Remedies Proposed 121 

opinion some remedies have been devised in other 
lands. Among them is that of electing a number 
of representatives in a large constituency, instead 
of having each one chosen in a separate electoral 
district. This has been done in France and Italy 
without effecting any radical cure; for although 
the local interests became larger, they were not 
effaced. 

Another remedy earnestly advocated in France 1 
and faintly heard elsewhere may be noted for a 
moment. It is a suggestion that instead of repre- 
senting geographical districts the members of the 
legislature should represent distinct interests; that 
instead of being elected by all the voters in a certain 
area they should be elected by people engaged in 
definite occupations. Thus we should have repre- 
sentatives of manufacturers, of bankers, of lawyers, 
of farmers, of artisans, and so on. The plan illus- 
trates the principles we have been considering, for 
it would tend to eliminate altogether the theory that 
a member of the legislature represents the nation 
as a whole. Each man would hold a brief for some 
special interest. All would be for a faction and no 
one for the state. The condition would be worse 
than excessive representation of localities, because 
the aims of the several districts are not of necessity 
antagonistic, as those of the different occupations 
are assumed to be in such a proposal. The sugges- 
tion is contrary to the principle that the legislative 
body ought to give effect to public opinion, because 
the true conception of public opinion is not a sum 

1 Charles Benoist, Le Crise de VEtat Moderne. 



122 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 52 

of divergent economic interests, but a general con- 
ception of political righteousness on which so far as 
possible all men should unite. 

52. Proportional Representation 

The device of proportional representation will 
naturally occur to the reader, but, while intended 
to correct certain defects in the system of represen- 
tation, it is not aimed directly at the evil we are 
now discussing — the predominance of local inter- 
ests. The attention paid to it has fluctuated very 
much, and of late years has revived. In the course 
of time the subject has given rise to a voluminous 
literature, all the larger because the advocates of 
each of the many forms proposed are often inclined 
to think their own plan quite different from, and far 
superior to, any of the others, although the general 
principles are in most cases essentially the same. 
The very size of this literature would make it im- 
possible to treat the matter adequately here, even 
if more closely germane to the questions under 
discussion. We are perforce limited to pointing 
out that, in the forms usually suggested, propor- 
tional representation is designed to prevent the 
minorities in a district from being unrepresented, 
and thereby to insure that people holding different 
opinions shall have seats in the legislature in some- 
thing like the ratio of their strength in the com- 
munity. This is the more important where, in 
order to avoid the pressure of local interests, con- 
stituencies electing several members are substituted 
for single electoral districts, because the larger and 



§ 52] Proportional Representation 123 

fewer the districts the greater the chance that con- 
siderable minorities will go unrepresented. 

The representation of minorities can certainly be 
attained by the system, but, in view of the tendency 
of some advocates of the plan to claim for it the 
benefits of a panacea, it is not superfluous to observe 
that disproportionate representation is not the sole, 
nor the most potent, cause of legislative defects. 
The system has been adopted in Belgium and 
Switzerland, but although it has had its best trial 
in those countries, it has not yet lasted long enough 
in either for a complete determination of its ultimate 
effects. One result to be watched with care is how 
far, like other complications in machinery, it will 
enhance the influence of the machinist; whether it 
will increase the power of wire-pullers and lessen 
the opportunity of the independent voter who cares 
less for party regularity than for the personal 
integrity and character of the candidate. In Bel- 
gium, where party spirit runs high, it seems to 
have strengthened party discipline, eliminated inde- 
pendent candidates, and reduced the scratching 
of tickets at elections. Under the conditions that 
prevail there this is considered a decided advantage. 1 
Such a result is most injurious where, as in Illinois, 
the system assists only a single minority by means 
of the limited vote. On the other hand, an effort 
to protect a large number of minorities may result, 
as in the case of the English school boards and the 
legislature in Geneva, in so splitting up the vote 

1 Dupriez, U Organisation du Suffrage Universel en Belgique, pp. 
174, 206-207. 



124 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 53 

that the elected body represents many small groups 
instead of the public at large. Partly for this reason 
the school boards in England have been abolished; 
and to reduce the number of small groups the quota 
for counting votes in Geneva has recently been 
raised. 1 

53. The Theories of Delegation and of Personal Judgment 

Another pair of contradictory theories of repre- 
sentation raises the question of the relation of a 
representative to the people. One theory asserts 
that he is a mere delegate to express their views; 
the other that he is selected for the purpose of using 
his own judgment on the matters he is called upon 
to decide. The question was given prominence by 
the celebrated controversy between Burke and the 
electors of Bristol, and in one form or another it has 
been cropping up ever since. From time to time a 
claim has been made by some local political organ- 
ization in England that it is entitled to call upon its 
Member of Parliament to resign when he ceases to 
act with his party. During the course of the South 
African War the claim was put forward in several 
cases, and on that occasion its validity cannot be 
said to have been universally admitted or denied. 
A symptom of the same trend of thought is seen in 
the demand made in the United States for a right 
on the part of a majority of the electorate to recall 
the men chosen to office. 

The proper relation of a representative to his 
constituents is akin to the question already dis- 

1 Referendum of November 10, 1912. 



§ 54] Delegation and Personal Judgment 125 

cussed; that is, whether he represents the whole 
country or merely a single district. As in that case 
we can find examples of bodies whose members are 
clearly mere delegates appointed to vote as they are 
directed, and we may refer again to the German 
Bundesrath for this purpose. But in a legislature 
elected by the people neither view does, nor in the 
nature of things can, wholly prevail; for, on the 
one hand, a representative is presumably in general 
accord with the opinions of his constituents, and is 
in fact more or less sensitive to their desires; while, 
on the other hand, if he has self-respect he never 
feels absolutely bound to follow their directions in 
all matters. He is no doubt selected because the 
voters approve of his attitude on the leading public 
issues, but special questions often arise on which he 
must be free to act according to his own opinion. 

54. Comparison of England and the United States 

Although neither the theory that a representative 
is a mere delegate, nor that which regards him as 
a person selected to exercise his own unfettered 
judgment, is anywhere carried to its logical con- 
clusion, yet, like the* theories of local and national 
representation, the relative importance of the two 
principles varies in different countries; and the 
comparison of England and the United States in 
this respect is again instructive. One might sup- 
pose that the stronger representation of local inter- 
ests and the tendency to be a delegate would go 
together on one side; and on the other the greater 
attention to broader issues with more personal 



126 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 54 

freedom of action. This would be so if the effect 
of national political parties did not enter into the 
problem, but we cannot leave them out of account 
as the political philosophers of the eighteenth 
century did when they speculated about democracy 
without an opportunity of watching it in action. 

A Member of Parliament is less free than an 
American representative to follow his personal 
opinions, because he must support the leaders of 
the party to which he belongs on pain of seeing 
them turned out of office and being himself branded 
as a renegade. Contrary to a prevalent impression, 
statistics prove that in Congress party lines are 
much less strictly drawn than in the House of Com- 
mons, and still less strictly in the legislatures of 
almost all the states. 1 An American representa- 
tive is, therefore, more free to exercise his own 
judgment on the questions with which he is called 
upon to deal. But if the Member of Parliament is 
less at liberty to act as he pleases, he is bound, not 
to his constituents as their delegate, but to a party 
that stands for national issues. The effort to exact 
from a candidate pledges on subjects of all kinds is, 
no doubt, carried farther in England than in the 
United States, but no prudent candidate will pledge 
himself against the declared policy of the party 
leaders, and they have usually taken their stand on 
most of the important matters that have a serious 
chance of being embodied in legislation. 

The coercive force of a party over its members 
is, perhaps, carried farther by the Labor Party in 

1 For a reference to these statistics see the note to Sect. 39, supra. 



§54] England and the United States 127 

Australia than by any other group of men forming 
the majority in a representative body at the present 
day. The action to be taken is determined by a 
caucus, and unlike the legislative caucus in America, 
which is rarely able to control all the members of 
the party, the decision of the Australian caucus 
appears to be rigidly obeyed. It is the English 
parliamentary system made democratic and carried 
to its logical result, a system where the ministry is 
responsible for the whole policy of legislation, and 
where it is strictly the business of the party in power 
to govern and of the opposition to oppose. 

In England a member of Parliament habitually 
follows his party leaders except in the rare cases 
when he has a very strong conviction that their 
policy is wrong, and this makes his course plain. 
In the vast majority of questions he has only to 
vote with the whips of his party; but the American 
representative is placed by his wider freedom in a 
position of greater difficulty where he is more open 
to criticism. If he is honest and sensible, he may 
be assumed to agree with the majority of his con- 
stituents on the most important questions about 
which a public opinion had been formed at the time 
of his election. But how is he to act on matters 
that arise afterwards, or on the manifold details 
of legislation? Is he to follow his party; is he to 
listen for the whispers of popular sentiment; or is 
he to act as in his own judgment is best for the 
public welfare, taking into account, of course, the 
need of concerted action to achieve any result and 
all other far-reaching effects of his conduct? If he 



128 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 54 

is to do the last he will no doubt make mistakes 
for which he can throw the responsibility on no 
one else; and he certainly will not always conform 
to public opinion. A legislative body composed of 
men guided by that principle may be wiser or less 
wise than the mass of the people, but will not 
invariably reflect their views. 

These two theories of representation — the duty 
to carry out the opinion of one's constituents, or 
to act on one's own best judgment — are to some 
extent inconsistent, and we must recognize that 
fact clearly with all the consequences it implies. 
We must remember also that, under the American 
practice of voluminous legislation there are many 
subjects upon which the public are quite incapable, 
for lack of time if for no other reason, of forming 
an opinion. In fact the legislature itself has not 
time to study them all thoroughly, for we have over- 
whelmed our representatives as well as the people 
with too much work. We demand that they shall 
act in accord with public opinion on matters where 
neither the public nor the legislature itself can have 
a real opinion. Such matters must be decided, but 
a discussion of the methods whereby this is or can 
be done must be reserved until we come to the 
regulation of matters to which public opinion cannot 
directly apply. 



CHAPTER X 

LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN REPRESENTATIVE BODIES 

55. The Rise of Modern Legislatures 

Modern representative government traces its 
origin to the mediaeval device for taxing the differ- 
ent estates and giving them in consequence a share 
in the direction of public affairs. In most of the 
larger countries of Europe the institution disappeared 
in the seventeenth century with the growth of an 
efficient centralized monarchy; but in England it 
had strength enough to endure, and the House of 
Commons as the one great national assembly has 
furnished, directly or indirectly, the model for almost 
all the elected chambers of the present day. 

When, toward the end of the eighteenth century, 
and during the first half of the nineteenth, discon- 
tent with autocratic rule and a desire for popular 
participation in politics spread over western Europe, 
representation was eagerly seized as the instrument 
needed for the purpose. It was generally extolled 
as the greatest of political inventions, as the only 
means whereby popular government could be con- 
ducted on a large scale. To its absence in the 
ancient world was attributed the small size of the 
democracies in Greece and the downfall of popular 
institutions in Rome. It was, of course, resisted 

9 129 



130 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 56 

by men who had no confidence in democracy, but 
by almost all those who believed in the rule of the 
people it was acclaimed as the necessary, if not 
absolutely flawless, agency for liberty, progress, and 
justice. The turbulence and miscarriage of popular 
government in the French Revolution did not 
destroy the faith of democrats, and if succeeding 
assemblies in France were unsatisfactory, that was 
ascribed to the very limited nature of the electorate. 
Every popular agitation on the continent of Europe 
took the form of a demand for a constitution and a 
parliament, until all the more progressive nations 
had adopted legislative chambers elected by popu- 
lar vote. They were to be the harbingers and pledge 
of a new era for mankind. 

56. Recent Distrust of Legislatures 

Many countries have now enjoyed for a consider- 
able length of time representative legislatures elected 
on a widely extended suffrage, but the results have 
often been disappointing. The political millennium 
is farther off than when enthusiasts began to build 
the road to it and saw its splendors in the sky. 
Disillusionment has shed a cold gray light over the 
landscape, while men, heedless as usual of the in- 
exorable laws of nature, are seeking for a scapegoat. 
Representative assemblies have not proved senates 
of unfailing wisdom, guided only by desire for the 
public good, and from many quarters we hear 
laments over their deficiencies. 

The contrast between expectation and results is 
not, perhaps, so sharp in the United States as in 



§ 57] Causes of Loss of Confidence 131 

some other places, because the confidence in repre- 
sentative bodies was always tempered there. When 
Americans framed their own governments after the 
Revolution, they foresaw abuse on the part of 
legislatures, and strove to prevent it by limiting 
their power. Jefferson declared that they were the 
bodies most to be feared and would remain so for 
many years to come. Many years have passed, and 
the feeling has grown more pronounced. Public 
confidence in them has manifestly declined, and 
with increasing rapidity of late, until it almost 
seems that the American people are drifting towards 
a general loss of faith in representative government. 

57- Causes of Loss of Confidence 

The growing distrust of legislative assemblies is 
due partly to the actual defects they have displayed, 
and partly to popular exaggeration of their faults. 
One of the most universal causes of complaint is 
the tendency to play party politics instead of 
regarding purely the welfare of the whole com- 
munity. It is strange that anyone with ordinary 
perception of human nature should not have antici- 
pated this; but the earlier democrats were notori- 
ously blind to the forces that give rise to parties in 
politics, and like reformers in all ages they assumed 
that their principles would bring about a change in 
the character of public men. 

Bad as the results of the tendency to play politics 
often are, they cannot be attributed wholly to evil 
motives. Everyone who tries to work effectively 
with other men recognizes the need of concerted 



132 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 57 

action and knows that to achieve it he must keep 
those with whom he is associated united in a com- 
mon cause. Even for a good man it is not easy in 
the heat of the fray to judge the means employed 
at their true value; for the battle often becomes 
engaged over a point that appears to the com- 
batants more important, and to the spectators of 
less moment, than it really is. To a man who 
believes sincerely that the prosperity of the nation 
is bound up with the success of his party, the 
manoeuvres of politics are apt to assume an undue 
prominence; and if this is true of a man with high 
conceptions of duty, it is still more true of the ordi- 
nary man in whom the excitement of the struggle 
is liable to overshadow greater ends. 

The tendency of representative assemblies to 
play politics exists everywhere; and, as is often the 
case, the outcries against it are not loudest where 
it is greatest, but where it is most out of place. 
Grand tactics in party warfare are, perhaps, dis- 
played on the most comprehensive scale in the 
British House of Commons, but they excite little 
reprobation because the motives are obvious and 
rational. Party politics play a considerable part 
and provoke as a rule more hostile comment in 
the continental assemblies with their divisions into 
many groups. They are prominent in Congress 
also, but are less fiercely condemned there than in 
the state legislatures, although, save in the case of 
the New York Assembly, party politics are a far 
smaller factor in the legislatures of the states than 
in Congress or in almost all other representative 



§ 58] The Pressure of Local Interests 133 

bodies. 1 The reason for the severe criticism of the 
action of parties in American state legislatures is 
its general lack of justification. The parties are 
divided mainly on national issues which have no 
connection with the ordinary legislation of the 
state, and hence manoeuvres for party advantage 
are foreign to the object the legislatures are designed 
to serve. This is, indeed, the strongest argument 
for withdrawing from them the election of United 
States senators, for that throws them almost inevi- 
tably into the vortex of national politics. Political 
parties have even less justification in municipal 
government where national politics have no proper 
place, and where their presence has fostered political 
abuses of the worst form. 

58. The Pressure of Local Interests 

Another defect of our legislatures is the prominence 
of local interests with the consequent temptation 
to log-rolling. The man who is sent to the legisla- 
ture from the town of Southfield chiefly in order to 
secure an act for a dam on the Quinnebet River is 
in a false position. He meets a representative of 
the large city, a very sensible person, who appreci- 
ates quickly the desire of the inhabitants of South- 
field for the dam, and tells him that the city people 
are very anxious for the benefits that will come from 
the grant of a franchise for a street railway; and 
so, perhaps deliberately, perhaps unconsciously, he 

1 See A. L. Lowell, "Party Votes in the House of Commons, in 
Congress, and in the State Legislatures," in the Annual Report 
of the American Historical Association, 1901. Vol. I, pp. 319-542. 



134 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 59 

trades his vote on the franchise for a vote on the 
dam. He knows nothing about the merits of the 
franchise. How can he? There are such a multi- 
tude of these bills and people make such contra- 
dictory statements about them. His new friend, 
who knows all about it, tells him that the opposition 
to the bill is worked up by a rival interest. Some 
years later there is an investigation, and he learns 
that the grant of the franchise was scandalous. 

This subject has been discussed in the preceding 
chapter, and it is enough for our purpose to point 
out that since local matters cannot ordinarily be 
the subject of general public opinion, and since they 
are in practice too numerous for a real opinion on 
the part of the legislature as a whole, they ought, 
so far as possible, to be decided by the locality 
concerned, or placed in the hands of an adminis- 
trative body or a committee that will act impartially 
and apply to each case principles established by 
general legislation. 

59. The Pressure of Private Interests 

A third defect arises from the action of private 
interests, at the present day mainly of a corporate 
nature. Direct conscious corruption, the sale of a 
vote for cash, is probably less common than it is 
often supposed to be. When it occurs, the fault 
lies primarily with the electorate for choosing dis- 
honest men who are usually perfectly well known 
to be untrustworthy. No honest man is corrupted 
by an open bribe against his will. The fable of 
the French deputy who harangued his constituents 



§60] The Lobby 135 

about the demoralizing condition of the Chamber, 
and told them the atmosphere there was so corrupt 
that even he did not escape entirely unscathed, is 
very well as a joke because it was a confession of 
his own lack of character. 

The less transparent forms of influence are more 
common and more dangerous, for the well-inten- 
tioned but inexperienced legislator may be quite 
unconscious of the way in which his opinions have 
been warped. The fact that a corporation has 
given his near relative a good position, or has rendered 
his friend some service, may prejudice him in its 
favor without his realizing it. This is particularly 
true when, not being on the committee to which 
the bill is referred, he is not compelled to hear the 
evidence, and has neither the time nor the knowledge 
needed to study the question for himself. The 
force that can be brought to bear by the enormous 
pay-rolls of great corporations is prodigious, and in 
some cases it has been used to help a party boss as 
the price of political services. In addition to the 
public offices in his gift, a boss has often been able 
to find places for his dependents by recommending 
them to the kindly consideration of public-service 
corporations. This is a link between these bodies 
and the boss which increases the power of both; 
and where it exists it is an evil exceedingly hard to 
combat. 

60. The Lobby 

The lobby opens another channel for private 
influence. Unfortunately the term includes many 
different operations, from those that are perfectly 



136 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 60 

proper to rank bribery; and the very confusion 
caused by the vagueness of the word presents an 
obstacle to applying an effective remedy for what 
is wrong. So far as lobbying at the legislatures 
means employment of counsel to argue publicly 
before a committee, it is free from objection. In 
fact it is an important aid to wise and just legis- 
lation. But when lobbying means the personal 
solicitation of individual legislators it has quite a 
different significance, even when there is no trace 
of actual corruption. It is an attempt to catch the 
member alone and persuade him in private by 
arguments that might be easily refuted by the other 
side. 

Clearly in those matters on which opinion cannot 
readily be formed by current public discussion, 
where a careful weighing of evidence is needed, it 
is important that the members should be placed 
in a judicial attitude and surrounded so far as pos- 
sible by the safeguards that experience has proved 
essential in judicial proceedings. What confidence 
should we have in the verdict of a jury if the parties 
were allowed to interview the several jurors in 
private; and why should we put greater reliance 
on the decision of legislators if this is almost their 
only source of information? So long, however, as 
the legislator is called upon to deal with vast num- 
bers of bills that cannot be discussed in open session 
with anything like the fulness with which cases 
are presented to a jury, it is impossible to prevent 
the people interested from bringing matters to the 
attention of members by talking to them. Some- 



§ 61] Private Influences in Elections 137 

thing can be done, and has been done, in several 
of our states, to regulate the practice of lobbying, 
by distinguishing between counsel retained to argue 
before committees and lobbyists engaged to inter- 
view privately. The registration of such men in 
different lists gives the member a chance to know 
that the person who approaches him is a paid agent 
employed to advocate a cause. If this does not 
place the legislator in a judicial attitude, at least it 
puts him upon his guard. 

61. Private Influences in Elections 

If the American public is losing its faith in repre- 
sentative government and demanding direct popular 
action, the sinister influences in politics have long 
been travelling a similar road by turning their 
attention from the representative body to the 
electorate. Large private interests have found 
that, instead of seeking to obtain a control over the 
legislator after election, it is less difficult and less 
dangerous to devote their energy to the election 
itself, and herein again they have been able to con- 
tract an alliance with professional politicians for 
mutual benefit. 

In the boss-ridden states the influence of the boss 
over the legislature is based mainly upon his power 
of controlling nominations and helping to elect the 
candidates. Even for legitimate campaign expenses 
money is needed, which can be provided by public- 
service corporations and other bodies that may be 
affected by the laws enacted in the ensuing session. 
Their easiest means of procuring friends among the 



138 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 61 

members is therefore a subscription to the campaign 
funds of the boss; and since their object is private 
gratitude, not party victory, they sometimes con- 
tribute to the funds of both parties, while the bosses, 
who are plying a trade, rather than advancing a 
public policy, have no scruple about joining to assist 
a common benefactor. Let us not imagine that this 
depicts a universal condition, for many states have 
never suffered boss rule; nor let it be supposed that 
the majority of any legislature is habitually under 
the orders of a boss, but the control of even a small 
number of members is usually enough where a case 
fairly good on its face can be made out. 

We hear complaints in such cases that legislators 
do not represent the people faithfully. Yet if they 
are to be guided, not by their own sense of what is 
right, but by public opinion, it is not unnatural that 
they should gauge that opinion by the prospect of 
reelection; and if their reelection depends upon a 
boss whose good will in the matter is nevertheless 
contrary to the real sentiment of the electorate, 
then this mode of expressing public opinion is 
vitiated at its source. Clearly it is unfair to elect 
incompetent or untrustworthy men and blame the 
legislature for not being wiser and better. It is 
particularly irrational on the part of men who have 
voted for representatives of that character. If an 
honest legislator cannot be corrupted against his 
will, it is not less true that the people cannot be 
compelled to elect the candidates of the boss unless 
they want to do so. Moreover, bad as the conduct 
of some corporations has undoubtedly been, it must 



§ 62] Defects of Legislatures Exaggerated 139 

be remembered that a vicious legislature is a sore 
temptation. Those who are familiar with the 
subject assert that the attempts to extort blackmail 
are far more frequent than the efforts to obtain 
privileges by purchase. This is no excuse either 
for seeking privileges or for resisting blackmail 
by corrupt means; but a condition that puts a 
premium on corruption in resisting injustice is 
exceedingly demoralizing to the whole community, 
and that condition is caused by requiring the 
legislatures to do work of a kind that they cannot 
do properly, and more work than any body could 
do well. 

62. Defects of Legislatures Exaggerated 

If the condition of legislative bodies in America 
is as bad as many good men believe, it forebodes 
mischief; for in the same way that a people among 
whom jurors cannot be trusted to be fairly impartial 
is unsuited for popular forms of trial, so a people 
who can neither trust nor control their represent- 
atives is at best imperfectly fitted for popular 
government. The complaints are, in fact, often 
exaggerated, because the public is unable to unravel 
the tangled threads of politics, to follow the innu- 
merable measures through the criss-cross divisions 
in the legislature, or to appreciate the reasons for a 
vote on a particular bill. English politics are much 
more simple. One has only to keep his eyes on the 
battle between the two front benches, which is 
waged in a bright light with the party organs 
unceasingly explaining every move in the game. 



140 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 62 

But here, where the voting is far less on party lines 
and hence the party cannot be held responsible, 
where most of the work is done in the many com- 
mittees of Congress and the state legislatures, 
where the field is complicated and the public are 
suspicious of everything they do not see, it is easy 
to give credit to rumors that are hard to disprove. 
Both the difficulty of controlling public officers 
and the exaggeration of their shortcomings have 
increased with the growth of democracy and the 
greater complexity of party machinery resulting 
therefrom. Advocates of the initiative and referen- 
dum assert that public opinion was more effective 
before the national party conventions arose than 
it has been since. 1 But the national convention 
for the nomination of a presidential candidate was 
regarded as a highly popular institution when it 
was devised, a revolt against the undemocratic 
nomination by a congressional caucus. It was an 
effort to restore to the people the selection of candi- 
dates, which had been usurped by the representa- 
tives in Congress. That the choice of the members 
of the conventions fell into the hands of a machine 
was a natural consequence of the size and complexity 
of the electorate. That it turned to the profit of 
the wire-puller is merely another example of the 
truth that the larger the number of men to be united 
for common action the more elaborate the machinery 
will inevitably become, and the greater the power 
of the men who can manipulate the machine. 

1 Memorial of Initiative and Referendum League (Senate Doc., 60 
Cong., 1 Sess., No. 516) pp. 4-5. 



§ 62] Defects of Legislatures Exaggerated 141 

The tendency to exaggerate the defects of repre- 
sentative assemblies is due in part to the inclination 
of men not in active public life to assume that their 
views are shared by the community and improperly 
slighted by politicians. We suffer, no doubt, from 
a lack of experience in our public bodies; but we 
suffer also from a self-confidence that causes every- 
one to think himself capable of forming a valuable 
opinion on every subject, and not less from a general 
lack of mutual confidence in one another. This 
last is a highly important matter, for it lies at the 
root of much of our evil-doing in politics, in business, 
and in daily life. It extends from the college 
athletic teams to the railroad corporations. Much 
secret cutting of rates and illicit rebating has been 
due to the fact that the railroad managers did 
not trust each other. So far was this true that for 
a time the expression a "gentlemen's agreement" 
meant an agreement that was not kept. Each 
company was easily persuaded by a shipper that 
the other side was breaking faith, and thought it 
no sin to do the same. The lack of mutual confi- 
dence, which has been a fertile cause of dishonesty, 
arises from the upsetting of old standards by the 
sudden changes of industry, and from the extreme 
mobility of the population. It is, perhaps, a natural 
result of the rapid struggle to subdue a wilderness. 
In spite of many phenomena to the contrary the 
conditions of American life have developed individual 
self-assertion and self-reliance at the expense of the 
qualities that make for collective self-control. 

We cannot repeat too often that one of the chief 



142 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 63 

difficulties in America lies, not so much in bringing 
public opinion to bear in cases where it can and does 
exist, as in the failure to perceive its intrinsic limi- 
tations. We need to learn on what subjects a real 
public opinion can be formed, how far it can extend 
to particular measures, and how far it is of necessity 
confined to general principles. We must then see 
that within those limits it is given its proper effect; 
but we must also recognize that beyond those limits 
there is a field in which the representative must act 
on his own judgment, and here we must take care 
that the conditions surrounding him promote as 
far as possible honesty and wisdom. Of this some- 
thing will be said hereafter. The problem of pre- 
venting representative bodies from acting contrary 
to public opinion has hitherto attracted far more 
popular attention. 

63. Results of the Confusion of Thought 

It will be observed that our ideas of the functions 
proper to a legislative assembly are highly confused 
and to a great extent contradictory. We are not 
clear how far the members represent the whole 
community and how far their several constituencies ; 
how far they are elected to give effect to public 
opinion and how far they are chosen in order that 
they may exercise their own judgment. It may be 
observed, also, that the defects in representative 
bodies which provoke criticism and lack of public 
confidence are in the main a natural consequence 
of this confusion of thought. The qualities that 
make a legislative body a faithful exponent of the 



§63] Results of Confusion of Thought 143 

currents of public opinion do not confer on its 
members the independence of judgment needed to 
decide rightly intricate questions on which the pub- 
lic have no opinion. If, therefore, the legislature is 
intended to reflect the opinions of the state as a 
whole, its members ought to be chosen by reason of 
their political opinions, and it ought to deal as little 
as possible with matters of purely local interest; 
whereas in fact the member for Southfield, while 
calling himself by the name of the political party 
long dominant in the place, may be really elected 
to obtain for it a right to draw its water supply 
from the Quinnebet River. For the same reason a 
legislature so constituted ought to deal as little as 
possible with private bills, whereas the member is 
called upon today to vote on public measures far 
less frequently than on local and private ones, and 
if he owes his election to a boss he is subjected to 
constant pressure, not to say commands, to vote 
in these last matters according to the trades the 
boss has made. If, on the other hand, the legis- 
lature is intended to deal mainly with local and 
private matters, on which there is no general public 
opinion, the members ought to be placed in a judi- 
cial attitude, surrounded by judicial safeguards for 
impartiality, and like the judges and jurors they 
ought to be freed from political pressure of all kinds, 
even that which may call itself public opinion. 

The confusion of aims has been the direct source 
of scandals; for the very fact that the legislature is 
elected ostensibly for public objects, and that the 
members are, therefore, nominated by the political 



144 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 64 

parties, whereas after election the attention of those 
members is largely occupied by local and private 
matters, naturally gives to the parties, or rather 
to the manipulators of the parties, an opportunity 
to exert an influence in these matters, with which 
the parties have properly no concern. In short, 
the main difficulty lies in a failure to distinguish 
between the affairs that are and that are not fit 
subjects for public opinion and to provide the 
appropriate machinery for dealing with each class. 

64. Remedies Devised for Legislative Defects 

In England this distinction is recognized, and the 
special system of legislation by private bills and 
provisional orders creates a different procedure for 
public questions and for local or private ones, the 
former being political, the latter essentially judicial, 
in character. But the remedies adopted in Amer- 
ica have been almost wholly negative, designed to 
restrain bad legislation, or even to diminish all 
legislation, rather than to insure proper considera- 
tion of the laws enacted. 

One device almost as old as our national existence, 
and lasting to the present day, is that of limit- 
ing the powers of the legislature by the provisions 
of the constitution. This prevents the legislature 
from doing things that the people in their sovereign 
capacity of constitution-makers think it ought not 
to have authority to do. We have already seen that 
it has great advantages in defining the field within 
which the minority is bound to submit to the will 
of the majority. Such is the object of the Bill of 



§ 64] Remedies for Legislative Defects 145 

Rights that finds a place in all our constitutions. 
Sometimes, however, the restrictions go so far that 
they prevent the majority from acting in matters 
where its opinion ought to be decisive. Of late 
years the tendency has gone very far, especially in 
the newer parts of the country, for the state con- 
stitutions have grown longer and more elaborate, 
fettering the legislatures to an ever increasing extent. 
Practically this results in restraining the people 
themselves, in preventing a genuine public opinion 
which exceeds the limits prescribed from having 
the operation it ought to have. It cannot, indeed, 
forever hinder the public from having their way if 
they continue long enough of the same mind; but 
it does erect a barrier that is not easily or rapidly 
surmounted. If carried too far it is a limitation 
of normal representative government, to be justified 
only on the ground that the legislature cannot be 
trusted; and this is, indeed, the motive of such 
provisions. The remedy is clearly negative, designed 
not to make the legislature good, but to prevent its 
committing certain specified sins. 

One form the constitutional restraints have taken 
has been that of forbidding special legislation. If 
this went so far as to withdraw from the legislature 
all local and private bills, and provide some other 
method of settling those matters which cannot be 
regulated by general laws, it might have greater 
importance, but it has merely touched the fringe 
of the subject and has a slight negative effect. The 
provisions have been evaded by passing a general 
law, for example, for all cities of the second class, 
10 



146 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 64 

and classifying the cities in the state so that only 
one of them falls into that class. The courts have 
begun to hold that such laws violate the constitu- 
tion, but their frequent enactment has shown how 
difficult it is to enforce a provision of this kind. 
Moreover, provisions against special legislation 
have not seriously interfered with the flood of 
special acts, for Professor Reinsch tells us that in 
the Hve years from 1899 to 1904 the number of 
acts passed by legislatures in the United States 
was 45,552, of which 16,320 were public and the 
rest special and local. 1 

The flood of special acts has been in part the cause 
of another mode of restricting the legislative out- 
put — a method also more commonly used in the 
newer than in the older states — that of lessening 
the frequency and limiting the duration of the 
sessions. It seems to be done in pursuance of the 
theory set forth by Mr. Bryce when he spoke of 
the American principle that most bills are presump- 
tively bad, ergo kill as many as you can. This again 
is an attempt, not to make the legislatures good, 
but to limit the harm they can do by limiting their 
total activity. It lessens their dignity, and there- 
with their sense of responsibility, while the shorten- 
ing of the session renders well-considered legislation 
almost impossible. Forty days every two years is 
far too brief a period for a proper discussion of the 
questions that ought to come before the legislative 
body, and it is not surprising that the members 
make little effort to use that time for fruitful debate. 

1 American Legislatures and Legislative Methods, p. 300. 



§65] The Recall 147 

65. The Recall 

A new device for keeping the representative under 
control has been urged of late, that of a power to 
recall him by vote of his constituents. It is akin 
to the practice freely employed at one time in 
Massachusetts of adopting in town meeting instruc- 
tions to the representative. This disappeared about 
a hundred years ago, no doubt because it proved 
inexpedient, and because it could be effectively 
used only where there were frequent town meetings 
and the member was elected by the town. Like 
that practice, the recall, as applied to a member of 
the legislature, assumes that he represents, not the 
whole community, but only his constituency; and 
in this it differs for the worse from the Swiss insti- 
tution for dissolving the whole legislature by vote 
of the whole canton, a provision which still has a 
place in the constitutions of several cantons, but, 
after a few fitful experiments at the outset, has long 
fallen into disuse. 

The recall assumes also that the representative 
is essentially a delegate, whose duty consists in 
giving effect to the prevalent opinion of his district, 
instead of a public servant charged to exercise his 
own judgment on the evidence brought before him. 
It would be obviously improper for the district to 
recall him because it disliked his action on local 
or private bills in which it was not interested and 
had no real opinion; and if it did so because it dis- 
liked his action on a bill in which it was directly 
interested, the result would be to accentuate one of 



148 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 65 

the worst evils from which our legislatures suffer. 
Of course this is not the way the recall of a repre- 
sentative presents itself to its advocates. To them 
it appears as a method of getting rid of a man 
who has proved himself unworthy, but if so it is 
an acknowledgment of popular incapacity to choose 
trustworthy men, with a hope that a second election 
will be wiser than the first. The effects of the 
recall are at present a matter of speculation, and 
there is no need of dwelling upon the institution 
here, except to point out that it is one more symp- 
tom of the distrust of representative government, 
and another device for restraining misconduct rather 
than for improving the conditions under which the 
legislature works. 

The recall touches the present discussion only so 
far as it affects the legislature; but where it has 
been adopted it is by no means confined to members 
of this body, nor, indeed, is that its primary intent. 
When it is applied to executive officers representing 
an entire community, and is coupled with a length- 
ening of the terms for which they are chosen, it has 
much the same object as frequent elections for short 
periods, and may, perhaps, accomplish that object 
better. Its application to the judiciary involves 
other considerations. If a judge is intended to 
render decisions that will be approved by the people 
at large, then he ought to be recalled if he fails to 
do so; but if his function is to administer justice 
without fear or favor, the recall is as much out of 
place as the decision of law suits by a mass meet- 
ing of citizens. The laws that he applies ought to 



§ 66] The Direct Primary 149 

be consonant with public opinion, but he ought to 
decide cases according to his conscience. If he is 
incompetent, corrupt, or in any way unfit for his 
high office, he ought to be impeached or removed 
after trial or hearing. 

66. The Direct Primary 

Another remedy for the election of public officers 
who do not truly represent public opinion has been 
sought in nomination by a direct primary of all the 
voters in the party, instead of by a party convention 
of delegates chosen by the local caucuses. This 
again is not designed principally for members of 
the legislature, but for officers chosen from a larger 
area. Its object is to strike at the power of the 
political machine, at the control by the professional 
politician; and the desire for relief of that kind has 
caused it to be adopted widely, one might almost 
say generally, over the United States. But it is 
still so new that its ultimate effects can as yet only 
be conjectured. As in the case of all devices from 
which too much is expected, its first results have 
not been wholly satisfactory. Whether in the future 
they will improve or not time alone can show. 

We have already seen that any body of people 
can only answer "Yes" or "No" to a question 
presented to them for decision, and at elections it 
is the function of parties to formulate the question 
by presenting candidates to the voters. This is 
still done under the direct primary; but the party 
itself is so large a body that someone must pre- 
sent the candidates for nomination to its members. 



150 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 66 

Even if all the Republican voters in a state could 
come together in mass meeting, a name to be dis- 
cussed and voted upon would have to be proposed 
by someone, and this is certainly not less true when 
the members of the party never meet together, but 
cast their ballots singly in polling booths. Moreover, 
to propose a name to all the party voters in a large 
community is not a simple matter. It is not enough 
to collect the number of signatures required to entitle 
the name to appear on the ballot. That is labori- 
ous; but to have any chance of success the candi- 
date and his qualifications must be made known to 
the voters, and that involves an organization with 
branches throughout the community. 

The bill of Governor Hughes in New York pro- 
vided that candidates for nomination should be pro- 
posed by the standing committee of the party, a 
plan that did away with nomination by a conven- 
tion and made the party chiefs responsible for their 
selection of candidates to the whole body of the 
party, but did not entail any other organization 
unless the nominations were objectionable to a con- 
siderable body of voters, when there would be a 
palpable motive for it. But under the usual system 
of direct primaries a special organization to solicit 
the nomination is normally a necessity, even when 
the only question is between the rival ambitions of 
individuals; an organization, by the way, which is 
temporary in its nature, for it concerns only a 
single election if it is not to work a permanent split 
in the party. Now such an organization is very 
expensive, and can hardly be undertaken unless 



§66] The Direct Primary 151 

the candidate or his friends are prepared to spend 
money freely. The contests for nomination at the 
direct primaries in Wisconsin in 1909 are said to 
have cost the candidates $802, 659. * 

The direct primary intensifies the practice, which 
had already begun to prevail under the convention 
system, of conducting an elaborate preliminary 
canvass for nomination. Perhaps this is inevitable 
under present conditions, but anything that tends 
to increase the personal expenses of election is 
unfortunate, and perhaps the tendency toward self- 
nomination is not altogether beneficial. The evil 
to be combated is real, and the effect of selecting 
members of a state legislature with a view to their 
choice of United States senator is not good; but it 
is by no means yet proved that the direct primary is 
the road to the promised land. 

1 Address of Senator Lodge at Princeton University, 1912 (Senate 
Doc., 62 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 406), p. 8. 



CHAPTER XI 

DIRECT POPULAR ACTION 

67. The Referendum 

The inroads made on the representative system 
in the United States bring us to a consideration 
of the second method of expressing public opinion, 
that of direct popular action. In America this is 
in part a native .growth and in part a recent imi- 
tation of Swiss institutions. Only two effective 
methods of direct action by the people have yet 
been devised: a popular assembly which can debate 
before it votes; and a ballot cast at the polls without 
a general meeting of the voters. 

68. The Town Meeting 

Popular assemblies have existed at various times 
from the dawn of history to our own day, the 
examples most familiar to us being the Athenian 
ecclesia, the Swiss lands gemeinde, and the town 
meeting of New England. 1 Obviously they can be 
used only when the community is compact enough 
to permit the citizens to come together easily, and 

1 There is a common feeling that the town meeting is a small affair 
compared with the Swiss landsgemeinde. It has not the sovereign power, 
but it is not by any means always smaller. The town of Brookline in 
Massachusetts, for example, has several times the population of the 
largest Swiss canton that still allows amendment and debate at its 
landsgemeinde. 

152 



§ 68] The Town Meeting 153 

small enough to enable them to hear a man's voice. 
When these limits are exceeded the institution loses 
its character as it has done in the Swiss canton of 
Appenzell-Ausserrhoden, where debate is no longer 
possible. In such a case the essential object of the 
meeting is lost, and the people might as well cast 
their votes in polling booths nearer home. 

A mass meeting of the citizens has distinct advan- 
tages over a popular vote taken without a meeting. 
In the first place the questions that arise in a com- 
munity small enough to have such an assembly 
are more likely to be simple and local. They are 
more likely to affect matters with which everyone 
is familiar, and hence fall more commonly within 
the range of subjects on which a real public opinion 
can be formed. Then they are not very numerous, 
so that the people vote upon them after hearing 
them all discussed; and in a New England town 
meeting, at least, they are often very thoroughly 
debated. The citizen cannot reach his conclusions 
merely after hearing one side stated by his friends, 
or reading one side in his newspaper, or being 
simply told by his party, or by some other or- 
ganization, how to vote. 

Moreover, the assembly or town meeting has 
an advantage quite apart from the formation of 
opinion on particular questions; for its most valu- 
able functions are those of inspection, supervision, 
and criticism. The initiation of measures for the 
government of a New England town comes mainly 
from the selectmen, who are the executive officers 
of the community, always present to explain their 



154 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 69 

proposals and defend their official conduct; and 
the real importance of the town meeting, besides 
ratifying or rejecting these proposals, is that of 
providing constant criticism of the management 
of public affairs, or at least the possibility of such 
criticism which has much the same effect. This 
is the chief duty of the House of Commons at the 
present day; and in fact the selectmen bear to the 
town meeting very nearly the same relation that a 
modern English ministry does to Parliament, and 
precisely the relation that a Swiss executive coun- 
cil does to the legislature. Some such process of 
holding a general inquest on the administration of 
public affairs makes up a large part of the useful- 
ness of any assembly that comes habitually into 
direct contact with the public officers. 

It is unnecessary to describe here the various 
forms of mass meetings of citizens or to discuss 
their merits, because an institution of that kind is 
not adapted for government on a large scale. Ex- 
cellent as it is for rural communities or small towns, 
it cannot be applied to a whole state or to a modern 
city with its hosts of voters, and it is with these 
that we are now concerned. 

69. The Referendum 

A popular vote without a mass meeting clearly 
cannot fulfil the purpose of a general inquest on 
the conduct of the government. At best it can 
express an opinion on the particular measures sub- 
mitted to the people, and it does this in a less satis- 
factory way than a public assembly because there 



§70] Reasons for the Referendum 155 

is no certainty of adequate discussion. A popular 
vote, therefore, or, to use the term that has now 
come into universal vogue, the referendum, performs 
only a part of the functions of a mass meeting and 
performs those less perfectly. Yet it is the only 
means of direct popular action in the making of laws 
on a large scale. The growth of cities has been 
driving the town meeting out of its original home 
in New England, until only a small fraction of the 
people of Massachusetts now enjoy that form of 
managing their affairs; and although it has been 
adopted in other sections of the country, especially 
in the Northwest, it cannot, as we have observed, 
be extended beyond small communities. The 
referendum, on the other hand, which is physically 
capable of use on any scale, has of late years been 
winning a larger amount of public support, and is 
believed by many people to be destined to play a 
constantly increasing part in the government of 
the country. A consideration of the possibilities 
that it offers, and the limitations to which it is 
subject, needs, therefore, no apology. 

70. Reasons for the Referendum 
(a) Distrust of the Legislature 

The objects sought in the use of the referendum 
as a means of expressing public opinion, instead of 
relying upon the elected legislature to express it, may 
be brought under two general heads. One of these 
is a fear that the representatives cannot be trusted 
to do so faithfully. They are exposed to many 



156 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 70 

temptations to betray the cause of the public, 
arising from the pressure of the party or the boss, 
from their willingness to trade their votes in order 
to carry through a measure — often a local one — 
in which they are chiefly interested, and sometimes 
from darker motives, based on the chances for black- 
mail or the corruption of unscrupulous men who are 
seeking for private profit to obtain or obstruct legis- 
lation. To guard against such dangers of misrep- 
resentation it is urged that an appeal ought to lie 
from the agent to the principal, from the legislature 
to the people who are the source of its authority. 

The opponents of the referendum reply that a 
popular vote may be subject to the same bad 
influences as a popular election. They ask whether 
a community that is unable to select intelligent, 
courageous, and honest representatives is more 
competent to pass judgment upon legislative meas- 
ures; whether the springs of public opinion may 
not be stained by the same methods that corrupt 
the legislature; whether the voters themselves may 
not feel the pressure of the party or the boss as 
much when voting on a law as when casting ballots 
for a representative. They point out that the 
channels through which information and opinions 
are diffused may be polluted, that the press is not 
free from bias in favor of concerns that advertise 
largely in its columns, and that cases have been 
known where almost all the newspapers in a city 
were under the control of a corporation seeking 
privileges from the legislature. The dangers, they 
say, may not be so great in the case of a popular 



§ 70] Reasons for the Referendum 157 

vote as in that of a representative body; but he 
must be bold or reckless who would venture a 
prophecy on the subject until we have had more 
experience of popular votes. 

The opponents of the referendum argue also that 
it would tend to impair the quality of representative 
bodies by reducing their sense of responsibility; and 
the Liberal Government in England recently rejected 
the proposal as a means of solving deadlocks between 
the Houses of Parliament partly on that ground. 
In this connection it is interesting to observe that 
in the United States the referendum is advocated 
as a radical measure by labor organizations and by 
people struggling against large financial and corporate 
interests, and is opposed by the more conservative 
elements; whereas in England precisely the opposite 
is the case. There the Conservatives regard it as 
a possible means of blocking radical legislation, and 
for that reason the Liberals with their allies in the 
Labor Party will have none of it. 

(b) Desire to Separate Issues 

Another reason for resorting to the referendum as 
a method of expressing public opinion arises from 
the confusion of issues in a general election to which 
we have already referred. An election means that 
the voters on the whole prefer one candidate or 
one party to another; yet they may not agree with 
all the points in the programme, and the referendum 
gives them a chance to separate the issues, passing 
a distinct judgment on each of them by itself. They 
can thus retain in power the party or persons with 



158 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 70 

whom they are most nearly in accord, while carry- 
ing public opinion into effect more accurately by 
rejecting the measures they do not approve. This 
is the chief reason for the existence of the referen- 
dum in Switzerland. 

Used for such a purpose, the institution aims at 
curing what is to some extent an unavoidable defect 
of representative government in a large democracy, 
if we assume that the object of representation is 
solely to give effect to public opinion. Some people 
do not feel that measures ought to be separated in 
this way, and it is interesting again to refer to the 
opinion of an English radical — in this case a Social- 
ist and one of the leaders of the Labor Party. 
In his Socialism and Government, Mr. J. Ramsay 
Macdonald says: "Democratic legislation must be 
the embodiment in many forms and directions of 
one comprehensive idea or sentiment, and every 
constitutional change which tends to break up the 
wholeness of a programme and to encourage the 
people to vote for separate measures and not for a 
group of measures, all equally necessary if the idea of 
the time is to be carried out, is reactionary. . . . Unless 
measures are attached to men and men to measures, 
both are pretty useless." l "The difference between 
Parliament with its continuity of policy and its pur- 
suit of a steady course year after year, and a series 
of separate meetings on a series of disconnected sub- 
jects, is that in the one there is the guidance of party 
which secures that questions shall not be treated 'on 
their merits,' but in relation to general principles and 

1 Vol. ii, p. 9. 



§ 71] The Sphere of Efficiency 159 

in connected groups, whilst in the other there is no 
such guidance, and decisions are therefore discon- 
nected, and display no general idea. . . . Party is 
the consistent and organic way of applying a prin- 
ciple, and should be taken as a whole and not in 
parts. The existence of party secures that a stream 
of tendency flows through human affairs." x 

71. The Sphere of Efficiency 

From the point of view of this book we are less 
interested in the question whether the objects 
sought by the referendum are desirable than in 
the further question how far it is capable of attain- 
ing them. So far as it does so it is efficient. So far 
as it does not it is not efficient, although it may 
produce other results good or bad. Now both of the 
objects described above are included in the general 
aim of bringing to bear on political matters a direct 
public opinion as contrasted with an indirect expres- 
sion of public opinion distorted more or less by 
passing through the medium of representation. A 
popular vote on a law being a means of ascertaining 
public opinion on that particular measure is clearly 
inapplicable unless the people have an opinion 

1 Vol. ii, p. 14. In another place (vol. i, pp. 102-4), speaking of di- 
rect popular legislation, he says: " Direct Democracy must bring primary 
instincts more into play. The appeal to a crowd must be couched 
in vague and general terms. It must have scintillating points about 
it. This will be taken into consideration by politicians competing for 
popularity. Intention will overshadow practicality. . . . The practi- 
cal details will have to be enlivened and legislation popularized, not by 
way of improving it, but of making it more sensational, more gran- 
diloquent, more effusive, if the people are to be roused up to vote 
for bills separately. This will tend to increase the shop-window display 
of legislation." 



160 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 71 

thereon; and this brings us back to the question 
discussed in an earlier chapter, on what subjects a 
real public opinion can exist. We saw that it can 
be formed on issues in apparent harmony or discord 
with principles already deeply embedded in the 
civilization of the community; and that on other 
matters, involving a knowledge of facts, it can exist 
if a substantial part of those facts are already 
familiar to the people, or if they will take the 
pains to ascertain them. The first of these cases, 
that of a measure depending on general princi- 
ples alone, does not often occur; for legislation is 
a complicated business and can seldom be con- 
ducted on abstract principles. When such a case 
does occur, the representatives are highly unlikely 
to act in a way to shock popular conviction, and are 
certain not to continue to do so long. Nor is it 
common in a large community that a substantial 
part of the facts needed for framing a law are a 
matter of public notoriety. The people may be 
sufficiently familiar with a subject to be keenly 
sensible of a grievance, without knowing enough to 
judge of the remedy. They may feel sure of the 
general direction they wish legislation to follow, 
without being able to weigh the merits of particular 
provisions. That involves an adjustment of con- 
flicting interests, a compromise of opposing views, 
a consideration of the remote effects, direct and 
indirect, that the law will produce, a balance of 
advantages and defects, which require careful study 
of all the facts involved in the situation. 

A large part, therefore, of the measures passed 



§ 71] The Sphere of Efficiency 161 

by most legislatures are of such a nature that a real 
public opinion upon them can be formed only if 
the people are willing to devote no little effort to 
their consideration; and the more complex they 
are, the greater the effort required. Whether the 
people will make the necessary effort or not depends 
upon how much interest they will take in the matter, 
and that is a very difficult thing to foretell. Occa- 
sionally they display a surprising interest and canvass 
the facts eagerly; but such examples furnish no 
reason to suppose that they will do so in all similar 
cases; and, indeed, from mere lack of time they 
could not do it if they would. Nor does the fact 
that a certain number of persons petition for a 
popular vote prove that the interest in the question 
is so widespread as to give rise to a true public 
opinion. It proves that some people are much in- 
terested, but not that the bulk of the community 
cares enough to study the facts carefully. A 
political system, like any other institution, cannot 
be constructed on the supposition that extraordinary 
events will habitually occur. It would seem wiser, 
therefore, to confine the referendum to questions 
involving general principles alone, and to the class 
of matters where the public is normally 'familiar 
with the facts required for a decision, than to extend 
it promiscuously to questions where a rational 
opinion can be formed only by a knowledge of 
details with which the ordinary man does not 
readily become acquainted. 



11 



162 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 72 

72. Negative and Positive Forms of Popular Votes 

A direct popular vote upon a law may be applied 
for two different purposes. It may be used to reject 
a law which the legislature has enacted, and if so, 
under the name of the referendum, it has a negative 
effect. In such cases it is a device for a popular 
veto, superimposed upon the executive veto if there 
be one, and is used not to legislate, but to prevent 
legislation. 1 

The other purpose is that of enacting a law which 
the legislature has not passed. This form is known 
as the initiative, and it is strictly a means of direct 
popular legislation. That the referendum and the 
initiative for general legislation in America have 
almost always been adopted at the same time, and 
are at present invariably advocated together by one 
set of arguments, shows that they are promoted 
rather from a belief that they are twin movements 
in a common direction, than from a consideration of 
their special effects. Yet their objects are so dif- 
ferent that their political effects and their relation 
to public opinion may not be identical. Each of 
them deserves to be examined separately, and to be 

1 Except in states where it is provided that the governor's veto shall 
not stand if the popular vote is in favor of the law. In such a case, if 
he vetoes the act, its opponents will not petition for a popular vote in 
order at much trouble and expense to kill a law already dead, with the 
chance that it may after all be ratified; but the supporters of the bill 
might petition against it for the purpose of carrying it by popular vote. 
If so, the object would be, not to prevent, but to promote legislation, 
but although the form would be a referendum, the substance would be 
that of the initiative. The same would be true if a legislature, under 
the power conferred upon it, should order a referendum upon a bill in 
order to escape a veto by the governor. 



§ 72] Forms of Popular Votes 163 

studied, not as is too commonly done, from a theoreti- 
cal standpoint alone, but primarily in the light of its 
actual operation in the two countries which have 
made the most use of it, Switzerland and the United 
States. We shall begin with the referendum. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE REFERENDUM IN SWITZERLAND 

73. Compulsory and Optional 

For more than a generation the Swiss have used 
the referendum freely in two distinct forms. One 
of these is known as compulsory, that is, when a 
popular vote upon measures passed by the legisla- 
ture is absolutely required; the other is the optional, 
when it is required only in case a petition therefor 
is presented by a certain number of voters. The 
distinction is the same that exists in America between 
amendments to a state constitution which must go 
before the people for ratification, and the recent 
process of a referendum on petition. In Switzerland 
changes in a constitution, whether federal or can- 
tonal, must always be submitted to popular vote; 
but for other laws the practice varies. In the 
Confederation and in nearly half of the cantons the 
referendum upon them is optional ; in as many more 
it is compulsory; in six the laws are enacted in mass 
meetings called lands gemeinde, and in one only there 
is no referendum at all. 

Now the compulsory form, being automatic, 
cannot be a dead letter, for a popular vote must be 
held; and in fact it often results in the defeat of a 
law, although naturally in a smaller proportion of 

164- 



§ 74] Results in Switzerland 165 

cases than under the optional form where the decision 

of the people is invoked only when there is strong 

objection to the law. In most of the cantons the 

optional form has proved effective; that is, a demand 

for a popular vote is not infrequently made with 

success. 

74. The Results 

In Appendix A, at the end of this volume, may be 
found lists of all votes under the referendum and 
initiative that have taken place in the Confederation 
from the adoption of a general referendum by the 
constitution of 1874 until 1912, and in the cantons 
from 1893 to 1910 and in some cases to 1912. A 
study of the lists throws much light upon the actual 
working of these institutions in the country where they 
have attained by far their greatest development; 
but in drawing conclusions from them one must not 
forget that the population of the land is compara- 
tively small and homogeneous and that wealth is 
not very unevenly distributed. 

In the Confederation during the nineteen years 
from 1893 through February, 1912, the referendum 
was used on twelve constitutional amendments, of 
which four were rejected; and on as many other 
acts passed by the legislature, of which six were 
rejected. An inspection of these measures in the 
Appendix will show that they were of various kinds, 
the most noticeable tendency being a hesitation, 
in the earlier years, at the rapid process of centrali- 
zation. 

In the canton of Bern — one of those where all 
laws, constitutional and ordinary, must be submitted 



166 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 74 

to popular vote — the referendum was used, in the 
nineteen years from 1893 through July, 1912, on 
sixty -two measures, and fifteen of them were de- 
feated. It is interesting to observe what these last 
were. Laws on insolvency were rejected three times 
before a statute on the subject was accepted. A 
law requiring inventories of estates on death and two 
laws for an inheritance tax were rejected — a strik- 
ing evidence of wide diffusion of property. Among 
other measures defeated were laws on vaccination; 
for the preservation of game; making women 
eligible to school boards; and lengthening the hours 
of work for women. 

Zurich also has the general compulsory referendum, 
and it is the canton in which by far the largest 
number of popular votes have taken place. In the 
fifteen years covered by the statistics the referendum 
has been used on eighty-one measures, of which 
sixteen were rejected. Among those so voted down 
were a law on the salaries of members of the executive 
council and of the highest court of law; inheritance 
taxes; a factory act; laws requiring state inspection 
of savings-banks ; raising the salaries of school teach- 
ers * ; creating a state fire insurance office; introducing 
proportional representation; and as usual a game law. 

In Aargau twelve laws out of forty-five were 
defeated by the referendum; among them a measure 
for taking over the bank by the state, and four tax 
laws. 2 In Thurgau the results are similar; fourteen 

1 Another law for this purpose was accepted later in the same year. 

2 These figures and those for several of the other cantons cover twenty 
years through 1912. 



§ 74] Results in Switzerland 167 

laws rejected out of forty, including provisions about 
salaries of public officials, subventions to railroads, 
state fire insurance, the general registration of titles 
to land, and the care of drunkards. In the Grisons 
eight measures out of thirty -nine were rejected at 
the referendum, among them a law on the salaries 
of primary school teachers, inheritance and stamp 
taxes, two public health acts, and a couple of game 
laws. In Rural Basle (through June, 1912,) sixteen 
were so defeated out of forty -three, the people show- 
ing themselves ill disposed toward school laws, and as 
usual towards acts relating to the salaries of public 
officials and taxation. 1 In Schwyz five out of thirty- 
six were rejected, including laws on taxes on schools, 
and insurance on cattle. In the Valais, apart from 
measures presented as alternatives, there were, out 
of twenty-five distinct matters, only three cases of 
rejection at the referendum, one of them that of a 
resolution fixing the salaries of public officials. In 
Solothurn eight measures out of fifty-one were so re- 
jected; in Schaffhausen, through August, 1912, four 
out of thirty-one, two of them being proposals to re- 
vise the constitution. 

In Geneva, through December, 1912, the propor- 
tion is very different, six laws out of ten being 
defeated; one of them an act for old age pensions 
which was beaten by a majority of nearly four 
to one. In St. Gall the proportions of rejections 
through February, 1912, is still larger, only five 
measures out of eighteen having survived the ordeal; 

1 Even an act on the taxation of shares in companies was accepted 
only by a trifling majority. 



168 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 74 

among the casualties being a law on direct taxes, a 
game law, and four laws on the insurance of houses 
and of cattle. In Lucerne there were only four popu- 
lar votes on referenda, two tax laws being accepted 
by narrow majorities, an amendment to the constitu- 
tion being ratified, and a game law being defeated. 
Finally, in Vaud the people rejected a law on rest from 
labor on Sunday and ratified another forbidding the 
sale of absinthe. In none of the other cantons does 
the referendum, as distinguished from the initiative, 
appear to have been used for the last twenty years. 1 

From such an array of figures it is clear that the 
referendum in Switzerland has been effective; that 
is, it has caused the defeat of many measures that 
would otherwise have been enacted. Whether the 
popular action has been wise or not is a question 
that will be answered differently according to one's 
political inclinations. Opponents of the institution 
will not find evidence that its effect has been radical 
or socialistic, nor its advocates encouragement to 
believe its tendency progressive. On the contrary, 
the result has been on the whole conservative; 
although we cannot assume that this would be true 
in a country with different social conditions. 

So much for the number and character of the laws 
rejected by the referendum in the country of its 
origin. Other matters relating to its working in 
practice, such as the size of the vote cast, can be 
considered more profitably in connection with its 
use in America. 

1 In Basle City the initiative appears to be used with the same 
object. (See Appendix A.) 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE REFERENDUM IN AMERICA 

Leaving aside the pre-revolutionary types of 
direct legislative action, the modern referendum, or 
submission of measures passed by the representative 
body to all voters of a state, has been introduced in 
three different forms at as many periods of American 
history. The periods have to some extent over- 
lapped, yet the movements have been distinct and 
may be described separately. We can, in fact, rec- 
ognize three notable waves of direct popular legisla- 
tion, each rising higher than the last. 

75. Referendum on Constitutional Amendments 

The first appeared in the form of submitting state 
constitutions to the people for ratification, a practice 
which began in Massachusetts in 1778 and spread 
slowly until after 1820 almost all new state constitu- 
tions were subjected to a popular vote. The uni- 
formity of the custom has been seriously interrupted 
on two occasions only, each the result of wholly 
exceptional conditions; first in the southern states 
during the stress of secession and reconstruction, 
and later in a number of the same states during their 
recent effort to disfranchise the negroes. Neither 
of these exceptions showed a distrust of the gen- 
eral principle, which may be regarded as a firmly 

169 



170 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 75 

established tradition in American public life. The 
practice has been applied not only to the adoption 
of a new constitution but also to particular amend- 
ments. A provision to that effect first appeared in 
Connecticut in 1818, and was copied by other states 
until it became almost universal. 

That the referendum on constitutional provisions 
has had a substantial effect in the American states 
there can be no doubt, for amendments referred to 
the people are often rejected. It has been asserted 
that legislators sometimes pass on to the people 
amendments in which they have little faith, in order 
to rid themselves of uncomfortable political ques- 
tions; but such cases can form only a small part of 
the measures rejected by popular vote. A few figures 
quoted by Dr. Oberholzer are conclusive upon the 
freedom with which the public refuses its assent to 
things it does not like. 1 He tells us that the Legisla- 
tive Bulletin of the New York State Library for the 
years 1895 to 1897 gives, for all the states, one hun- 
dred and ten constitutional amendments submitted 
to popular vote, of which fifty were ratified and sixty 
rejected. In an earlier periodical covering the six 
years from 1886 to 1891 he finds one hundred and 
sixteen amendments so submitted, fifty-four of these 
being accepted and sixty-two rejected. In Michigan, 
since the adoption of the first constitution in 1835, 
there had been submitted to the people, through 1908, 
no less than eighty-seven constitutional questions, 
of which forty-eight were accepted, and thirty-six re- 
jected; while three for the calling of constitutional 

1 The Referendum in America, pp. 163, 164. 



§ 76] The Constitutional Referendum 171 

conventions failed because a majority of all those 
who voted at the election was required. 1 

In Massachusetts — whose legislature reflects pub- 
lic opinion better than those of most of the states, and 
whose people have voted on constitutional questions 
longer than any other community too large to meet 
in a general assembly — there have been submitted 
to popular vote, from the adoption of the constitu- 
tion in 1780 through the year 1911, sixty such ques- 
tions, of which forty-one have been answered in the 
affirmative and nineteen in the negative. 2 A survey 
of these sixty cases leaves the impression that, while 
the people were sometimes less progressive than 
their representatives, almost all the popular votes of 
doubtful wisdom were either in accord with the best 
thought of the time or were afterwards reversed. 
There can certainly be no doubt that the referendum 
on constitutional questions retains general respect 
in the United States, for the institution is as firmly 
rooted as ever and no one would seriously propose 
its abolition. 

76. Referendum on Special Legislative Acts 

The constitutional referendum was a natural result 
of the attempt to place the fundamental law on a 
different basis from ordinary legislation. The second 
development of direct popular action in law making, 

1 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
September, 1912, pp. 155, 158. 

2 One of those in the negative, relating to the introduction of woman 
suffrage, was merely of an advisory nature. Lists of these questions 
and the votes cast upon them may be found in the Bulletin of the 
Statistics Department of Boston for December, 1909, December, 1911, 
and January, 1912. 



172 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 76 

not very different from the first in principle or in its 
effects, arose from a practical demand for a check 
upon the legislature when dealing with matters that 
involve peculiar temptations or the pressure of local 
and other interests. With this object a clause was 
inserted in the constitutions of several states provid- 
ing that the acts of the legislature upon certain 
subjects should not be valid unless ratified by popular 
vote, although the other formalities for constitutional 
amendments were not required. 

The practice began about the middle of the last 
century, and has been applied to the selection of 
sites for state capitals and public buildings, to the 
contracting of state debts, to taxation in excess of a 
fixed amount, to the charters of banks, to the exten- 
sion of the suffrage, and to a few other matters. 
It has been used mainly, though not exclusively, by 
the newer states, and was devised to meet difficulties 
keenly felt rather than as an expression of any gen- 
eral political principle. While it has been retained 
in those communities where it arose, it may be 
considered the product of immature conditions, for 
it has shown no marked tendency to spread to other 
parts of the country or to expand over new subjects. 

In connection with these provisions for the refer- 
ence of particular matters to popular vote one 
must speak of the resolutions occasionally passed 
by legislatures, without constitutional authority, to 
refer some perplexing question to the people. The 
procedure might perhaps have become common had 
not the weight of judicial opinion denied the right 
of a legislature to delegate its power and divest 



§ 77] The General Referendum 173 

itself of responsibility for legislation by shifting it 
onto the shoulders of the voters. 1 It can, of course, 
consult them informally, and it can make the local 
application of an act subject to its adoption by the 
voters of the place, but under the decisions, it cannot, 
in the absence of a constitutional provision, make the 
enactment of a statute depend upon ratification by 
popular vote. 

77. The General Referendum 

The third and most comprehensive movement 
for the referendum is very recent. It takes the form 
of a general provision in the state constitution that 
upon the petition of a certain number of citizens 
any law, not declared urgent by the legislature, shall 
be submitted to the people. Unlike the two earlier 
phases of direct popular action, which are native in 
origin and grew out of purely indigenous ideas and 
conditions, this last is a conscious imitation of the 
Swiss optional referendum. The movement has had 
a strongly theoretical tinge and has been urged by 
associations that advocate it on abstract principles. 
Nevertheless, the main force that has given it mo- 
mentum with the public, and won its victory in a 
number of states, has been dissatisfaction with the 
legislatures, a conviction that they are too largely 
under the control of party machines allied with 
moneyed interests. The referendum in this general 

1 See Oberbolzer, The Referendum in America, chap, viii, for a dis- 
cussion of this point and a collection of cases thereon. Such a submis- 
sion has been expressly authorized in some states that do not have a 
general referendum; as, for example, in the Michigan Constitution of 
1908. 



174 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 78 

form was adopted first in South Dakota in 1898; 
and, in the fourteen years that have passed since 
that date, by Utah (1900), 1 Oregon (1902), Nevada 
(1904), Montana (1906), Oklahoma (1907), Maine 
(1908), Missouri (1908), Arkansas (1910), Colorado 
(1910), Arizona (1911), California (1911), New 
Mexico (1911), Ohio (1912), Idaho (1912), Nebraska 
(1912), Washington (1912). In several other states 
constitutional amendments for the purpose are still 
pending. As yet it is too early to predict what the 
ultimate effect of the institution will be. A genera- 
tion must pass before that can be determined; but 
the use that has actually been made of it in the few 
years during which it has been in operation is not 
the less interesting. Appendix B to this volume 
contains a list of all the laws to which it has been 
applied through 1912, and with them are included, 
but separately marked, all the instances of popular 
votes on constitutional amendments and on meas- 
ures proposed by the initiative in those states during 
the same period. 

78. Actual Use of the General Referendum 
(a) The Emergency Clause 

The referendum on general legislation has been in 
actual use even a shorter time than the date of its 
first adoption would indicate, for although it was 
established in South Dakota in 1898 no popular vote 
took place under it there until ten years later; nor 
was it used in any state before 1906; and since in al- 

1 But the statute needed to put it into operation had not been passed 
up to 1912. 



§78] 



Results in America 



175 



most all the states that have adopted it general elec- 
tions regularly take place only every other year, the 
opportunities for submitting statutes to the people 
have not yet been numerous. It must be remembered 
also that vast as is the quantity of laws passed by 
an American legislature in the brief space commonly 
allowed for its session, the referendum does not 
apply to them all. The constitutional provisions for 
its exercise usually contain a clause authorizing the 
legislature by a two thirds vote to declare that an 
act is of urgent importance for the public peace, 
health, or safety, in which case it is not subject to a 
petition for a popular vote. This power is said to 
have been abused in order to withdraw measures 
from the referendum, and it has certainly been freely 
used. Thus in South Dakota the number of acts 
declared urgent in recent sessions compared with the 
total number of acts passed have been as follows : 



Year 


Total Acts Passed 


Passed with Emergency Clause 


1899 


126 


65 


1901 


185 


82 


1903 


223 


107 


1905 


173 


87 


1907 


249 


100 


1909 


295 


96 


Totals 


1251 


537 



In six sessions, therefore, covering the legislation of a 
dozen years, about forty-three per cent, of the acts 
passed in the state were withdrawn by the emergency 
clause from the operation of the referendum. In 
other states the proportion has been smaller; but in 



176 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 78 

Oregon trie charge of abuse of this power is made, 1 
and the Governor is said to have vetoed a number of 
bills for that reason. 2 

(b) Number of Laws Rejected 

The legislative output in America is so great that 
even a free use of the emergency clause leaves a vast 
number of acts to which the referendum could be 
applied. But in view of the fact that the referen- 
dum has been adopted in states where distrust of the 
legislature is acute, the quantity of acts rejected by 
its means has been moderate. Leaving aside con- 
stitutional amendments and popular votes provoked 
by the initiative, the only cases in which the general 
referendum has been used, through 1912, have been 
as follows: 











Per cent. 


State 


Year 


Bill 


Result 


of votes 

at 
election 


Arkansas 


1912 


An Act revising the tax laws 


Rej. 


79.6 

Per cent. 

of 

registered 

voters 


Arizona 


1912 


An Act to create a lien for 










labor upon mines .... 


Ace. 


62.2 






An Act to regulate the num- 










ber of men to be employed 










on trains and engines . . 


Ace. 


60.3 






An Act to compel all engines 










to carry electric headlights 


Ace. 


60.1 



1 Introductory Letter to Suggested Amendments to the Constitu- 
tion of Oregon, Portland, August 14, 1909, p. 6. 

2 Arena, September, 1908, p. 146. 



§78] 



Results in America 



177 











Per cent. 


State 


Year 


Bill 


Result 


of 

registered 

voters 


Arizona 


1912 


An Act to forbid employ- 
ment of locomotive engi- 
neers without three years' 
service as firemen, or of 
conductors without service 










as brakemen, etc. . . . 


Acc. 


60.6 






An Act to limit the number 










of cars in a train 


Ace. 


60.9 






An Act to limit passenger 










fares on railroads .... 


Acc. 


63.2 






An Act to provide for semi- 










monthly payment of wages 










by companies and public 










bodies 


Acc. 


62.1 




An Act to forbid the shoot- 








ing of game without a li- 










cense 


Acc. 


62.2 


California 


1912 


An Act to provide for a regis- 










trar of voters 


Rej. 


40.6 






An Act to regulate salaries 










and fees of officers in 










counties 


Rej. 


39.4 






An Act to change the law of 










officers of counties, etc. 


Rej. 


39.4 

Per cent, 
of votes 

at 
election 


Colorado 


1912 


An Act for eight hours' work 










for miners 


Acc. 


38.2 






An Act to place the branding 










of cattle under the charge 










of the State Inspector . . 


Rej. 


28.6 






An Act providing that state 










officers turn over receipts 










to the Treasurer daily in- 










stead of monthly .... 


Rej. 


24.8 



12 



178 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 78 











Per cent. 


State 


Year 


Bill 


Result 


of votes 

at 
election 


Colorado 


1912 


An Act to provide summer 










schools for teachers . . . 


Rej. 


33.0 






An Act on examinations and 










certificates for teachers . . 


Rej. 


30.2 






An Act to regulate water 










rights for immigration . . 


Rej. 


26.8 


Maine 


1910 


An Act to regulate the per- 
centage of alcohol in pro- 










hibited liquor 


Rej. 


50.7 






An Act to create the town of 










Gorges 


Rej. 


38.6 






An Act for a bridge at Port- 








land 


Rej. 


36.2 




1912 


An Act to provide for uni- 








form ballot boxes and the 










preservation of the ballots 








1912 


cast 


Ace. 


75.1 


Montana 


An Act for an Asylum bond 








issue 


Ace. 


81.1 


Nevada 


1908 


An Act creating a state con- 










stabulary 


Ace. 


77.9 


New Mexico 


1912 


An Act for a state highway 










bond issue 


Ace. 


90.1 


Oklahoma x 


1910 


Bryan Election Law . . . 


Rej. 


73.3 


Oregon 


1906 


An Act making an increased 
appropriation for the State 










University 


Ace. 


73.0 




1908 


An Act to appropriate money 










for the State University. . 


Ace. 


72.3 






An Act for the better treat- 










ment of prisoners in jail. . 


Ace. 


77.3 






An Act to appropriate money 










for armories for the militia 


Rej. 


75.5 



1 Both in 1908 and 1910 the people of Oklahoma were consulted 
by the Legislature about the creation of a model capital city, but this 
was informal, not for the ratification of a law. 



78] 



Results in America 



179 











Per cent. 


State 


Year 


Bill 


Result 


of votes 

at 
election 


Oregon 


1908 


An Act to allow railroads to 
give free passes to members 










of the legislature 


Rej. 


75.4 




1910 


An Act to increase the salary 










of a district judge . . . . 


Rej. 


70.4 






An Act to create a branch in- 










sane asylum, referred to the 










people by the legislature 


Ace. 


76.2 






An Act for holding a con- 










stitutional convention, re- 










ferred under the consti- 










tutional provision to the 










people by the legislature 


Rej. 


69.1 




1912 


An Act giving the railroad 
commission power to regu- 
late all public service cor- 
porations 










An Act making special ap- 


Ace. 


78.6 






propriations for the State 










University 










An Act making an appro- 


Rej. 


79.7 






priation for a library and 










museum for the University 






South Dakota 


1908 


An Act for the protection of 
quail 


Rej. 


78.4 






An Act to forbid theatrical 


Ace. 


85.7 






plays on Sunday 










An Act to require a year's 


Ace. 


84.6 






residence before suit for di- 










vorce 








1910 


An Act to require electric 
headlights on locomotives . 


Ace. 


86.9 






An Act empowering the 


Rej. 


83.0 






Governor to remove delin- 










quent public officers . . . 


Rej. 


79.8 



180 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 78 











Per cent. 


State 


Year 


Bill 


Result 


of votes 

at 
election 


South Dakota 


1910 


An Act dividing the state 
into districts for the elec- 
tion of members of Con- 










gress 


Rej- 


71.6 






An Act to provide a military 








code for the militia . . . 


Rej. 


71.2 






An Act for licensing embalm- 










ers 


Rej. 


79.5 




1912 


An Act for a direct primary 








law 


Ace. 


71.5 




An Act to require electric 








headlights on locomotives . 


Ace. 


74.7 






An Act to repeal the law on 










damages for trespass by 










animals 


Ace. 


68.7 






An Act on "city, town, or 










place desiring to become a 










candidate for county seat " 


Ace. 


60.1 



(c) Character of Laws Rejected 
It will be observed that the referendum by popular 
petition was effective — that is, resulted in the 
defeat of the law — in twenty-three cases, and it is 
instructive to examine these with a view to discover 
how far they were, or might probably be, an expres- 
sion of a general public opinion. Take first the five 
rejections in South Dakota in 1910. There were 
submitted at the same time one law proposed by 
initiative and six amendments to the constitution. 
Equity, the organ for direct legislation, says of this 
election, 1 "A 'vote no' campaign was made, and they 

1 January, 1911, p. 35. 



§78] Results in America 181 

were all defeated, except possibly one. A general 
'vote no' or 'vote yes' campaign when there are 
so many measures submitted, some of which were 
doubtless meritorious, is not discriminating. It is said 
that the ballot upon which the referred laws were 
printed was six feet long, in fine print; the amend- 
ment ballot being less in size, and the candidate 
ballot still less." The result was that a constitu- 
tional amendment in relation to the renting of public 
lands was accepted and everything else rejected. 
An examination of the votes cast upon each measure, 
set forth in Appendix B, gives the impression that 
the voters had a definite opinion upon the initiative 
about intoxicating liquors, the amendments about 
woman suffrage and renting of public lands, the 
referendum about the militia, and perhaps on one 
or two more questions. The other measures voted 
upon were not of such a character as to render a 
true public opinion upon them improbable, yet 
the even run of votes for and against them makes 
it seem highly unlikely that the public formed a 
distinct opinion upon each of them separately. 
Curiously enough on the next occasion, two years 
later, every measure brought before the people of the 
state was accepted with as much uniformity as every 
ordinary law submitted to them had been rejected 
two years earlier. The measures of 1912 were, 
indeed, ratified by overwhelming majorities, and the 
largest majority of all — nearly four to one — was 
obtained by a law for headlights on locomotives very 
similar to that which was rejected in 1910. 

In Oklahoma the Bryan Election Law was a 



182 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 78 

political measure, alleged to be passed for party 
purposes, and the people could no doubt form an 
opinion upon it without difficulty. Their ability to 
do so can be assumed also in the cases of the Maine 
law regulating the amount of alcohol in prohibited 
liquors, of the Oregon law appropriating money 
for armories, and certainly of the law permitting 
the railroads to give free passes to legislators. The 
people of California may have had a deliberate 
opinion also on the three laws rejected at the referen- 
dum in 1912, although in view of the fact that only 
about 40 per cent, of the registered voters cast their 
ballots upon them, a number less than on any of the 
other measures presented at the same time, one can- 
not assert positively that the people as a whole had 
such an opinion. On the other hand, the Maine 
laws to create a new township and for a bridge at 
Portland, and the Oregon law to increase the salary 
of a district judge, must have required a familiarity 
with local conditions which the people of the whole 
state could hardly be expected to possess by intui- 
tion; although they may well have had an opinion 
that special legislation of this kind is of a suspicious 
character, and that the laws in question were passed 
in a way to awaken suspicion. Nevertheless, the 
people of Oregon thought they had an opinion upon 
the salary act, for they voted against it 71,503 strong, 
a figure larger than half the registered voters in the 
state, and larger than any vote previously cast for 
or against any measure since the referendum was 
adopted. Yet it is noteworthy that the official 
pamphlet of arguments issued by the state govern- 



§78] Results in America 183 

ment contains no argument either for or against this 
measure. This was true also of the two appropria- 
tions for the state university rejected in 1912; and 
in that case the issue was complicated by an initiative 
presented at the same time for a special tax in favor 
of the university which involved the repeal of these 
appropriations. 

In regard to the two local acts in Maine the people 
themselves evidently did not consider that they had 
opinions, for the total votes cast upon those acts 
were only 38.6 and 36.2 per cent, of the votes cast for 
Governor at the same election; the percentage of 
registered voters being, of course, smaller still. Thus 
not more than one third of the voters felt competent, 
or cared, to express an opinion about them, and the 
people who voted against them were only 24.6 and 
21.2 per cent, of those who cast their ballots for 
Governor. This is even more true of the five laws 
rejected in Colorado in 1912, on which the total votes 
ran from 33 per cent, down to 24.8 per cent, of those 
cast for presidential electors at the same time; the 
largest negative vote being 24.1 per cent, and the 
smallest 14.3 per cent, of that for presidential elec- 
tors. In the case at least of these two laws in 
Maine, and of four of the laws of South Dakota 
(or in about a quarter of the twenty-three instances 
where the referendum on petition has been effective) 
it is by no means clear that the people of the whole 
state formed or expressed a real opinion on the par- 
ticular measures rejected. Nor would it be safe to 
assert that they acted on a deliberate judgment in 
rejecting the three laws in California, the five in 



184 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 79 

Colorado, or the two appropriations of 1912 in Ore- 
gon. All these added together make sixteen out of 
the twenty-three rejections, so that it can hardly be 
certain that a definite public opinion existed in more 
than about one quarter of the laws rejected. This 
does not mean that the defeat of the measures was a 
misfortune, for there can be on shadow of doubt 
that there was no general public opinion in their 
favor, and the delay of legislation under such con- 
ditions is usually no detriment to the state. 

79. Size of the Vote Cast 

Reference has been made to a phenomenally small 
vote on certain laws. The size of the vote has in 
two ways a bearing upon the expression of a true 
public opinion by the referendum. First, those 
persons who go to the polls and cast their ballots for 
Governor, but do not make a mark for or against the 
measure, may be assumed to have no opinion, or no 
serious opinion, thereon. Men may, and often do, 
vote without having a real personal opinion on that 
particular measure; but they surely do not fail to 
mark their ballots when they have a decided opinion. 
Second, the size of the vote is a measure of public 
interest in the matter; and hence an indication of 
the extent to which the people are likely to have 
studied the facts necessary for a decision, and 
thereby formed a genuine opinion about the law, 
A decision by a majority of the votes actually cast 
upon a question is doubtless the most natural 
method to pursue in the case of a popular vote, but 
that such a result expresses public opinion may 



§80] Size of the Vote in Switzerland 185 

sometimes be a political fiction rather than a fact. 
That is not necessarily a condemnation of the proce- 
dure, for politics is at best an inexact art and must 
work by the nearest possible approximation; yet the 
probable accuracy of the approximation is a factor 
to be taken into account. 

80. The Vote Cast in Switzerland 

In the list of popular votes in Switzerland (printed 
in Appendix A) the number of registered voters 
appears for several of the cantons as well as for 
the Confederation since 1893, and the proportion of 
votes cast is surprisingly small. In the Confedera- 
tion a majority of the registered voters cast valid 
votes at the referendum in only half the cases, in 
twelve out of twenty-four 1 ; in Bern in ten cases out 
of sixty-two 2 ; in Rural Basle in six out of forty- 
three 3 ; in Solothurn in twenty out of fifty-one; while 
in not one of the twenty-five cases in the Valais was 
a majority of the registered vote cast. In Zurich 
the proportion is far larger, sixty-eight out of eighty- 
one, 4 the normal being a trifle over 55 per cent, of the 
registered voters, a result due, no doubt, to imposing 
a fine for failure to deposit a ballot, — although 
not for omission to fill out the blanks therein. In 
Geneva and Vaud the normal vote was about the 
same; and in Schaffhausen it ran even higher, from 
65 to 75 per cent, of the registered voters. 

1 In these and the following statistics for Switzerland constitutional 
amendments are included, but measures proposed by initiative are not. 
A majority of the registered voters cast their ballots on five federal 
initiatives out of eight. 3 And on the only initiative. 

2 On four initiatives out of nine. 4 On ten initiatives out of eleven. 



186 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 80 

The percentage of votes cast often varies very 
much on different measures. In the Confederation 
it runs from 79.1 down to 34.3; in Bern from 63.3 
down to 21.8; in Zurich from 76.4 down to 31.1; 
in Rural Basle from 73.5 down to 24.0. In Solo- 
thurn from 82.1 down to 21.4; and in the Valais from 
49.8 down to 21. In Aargau, Thurgau, St. Gall, 
Schaffhausen, and Geneva, on the other hand, the 
number of votes cast shows comparatively little 
variation; but in other cantons, where the number of 
registered voters is not given, the differences are very 
large; and in Schwyz the number ran in 1895 and 
1898 from 1,243 to 12,328. 

Clearly in some questions the people took little 
interest, and the probability that the result expressed 
a real public opinion is therefore small. To take 
extreme cases: Is the legislature of Zurich less 
likely to have represented public opinion correctly in 
increasing the salaries of school teachers than the 
popular vote at a referendum where 31.74 per cent, 
of the registered voters cast their ballots against the 
law, 31.50 in its favor, and 36.76 per cent, did not 
vote at all? or the legislature of Schwyz when it 
passed a law about highways which was rejected by 
a vote of 1,682 to 1,593, the total number of votes 
against the bill being only 13.54 per cent, of the 
number cast four years earlier on the question of 
adopting a new cantonal constitution? Or again, 
what value, as an evidence of popular approval, had 
a ratification of a law on the organization of the 
police in Bern, when 17.4 per cent, of the registered 
voters cast their ballots for it, 17.2 per cent, against 



§81] Size of the Vote in America 187 

it, and 65.4 per cent, did not vote? Do not these 
figures show that the people as a whole did not really 
have an opinion on the measures in question? 

Such instances do not condemn the institution, 
but they shake our faith in a popular vote as an 
infallible index of public opinion. They make one 
feel that the referendum does not always accomplish 
the object for which it is designed; and what is true 
in these extreme cases is also true to a less extent 
in many others. The referendum, like every other 
human agency, is an imperfect instrument, that 
will work well only when used on the appropriate 
material. 

81. The Vote Cast in America 

In the United States, as in Switzerland, the vote 
on measures submitted to the people is habitually 
smaller than for the principal public officers elected 
at the same time. Dr. Oberholzer, finding that in 
general about one half as many voters cast their 
ballots on constitutional amendments as for presiden- 
tial electors, says that only about half of all those 
who know their own minds respecting candidates 
seem to care anything about measures. 1 In Massa- 
chusetts, for which statistics have been carefully 
compiled, it appears that, from the adoption of the 
constitution of 1780 through 1911, sixty constitu- 
tional questions kave been submitted to the people of 
the state, 2 and the votes cast upon them have varied 
from a number slightly in excess of those polled for 

1 The Referendum in America, ed. of 1900, p. 168. 

2 One of these, on the introduction of woman suffrage, was merely 
of an advisory nature. 



188 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 81 

Governor in the same year down to one thirtieth part 
thereof, two amendments to the constitution being 
actually carried with less than 4,500 affirmative votes 
although nearly 170,000 were cast in the election of 
the Governor. On ten questions the number of votes 
polled was less than one fifth of those cast in the 
election; on forty-two it was less than two thirds; 
and it must be remembered that on the average only 
three quarters of the registered voters cast their 
ballots even for Governor, while a considerable num- 
ber of qualified citizens are not registered. 

In Michigan, where eighty-seven constitutional 
questions have been submitted to the people since 
the adoption of the constitution in 1835, there is a 
similar variation in the size of the vote cast. 1 One 
amendment was adopted by 3,180 affirmative votes, 
while 130,818 were cast at the election. On eighteen 
questions the votes polled were less than one fifth 
of those cast for state officers, or, when no state 
officers were elected, less than one fifth of those 
usually so cast at the period; and in forty-seven, or 
more than half of the cases, they were less than one 
half of the votes so cast. 

If now we turn to the states which have recently 
adopted a general referendum, the first thing that 
strikes us is the fact that there is no marked difference 
in the size of the popular vote cast on constitutional 
amendments and on ordinary laws. The vote on 
these last has certainly not been the smaller; nor 
is that surprising. A law against which a petition 

1 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
September, 1912, pp. 155-158. 



§81] The Vote Cast in America 189 

has been filed is one that excites repugnance, and 
is therefore in some degree contentious; whereas a 
constitutional amendment, submitted automatically, 
may in some cases provoke no serious antagonism. 

Taking the votes at the referendum on ordinary 
laws we find that they run all the way from 90.1 per 
cent, of the vote cast at the election in New Mexico 
in 1912 down to 24.8 per cent, in Colorado in the 
same year. In most of the states the number of 
votes cast on the different measures presented at any 
one time does not vary greatly, showing that the 
people who feel competent to express an opinion on 
one law voted as a rule on all the others also; but 
the variations from year to year are sometimes 
considerable. In Maine, for example, the average 
percentage of those taking part in the election in 
1910 who voted at the referendum was 41.8; whereas 
in 1912 it was 75.1. In South Dakota it was 85.7 
in 1908, 77.0 in 1910, and 68.75 in 1912. In Oregon 
it has been very uniform, ranging between 72 and 79. 
This is not far from the general average in the differ- 
ent states, which may be taken as not more than 75 
per cent. 1 

From these figures it would seem that the votes 
cast are decidedly larger than in Switzerland, but it 
must be remembered that the percentage is of the 
votes cast at the election of public officers, not of 
the registered voters as in Switzerland. To bring 
them to this last basis — the most significant for 
their relation to public opinion — it is necessary to 

1 These figures do not include constitutional amendments or the 
initiative. 



190 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 81 

reduce the figures just given by a fifth or a quarter. 
Reducing them by a fifth, the average would be about 
sixty per cent, of the registered voters. This is 
somewhat better than the average in Switzerland, 
but it is not very large. Now if only three fourths 
as many people cast their votes on measures as for 
the chief public officers it shows that there are one 
third part more people who are interested in or feel 
competent to vote for candidates than measures. 
This would seem to indicate that there is a more 
general public opinion on the election of officers than 
at the referendum, although, of course, it by no 
means follows that the men elected will represent 
public opinion more truly than does direct legislation. 
The small size of the vote has the more significant 
bearing on the question of a real public opinion where 
the majority is narrow. How much value, for ex- 
ample, as an indication of public opinion, had the 
ratification in 1908 of the appropriation for the 
state university in Oregon when 37.8 per cent, of 
the citizens actually present at the polls voted for 
it and 34.8 per cent, against it; or the acceptance 
in the same year of the law closing the theatres on 
Sunday in South Dakota when of the voters present 
42.5 per cent, favored and 42.1 per cent, opposed it? 
A still stronger instance was presented in Colorado 
in 1912 where the law on the branding of cattle was 
rejected by 14.35 per cent, against 14.22 per cent., 
while of the voters actually taking part in the election 
five times as many failed to express any opinion on 
this measure as voted either for or against it. We 
cannot repeat too often that such results are not 



§82] Attempts to Stimulate Opinion 191 

necessarily a condemnation of the referendum. They 
do not prove that a popular vote is not under the 
circumstances the wisest and best method of decid- 
ing a question; but they show that a vote of this 
kind cannot always be regarded as vox populi. 

82. Attempts to Stimulate Opinion 

Efforts have sometimes been made to enhance 
the value of the popular verdict, by increasing the 
participation of the voters, or by furnishing them 
with better means of forming an opinion; and these 
attempts have been in a measure successful. In 
Zurich, for example, a fine is imposed for not deposit- 
ing a ballot, though not for failing to enter a vote 
upon all the questions therein. We have seen that 
this results in a larger vote there than in other 
cantons, yet the blanks in the ballots have been 
discouragingly numerous, running all the way from 
4.5 per cent, to 39 per cent, of the ballots cast, the 
average being almost exactly 20 per cent. 1 In other 
words, about one fifth of the voters whose ballots were 
actually placed in the box felt incompetent to form 
an opinion on the measures submitted, or took too 
little interest in them to make a mark on the sheet 
of paper in their hands. 

In Oregon, on the other hand, the state has wisely 
attempted to educate the voters by furnishing them 
with arguments for and against each measure. These 
arguments are prepared voluntarily by the per- 
sons interested, but, together with the full text of 

1 In the case of one initiative the blanks ran as high as 58.5 per cent, 
of the votes cast. 



192 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 82 

the measures, are printed by the government in a 
pamphlet which is then sent to every voter. The 
pamphlet for 1910 contained, apart from the index, 
202 octavo pages of fine print. Yet the arguments 
were by no means complete. Of the thirty-two meas- 
ures submitted (including those proposed by initia- 
tive and all constitutional amendments) only twelve 
had arguments both pro and con; fifteen more having 
arguments in favor alone; four opposing arguments 
alone; and on one there was no argument at all. 
This last, the sole law against which a petition for 
a referendum was filed, was that for increasing the 
salary of a judge, and was rejected. In 1912 the 
pamphlet contained, apart from the index and local 
matters submitted only to the voters of Portland, 
252 pages. Of the thirty-eight measures covered 
thereby, thirteen had arguments on both sides; six 
only in favor; six only against; while thirteen had 
no arguments at all. Thus the excellent plan of 
furnishing the people with arguments by no means 
accomplishes its object completely. The results do 
not show that absence of argument was due to con- 
fidence in the result, or on the other hand that the 
arguments had a decisive effect. 1 

1 Thirty-two measures were submitted in 1910. 

Of the twelve that had arguments pro and con, four were accepted 
and eight rejected. 

Of the fifteen that had arguments pro alone, five were accepted and 
ten rejected. 

Of the four that had arguments con alone, all were rejected. 

The one that had no argument was rejected. 

Of the thirty-eight public general measures in the pamphlet for 1912, 
one was not placed on the ballot. 

Of the thirteen that had arguments pro and con, three were accepted 
and ten rejected. 



§83] The Local Referendum 193 

The comparatively small size of the vote cast at 
the referendum everywhere, and the incomplete suc- 
cess of efforts to stimulate a larger vote or a more 
general consideration of the questions presented 
have, as we have seen, an important bearing on the 
trustworthiness of the popular vote as an expression 
of a genuine public opinion. We shall recur to this 
again after discussing the initiative. 

83. The Local Referendum 

A general referendum on ordinary laws in America 
has been adopted by a dozen states, but a local 
referendum on local matters, or on the local appli- 
cation of general laws, has spread far more rapidly 
and been adopted much more freely through- 
out the country. This is not unnatural, because 
some of the objections made to the general referen- 
dum do not apply, or apply with less force, to local 
popular votes. In fact the two things are not 
precisely the same. The term "local referendum" 
itself is used for at least three distinct processes: 
one is referring a special local act passed by the 
legislature to the people of the place for acceptance 
or rejection; another is making the local application 
of a general law depend upon its adoption by the 
people of each city, town, or county; and a third is 
giving to the people of a city a right to reject by 

Of the six that had arguments fro alone, none were accepted and 
six rejected. 

Of the six that had arguments con alone, one was accepted and five 
rejected. 

Of the twelve that had no arguments, seven were accepted and five 
rejected. 

13 



194 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 83 

popular vote a measure passed by their own local 
council. 

When the local referendum means a reference of 
a special act for acceptance to the citizens of the 
place it is not an appeal from the representative body 
to the people it represents, but from the representa- 
tives of the state as a whole to the part affected. 
If the Legislature of Pennsylvania, for example, 
enacts a charter for Pittsburg subject to ratification 
by the inhabitants, this is not asking the people of 
that city whether their wishes have been rightly 
expressed by their representatives, for the members 
of the Legislature from Pittsburg may have opposed 
the bill. The contrast is primarily between central- 
ized government and local home rule, not between 
representative and direct democracy. The question 
whether the act shall be referred to the people or the 
council of the city is, indeed, one of direct democracy, 
but as such it touches local not state government, 
the relation of the council to the citizens, not that 
of the legislature to the people of the state. This 
distinction must be borne in mind; because state- 
wide popular votes on local questions, like that on 
the Portland Bridge Act in Maine and like several 
initiatives on local matters in Oregon, while in accord 
with the principle of the general state referendum, 
are as much violations of the principle of the local 
referendum and local autonomy as if the legislature 
alone had acted. 

The same distinctions apply to making the local 
application of a general law depend upon its adoption 
by the people of each local community ; the common- 



§84] Advantages of Local Referendum 195 

est example, and a typical one, being local option in 
regard to the sale of liquor. Here again there is no 
appeal from the representatives to their constituents, 
but the conferring of power over a matter deemed of 
local interest to the locality concerned to be exercised 
by local popular vote. 

The third form of the local referendum — that of 
giving to the people of a city the right to reject by 
popular vote measures passed by their own local 
council — is a pure instance of direct, as compared 
with representative, democracy, But it may be 
observed that while the general principle involved is 
the same as in the case of a referendum to the people 
of a whole state, it is applied to a more limited class 
of questions on a smaller scale; and if our analysis of 
public opinion is correct, the difficulty with the prob- 
lem of direct popular government lies not so much 
in the general principle as in the application. 

84. Advantages of the Local Referendum 

One of the objections raised against the state- wide 
referendum which does not apply to local popular 
votes is the danger of confusing constitutional and 
other laws. It is urged that if all laws are sanctioned 
alike by popular vote, people will cease to regard as 
peculiarly sacred those fundamental principles that 
are embodied in the constitution. Many of the 
advocates of direct legislation do not regard such a 
result with disfavor. They think that the sanctity 
of the constitution has been carried too far, and that 
it would be well to reduce it, if not to abolish it 
altogether. Other people feel that the fundamental 



196 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 84 

principles of public life ought to be held in peculiar 
reverence, and changed only after careful and mature 
deliberation; that changes once made ought to 
endure; that we ought not to experiment lightly 
with the foundations of civilized society. They 
believe that, while there are many ways of insuring 
political stability, the American method of doing 
so lies in a distinction between constitutional and 
other laws. A constitution, they say, should be 
readjusted to the fundamental, not the superficial, 
changes in society. The compass follows the slow 
movement of the magnetic pole, and a constitution 
should be a compass not a weathercock. Now this 
objection, whatever it may be worth, clearly does not 
apply to the local referendum. 

Again, the referendum for local affairs is applied on 
a smaller scale, and the smaller the scale the greater 
the opportunity for discussion and hence the forma- 
tion of a true public opinion . The questions presented , 
also, are more limited, more likely to be simple and 
familiar to the mass of voters, who are therefore in a 
better position to weigh their merits. That this is 
in fact the case may be seen in the relative size of the 
vote cast on state and local questions by the citizens 
of Boston. The figures have been compiled by the 
Statistics Department of the city for twenty-two 
years from 1890 through 191 1, 1 and show that a de- 
cidedly larger proportion of the people were inter- 
ested in, or felt competent to express an opinion 
upon, local than state- wide measures. It appears 
that the average percentage of registered voters in 

1 Monthly Bulletin for December, 1911, and January, 1912. 



§84] Advantages of Local Referendum 197 

Boston who voted upon the thirteen state questions, 
though larger than the average percentage in the 
rest of the state, was only 52.44, while the average 
percentage on the seven city questions voted upon 
at state elections was 63.16; and that on six such 
questions submitted at city elections, where the 
attendance is naturally less than at state or national 
elections, the average percentage was 59.81. 1 It 
may be added that eight of the votes at city elec- 
tions occurred when there was no election of mayor, 
and hence the attendance was unusually small; 
whereas at every state referendum a governor was 
elected. All this enhances very much the signifi- 
cance of the larger vote on local matters. Such a 
result goes far to justify a more general confidence 
in the local referendum as an expression of a real 
public opinion. 

1 One question, that of incorporating the Elevated Railway Com- 
pany, presented on a special occasion when no election was held, is not 
included. The vote on it was only 33.41 per cent. — far the lightest 
vote on any of the city measures. Including this, the average vote on 
city questions at city elections was 56.57 per cent. These figures do 
not include the annual votes on licensing the sale of liquor which take 
place at city, not state, elections, and where the percentage of the 
registered vote cast has averaged 62.63 in the twenty-one years covered 
by these statistics. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE INITIATIVE 

85. The Nature of the Initiative 

The referendum is, after all, negative. It is an 
instrument whereby the people can reject an act 
passed by their representatives which they do not 
like. It enables them to take the same part in 
legislation that the governor does by his veto — a 
power, by the way, which no public officer possesses 
in Switzerland — but it gives them no power to 
legislate themselves. For this last purpose the initia- 
tive was devised by the Swiss, and has recently been 
copied in America by most of the states t that have 
adopted the general referendum on ordinary statutes. 
It empowers a certain number of voters to draft a 
law and demand a popular vote upon it without 
regard to the opinion of the legislature. Herein it 
differs essentially from the right of petition. Any 
citizen can petition the legislature, and in America 
he can, as a rule, appear before a committee of that 
body to argue for his bill. Many useful laws origi- 
nate in this way; but if the legislature refuses to 
act, the bill is dead. Now the specific object of the 
initiative is to open another channel for lawmaking, 
to enable citizens to draft a bill and appeal directly 
to the people on it when the legislature declines to 

198 



§86] Results of Initiative in Switzerland 199 

enact it. The procedure varies, but this is the essen- 
tial object in all cases, and for our purpose the first 
question is how far there is a public opinion in favor 
of measures to which the legislature is opposed. 

86. Results in the Swiss Confederation 

The initiative was introduced in a couple of Swiss 
cantons as early as the middle of the last century, 
and after 1869 it spread rapidly, until for a score of 
years it has existed in some form in every canton but 
one. In 1891 it was adopted also for amendments 
to the federal constitution, but it does not apply to 
other federal laws. 1 An inspection of the tables in 
Appendix A will show the extent of its use and the 
cases in which it has been used with success. Eight 
attempts have been made to amend the federal 
constitution by this process, of which two only have 
been successful. The first of these, in 1893, forbade 
the slaughter of cattle by bleeding, chiefly in order 
to prevent the manufacture of kosher meat; and 
the second, in 1908, forbade the sale of absinthe. 
The first, although supported on the ground of 
cruelty to animals, certainly sprang from race 
prejudice; the second was a prohibitory law, on 
which people always disagree, and in fact the national 
legislature approved it. It may be observed that in 
neither case did a majority of the registered voters 
take part in the vote. 2 

1 At an earlier date the initiative could be used to provoke a complete 
revision of the federal constitution, but it proved useless. 

2 An amendment on the use of water-powers was proposed by initia- 
tive, but withdrawn when the legislature drew up a measure of its own 
which was ratified at the referendum in 1908. 



200 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 87 

87. Results in the Cantons 

In the canton of Bern the initiative was set in 
motion nine times from 1893 through July, 1912, 
and in but four of them with success. These four 
abolished compulsory vaccination; provided for im- 
provement in cattle breeding; changed the price of 
salt; and introduced the election of the executive 
council of the canton by the people. It has not been 
used at all for the last six years. In the democratic 
canton of Zurich, where the votes on the referen- 
dum have been more numerous than elsewhere, 
the initiative has been put in operation, from 1893 
to 1908, in eleven cases and once with success. 1 It 
was a proposal in 1894 to amend the cantonal con- 
stitution by providing that the apportionment of 
members of the legislature should be based upon the 
number of Swiss citizens, instead of the number of 
residents, in the district. In Aargau it has been 
successful, from 1893 to 1912, in three cases out of 
six: a game law; election of the executive council 
by the people; and a law on the local referendum. 
In Thurgau out of three trials it was successful once: 
creating industrial tribunals. In Solothurn both 
initiatives were rejected, but an alternative to one 
of them, proposed by the legislature, was adopted. 
In Schaffhausen the only measure brought forward 
by the initiative was rejected. This was true also 
of the single cases in Rural Basle and the Valais, of 
the two in the Grisons, and of the five in Lucerne. 

1 Two laws based upon initiative were enacted by the legislature and 
ratified at the referendum. 



§ 88] Results of Initiative in Switzerland 201 

In Schwyz the only initiative was a proposal for a 
total revision of the constitution which was accepted 
by a light vote; but the constitution so framed was 
rejected by more than two to one at the largest 
popular vote polled in the canton on any measure. 
In St. Gall three measures were so proposed, of which 
one was adopted. It reduced the rate of interest on 
mortgages to four per cent., but three years later a 
law restoring the rate to four and a half per cent, was 
ratified at the referendum. Curiously enough, in a 
couple of cantons that make little use of the referen- 
dum the initiative has been comparatively frequent. 
Geneva, which has used the referendum only on 
ten measures in more than thirty years, voted on 
initiatives six times, and in two cases with success. 
One forbade a man to hold certain public offices at 
the same time; and the other provided for the 
election of judges by the people. In Basle City, 
where the referendum has not been used at all, the 
initiative has been set in operation twelve times and 
has been successful in two instances; one of which 
provided that the legislature should be chosen by 
proportional representation, and the other that non- 
residents should be charged tuition fees in the 
schools. In none of the other cantons has any 
attempt been made to use the initiative. 

88. Tendencies in Switzerland 

An examination of the list shows that, except for 
the federal act on the slaughtering of cattle, there is 
nothing very peculiar about any of the laws enacted 
by this process. People may well differ about their 



202 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 88 

wisdom, as about that of any legislation, but they 
were certainly not eccentric. The election of the 
executive council in Aargau, and of the judges in 
Geneva, by the people does not strike Americans as 
extraordinary; and, on the other hand, a study of the 
tables in Appendix A will prove that the really radical, 
unusual, or doctrinaire proposals were rejected by 
overwhelming majorities. A declaration, for exam- 
ple, of the duty of the state to furnish laborers with 
work was defeated in the Confederation by nearly 
four to one; a proposal in Geneva for the separation 
of church and state and for old age pensions was 
rejected by more than two to one (although when 
later separated the first part of this measure was 
ratified on a referendum), and an initiative in the 
same canton for compulsory mutual fire insur- 
ance was defeated more than four to one. Even 
proportional representation, although on the whole 
becoming more and more popular, has been rejected 
a number of times, and was accepted in Basle 
City only by a vote of 5,290 to 5,280. In short, 
the Swiss have shown themselves in the use of 
this instrument, as in that of the referendum, an 
eminently conservative people. 

The most notable fact about Swiss experience 
with the initiative is the small amount of legislation 
it has produced. Even the attempts to use it 
have not been very frequent. The total output of 
federal legislation from that source in a score of 
years has been two measures, or one in ten years. 
In the cantons the result has been smaller still. 
In the eighteen, or in some cases twenty, years 



§ 89] Results of Initiative in America 203 

covered by the tables only fifteen measures have 
been enacted in this way by all the eighteen cantons 
that possess the procedure, or an average of less 
than one measure per canton in twenty years; 
while in Bern, the most prolific of them all, the 
average is only one measure in five years. The 
Swiss people certainly do not appear to crave any 
considerable amount of legislation which their rep- 
resentatives are unwilling to enact. This is the 
more striking because in strong contrast with the 
experience of the American states, where the initia- 
tive has been used more freely than the referendum. 

89. Results of the Initiative in America 

Although the initiative was adopted in South 
Dakota in 1898, it was not used in any state until 
1904, when it was put into operation by Oregon, 
which has, indeed, applied it more frequently and 
with greater positive results than all the other 
states that possess it put together. 1 Apart from 
constitutional amendments passed by the legislature 
and submitted as of course to the people, Oregon 
has had, through 1912, popular votes by referendum 
on eleven laws or appropriations, six of them being 
rejected. But by initiative twenty-eight constitu- 
tional amendments have been proposed, of which 
sixteen were adopted by the people; and forty-eight 
other laws, of which seventeen have been accepted 

1 All the states, except New Mexico, that have the general refer- 
endum have also the initiative, at least for ordinary laws. Nevada, 
however, adopted the former in 1904, but did not adopt the initiative 
until 1912. In Michigan the legislature has power to refer laws to the 
people, and there is an initiative for constitutional amendments. 



204 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 89 

in this way. The number of measures so proposed 
has increased steadily, but at the last four biennial 
elections the number adopted has remained nearly 
constant. 1 Truly the output is not meagre. In 
Oregon alone it is now four times as rapid as in the 
Confederation and all the cantons of Switzerland 
added together. In Colorado the institution, for 
the single year in which it has been in operation, 
has been equally prolific; for in 1912 twenty meas- 
ures were proposed by that means and eight of 
them adopted. With such a number of laws 
enacted by petition and popular vote, the advocates 
of direct legislation are certainly right in believing 
that, if the votes express the real opinions of the 
people, the representatives in these two states are 
out of touch with their constituents; and if this 
is a permanent condition, representative democracy 
there has not been highly successful. 

The other states have found the initiative less 
productive. In Maine, where it has existed several 
years, only one measure has been proposed and 
that was adopted. In Missouri six measures, all 
constitutional amendments, have been proposed, 
and all of them were heavily defeated. In Montana 
it was not used until 1912, when four acts were 
proposed and accepted by large majorities. In 
Oklahoma ten measures have been proposed, four 

1 Year Proposed Adopted 

1904 2 2 

1906 10 7 

1908 11 8 

1910 25 8 

1912 28 8 

One other measure proposed in 1912 was not on the ballot. 



§ 90] Laws Enacted by Initiative 205 

of them being accepted; but the special election 
at which one of these was ratified was afterwards 
declared unconstitutional. It may be observed, 
however, that another of the measures received a 
majority of the votes cast thereon, but not a majority 
of all the votes cast at the election, which is required 
by the constitution. In South Dakota only three 
measures have been so proposed, of which only one 
was accepted; and that one, although proposed by 
initiative, was in fact enacted by the legislature. 

Of the states in which the initiative did not come 
into operation until the election of 1912, Colorado 
has already been mentioned. For the rest, one 
measure, extending the suffrage to women, was 
proposed and adopted in Arizona. In Arkansas, 
on the other hand, six measures were proposed and 
three adopted. In California three were proposed 
and rejected; while New Mexico made no use of the 
institution. 

90. Nature of the Laws Enacted by Initiative 

The people of those American states which have 
established direct legislation have certainly been 
more attracted by the initiative than by the refer- 
endum, for they have used it more frequently. An 
examination of the various measures enacted thereby 
will throw light upon the working of the institution. 
Many of them have been of a purely political 
character; that is, they have dealt with the structure 
and powers of the state government or the forms of 
procedure. Twenty-two of the fifty-five so carried, 
or about two fifths, fell within that category. They 



206 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 90 

related to such matters as the method of amend- 
ing the constitution, direct nominations, length of 
legislative sessions, recall of public officers and of 
judicial decisions, ballots at elections, expenditures 
by candidates, proportional representation, woman 
suffrage, and disfranchisement of negroes. Nearly 
a score more concerned other public affairs, such 
as civil service reform, judicial procedure, aid for 
schools, the limit of debt for roads, state printing, 
state institutions, the employment of convicts, free 
passes on railroads for members of the legislature, 
the kinds of property to be taxed and the rates 
thereon. Some of the measures in Oregon dealt 
with specific matters, like the adoption of a particu- 
lar normal school by the state, and the imposing 
of a tax on the gross earnings of telegraph, telephone, 
and sleeping car companies. Other successful uses 
of the initiative related to local government. Of 
this nature were laws establishing local option in 
the sale of liquor, giving to cities power to create 
their own organization, providing for the referendum 
and initiative therein, regulating their debts, and 
in one case in Oregon creating a new county by 
special act. 

Only nine of the laws adopted in this way con- 
cerned directly the conduct of private persons. 
Three of them regulated the taking of fish; three 
related to the hours of labor in public work, in mines, 
and of women; one to the liability of employers for 
accidents ; one fixed freight rates ; and another was a 
mothers compensation act. Of these nine, six were 
adopted in Oregon, and the other three in Colorado. 



§91] Nature of Proposals Rejected 207 

91. Nature of Proposals Rejected 

The measures proposed and rejected are, perhaps, 
not less illuminating. Passing by for a moment the 
fertile soil of Oregon, we find, as in the case of the 
laws adopted, a great preponderance of measures 
of a political character; the only proposals relating 
primarily to the conduct of private persons being 
a number of attempts to secure prohibition in the 
sale of liquor and one to license horse-racing and 
forbid betting. A few proposals there were upon the 
border line; such as the creation of commissions 
to regulate public service corporations, a provision 
for trial by jury in cases of contempt of court, and 
perhaps we should add the maintenance of an 
immigration bureau. All the rest of the measures 
proposed and rejected dealt with the organs of 
government and their functions. They related to 
elections, local government, public education, high 
ways, taxation and the like, many of the meas- 
ures rejected being similar to those adopted in 
other states. 

Turning now to Oregon, the greatest of labora- 
tories for experiments in direct legislation, we find 
that the laws proposed by the initiative cover a 
range of miscellaneous objects as wide as those 
which come before a state legislature. Nor, con- 
trary to the usual assumption, did they proceed 
wholly from those who advocate lawmaking by 
popular vote, but in no inconsiderable share from 
its opponents. In other words, the measures 
brought before the people in this way have not been 



208 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 91 

by any means always radical, or all in one direc- 
tion. Measures have been brought forward, for 
example, to enlarge and to restrict the operation of 
the referendum and the initiative. The questions 
of prohibition and taxation have been the subject 
of proposals and counter proposals seeking directly 
contrary ends; and so has the question of author- 
izing or limiting indebtedness for building roads. 
Some of the proposals, moreover, that have been 
adopted by the people, were not the radical ones. 

The House of Commons has been compared to 
an elephant's trunk which can lift a tree or pick 
up a pin, and the initiative in Oregon seems to 
emulate that versatility. One proposal involved 
a reconstruction of the whole state government, 
abolishing the Senate, introducing proportional repre- 
sentation into the remaining House, making the 
Governor and all his defeated rivals ex officio mem- 
bers thereof, forbidding appropriations except on 
the recommendation of the Governor, etc.; while 
no less than ten special acts were proposed to create 
particular new counties or change the boundaries of 
existing ones. Save for one measure in 1908 creat- 
ing a county these last proposals were rejected by 
overwhelming majorities. Attempts have also been 
made to transfer to the state a toll road and particu- 
lar normal schools, in the case of one of the latter 
with success. Other proposals which were rejected 
dealt with woman suffrage, the law of elections, 
the apportionment of state taxes, the establish- 
ment of an official state periodical, a state highway 
department, a state hotel inspector, with state 



§92] The Initiative and Public Opinion 209 

printing, a state license for selling stocks and bonds, 
with the government and support of the state 
University and the Agricultural School, with the 
areas of local government, with the abolition of 
capital punishment, with the prohibition of boy- 
cotting and picketing and of meetings on public 
land without the consent of the mayor. 

92. The Initiative and Public Opinion 

An examination of the measures proposed by the 
initiative in Oregon makes it appear improbable 
that the public could have had a real opinion on all 
of them. No doubt there was a very genuine opinion 
on some of them which were well understood, such 
as woman suffrage, prohibition, and others. But 
this can hardly have been true of all the rest, on 
account of the number of questions submitted to 
popular vote at one time. In addition to the choice 
of many public officers, the people were asked to 
vote on thirty-two different measures in 1910 and 
thirty-seven in 1912. Now if any candid man who 
is not in active politics, but takes a serious interest 
in public affairs, will consider on how many of the 
candidates for office, constitutional amendments 
and other questions on which he votes (quite apart 
from the general referendum and initiative) he has 
a real personal opinion formed by personal judg- 
ment, he will be shocked if he is not already aware 
of his own ignorance. In a lamentable proportion 
of cases he acts upon an impression, a prejudice, or 
upon the advice of some person or party that he 
trusts; and if he is as intelligent and conscientious 

14 



210 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 92 

as the average citizen, he may assume that the other 
voters are mostly in the same condition as himself. 
But the opinion of the whole people is only the 
collected opinions of all the persons therein. Even 
assuming that every citizen reads a pamphlet of 
over two hundred pages, with brief arguments on 
both sides of a part of the questions, it is unlikely 
that he will form a personal judgment on all of them. 
The fact that he votes on them all may prove only 
that he follows what he believes to be a good lead; 
and the fact that the people discriminate, not adopt- 
ing or rejecting everything coming from a certain 
source, proves only that a fraction of the people 
act independently, rather than that they all have 
opinions of their own. Yet this is the assumption 
on which the initiative is based, and it becomes less 
accurate as the number of questions to be decided 
by popular vote exceeds the capacity of the ordinary 
busy man to decide for himself. 

We have seen that such questions in Oregon are 
far more numerous than in any of the Swiss cantons, 
even those with both initiative and compulsory 
referendum on all laws. Among the laws, moreover, 
proposed by initiative in Oregon there were some 
requiring for the formation of an intelligent opinion 
a familiarity with facts not of common knowledge. 
This is true, for example, of the question which, if 
any, of three competing normal schools ought to be 
supported by the state. Others required informa- 
tion about local conditions, as in the case of the 
eight proposals of 1910 to create new counties or 
change the boundaries of existing ones. The people 



§93] Complex Subjects and the Initiative 211 

seem to have recognized this in their rejection of all 
the eight; but if so, the vote was an expression of 
opinion, not on the merits of the measures them- 
selves, but on the popular incompetence to decide 
them, and on the principle that such measures 
ought not to be proposed in this way. 

93. Complex Subjects Presented by Initiative 

Then some of the measures presented by the 
initiative in Oregon — that on judicial procedure in 
1910, for example, and those changing radically 
the structure of the state government in 1910 and 
1912 — were very comprehensive and complex, of 
a nature to require profound and prolonged study. 
Even the advocates of direct legislation assert that 
the issue in the case of the constitutional pro- 
posal of 1910 was confused. Their organ, Equity, 
quotes Mr. Alfred D. Cridge to the effect that, out- 
side of the cities, the provision seeking to estab- 
lish proportional representation was not understood, 
and that if it had not been combined with dis- 
tinctly unpopular matters, and if the People's Power 
League has been able to place a few speakers in 
the field, it would have been carried by a large 
majority. 1 The judicial procedure amendment of 
1910, although not very long, contained a series of 
provisions about trial by jury and about the power 
of the Supreme Court of the state to deal with 
appeals in cases where verdicts have been rendered. 
This is a highly technical subject in which it is 
easy to lose one's way. One of the objects of 

1 Equity, January, 1911, p. 42. 



212 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 93 

the measure was undoubtedly to prevent the vexa- 
tion of a new trial where substantial justice can 
be done without it. 1 The provision reads: 

"Sec. 3. In actions at law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right 
of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried 
by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any 
court of this State, unless the court can affirmatively 
say there is no evidence to support the verdict. 
Until otherwise provided by law, upon appeal of 
any case to the Supreme Court, either party may 
have attached to the bill of exceptions the whole 
testimony, the instructions of the court to the jury, 
and any other matter material to the decision of 
the appeal. If the Supreme Court shall be of 
opinion, after consideration of all the matters thus 
submitted, that the judgment of the court appealed 
from was such as should have been rendered in the 
case, such judgment shall be affirmed, notwith- 
standing any error committed during the trial; or 
if, in any respect, the judgment appealed from 
should be changed, and the Supreme Court shall 
be of opinion that it can determine what judgment 
should have been entered in the court below, it 
shall direct such judgment to be entered in the 
same manner and with like effect as decrees are 
now entered in equity cases on appeal to the Supreme 
Court. Provided, that nothing in this section shall 
be construed to authorize the Supreme Court to 
find the defendant in a criminal case guilty of an 
offence for which a greater penalty is provided than 

1 Official Pamphlet, 1910, p. 177. 



§93] Complex Subjects and the Initiative 213 

that of which the accused was convicted in the lower 
court." 

One of the leaders of the Oregon Bar is of opinion 
that this empowers the Supreme Court of the state 
to enter judgment contrary to the verdict of the 
jury. 1 In view of the first sentence of the section, 
forbidding reexamination of facts tried by a jury, 
and the last sentence, which assumes that a prisoner 
may be found guilty of an offence for which he was 
not convicted by the verdict of the jury if the 
penalty is not greater, the construction of the powers 
conferred on the Supreme Court in the body of the 
section appears, to a lawyer bred in another part 
of the country, open to doubt. Is it probable that 
the bulk of the voters of Oregon had an opinion on 
this intricate point of law; and if not, can they be 
said to have had an opinion in favor of investing 
the Supreme Court with powers that they did not 
understand? No doubt they had an opinion upon 
another section which provides for verdicts in civil 
cases by three quarters of the jury; but the question 
what the court shall do when the verdict is incon- 
sistent with the testimony does not seem to have 
occurred even to the framers of the amendment, 
who were apparently thinking only of avoiding 
new trials on technical grounds. 2 Yet whatever 
the provision may mean, it obviously goes farther 
than this. 

The object of the initiative being to form and 

1 Address of Frederick V. Holman, President of the Oregon Bar 
Association, at its meeting, November 15, 1910, p. 39 et seq. 

2 See their argument in the Official Pamphlet, 1910, p. 177. 



214 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 94 

elicit a real public opinion, and to separate the issues 
presented to the people from general party consider- 
ations, the questions presented ought to be simple 
and single; whereas under a general initiative it 
is possible to present a complicated measure, diffi- 
cult to understand, and sugar-coat it by some 
provision obvious and attractive at first sight. 
Thus in Oregon the amendment of 1910, repeal- 
ing the constitutional provision about equality of 
taxation and giving to local bodies authority to 
regulate taxes, contained a provision abolishing 
the poll tax. The amendment was adopted by 
36.7 per cent, of the citizens who took part in the 
election, 35 per cent, voting against it, and 28.3 
per cent, not voting on it at all. A change of 1023 
votes would have changed the result, and there 
may well have been more than that number who 
thought of the poll tax alone. I do not for a moment 
wish to insinuate that the provision was inserted 
to make the measure more palatable, or distract 
attention from the main issue, but the occurrence 
points to a possible danger in the unrestricted use of 
the initiative; and it is noteworthy that a repeal 
of the whole of the amendment, save the abolition 
of the poll tax, was ratified at the next election by 
a popular majority of 16,731. 

94. Close Votes and Public Opinion 

The doubts about the existence of a real public 
opinion arising from the closeness and small size 
of the vote apply, of course, to the initiative as 
well as the referendum. With what confidence, for 



§ 94] Close Votes and Public Opinion 215 

example, can we say that the people of Oregon did 
not want an income tax when at the election of 
1912, 38.75 per cent, of those who went to the polls 
voted for it, and 38.92 voted against it. In other 
words, the decision was made by 0.17 per cent, of 
those who took part in the election, while 22.33 
per cent, of those present did not vote on it, and 
probably as many more were absent altogether. 

Several cases in Colorado in the same year are 
even more striking. The proposal to publish an 
official pamphlet containing arguments on the 
measures to be submitted to the people was defeated 
by a vote of 14.30 per cent, in its favor against 
14.65 per cent, against it, while 71.05 per cent, of 
those who took part in the election abstained from 
voting either way on the question. On the other 
hand the law to place all appointed public officers 
under civil service rules was adopted by 14.61 per 
cent, against 13.42 per cent., 72 per cent, of those 
present not voting; and the laws to give home rule 
to cities, to forbid lists of party candidates on 
ballots, and to make eight hours a day's labor in 
mines were carried by only slightly larger margins. 
It must be remembered that the percentages of 
votes on these measures are of the votes actually 
cast for presidential electors at the same time, so 
that the proportions of registered voters were 
smaller still. In such cases it seems an exaggera- 
tion to speak of the result as a real expression of 
public opinion. 



216 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 95 

95. Stability as Evidence of Opinion 

Persistence in the result of popular votes on a 
subject has an important bearing on the question 
of public opinion in two ways. If the people vote 
differently at short intervals it increases the prob- 
ability that in one or other of the cases the majority 
was due to chance, or rather to something other 
than a deliberate opinion on the measure presented; 
and if the people really change their opinions in a 
short time, those opinions are of the less value as 
a basis for legislation. The public sentiment that 
should rule is one which is serious, deep-rooted, and 
stable. Now Oregon is the only American state 
that has made use of direct legislation long enough 
to measure the stability of the vote, and the results 
are not wholly reassuring. A constitutional amend- 
ment giving women the right to vote was brought 
forward and rejected with ever increasing majorities 
in 1906, 1908, and 1910, and was adopted by a small 
margin in 1912. The sale of liquor has been the 
subject of constant agitation. In 1908 a measure 
providing for local option was rejected by a sub- 
stantial majority. At the next election in 1910 a 
similar proposal was made which was said by its 
opponents to be "the most impudent affront to 
the intelligence of Oregon voters," an attempt "to 
foist into the Constitution in a new dress, the Reddy 
Bill, which was defeated at the last state election" 1 ; 
but it was carried. Again, it is charged from 
an entirely different quarter that the constitutional 

1 Official Pamphlet, 1910, p. 78. 



§96] Defects of the Initiative 217 

amendment on taxation proposed by initiative in 
1910, and adopted, had substantially the same 
object as an initiative of 1908 which had been 
defeated by a majority of nearly two to one. 1 The 
amendment of 1910 gave to the counties power to 
levy taxes in any way they pleased, and at the 
same time abolished the poll tax; but the next 
legislature passed an amendment to repeal the whole 
of the amendment of 1910 except the abolition of 
the poll tax, and this in turn the people ratified by 
a vote half as large again as that which had been 
cast against the measure adopted in 1910. A 
stranger cannot form an opinion of any value on 
the merits of these questions, but when leading 
citizens of the state on opposite sides allege that 
the people changed their mind at short intervals 
without adequate reason, he must admit that there 
is some ground for their statements. 

96. Defects of the Initiative 

Connected with this matter of stability of laws 
under the initiative is that of constant repetition 
of the same proposal. If a popular vote expresses 
a real opinion, an enduring opinion, of the electorate, 
it ought to be accepted as final until such time as 
the people may reasonably be supposed to have 
had good ground for changing their convictions. 
It is hardly wise to overburden the people by 
enlarging the list of measures they must decide 
with questions needlessly repeated. When they 

1 Chicago Civic Federation Bulletin, No. 3, Remarks of Frederick V. 
Holman, pp. 16-17. 



218 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 96 

are weary of the subject, it may by accident be 
carried by default because they think the result 
certain. This is quite different from the repetition 
of a bill in the legislature, which is bound to discuss 
it, at least in committee, before acting upon it. 
It might be well to provide that the same question 
shall not be proposed by initiative afresh until 
after a certain lapse of time. 

There is also some objection to constitutional 
amendment by the ordinary initiative. This tends 
to incorporate in the constitution matters that have 
no proper place there. The object in resorting 
to it is to make the law a little more difficult 
to change; but if the people can be trusted, there 
is no sufficient reason for that. If there be any 
difference between constitutional and other laws, 
the former ought surely to require a greater degree 
of consideration and, therefore, a more deliberate 
procedure. Really fundamental institutions do not 
need to be changed in a hurry, and it is noteworthy 
that several of the states which have adopted the 
initiative have not applied it to constitutional 
questions. 

Another practical difficulty arises from the lack 
of a thorough examination of the measure proposed. 
There may, or there may not, be an active discussion 
upon it in the press or among the people; but there 
is no one whose business it is to study it, to criticise 
it, or to hear evidence upon it; and in a democracy 
that which is anybody's business is apt to be 
neglected. We have already seen how small a 
proportion of the measures brought forward by 



§97] Impossibility of Amendment 219 

initiative in Oregon have been argued on both sides 
in the Official Pamphlet, and how many have not 
been argued there at all. In order to remedy this 
defect in the procedure some states have provided 
that initiated measures must first be presented to 
the legislature for debate and public hearing, and if 
that body sees fit it may submit to the people, 
alongside of the original proposal, an amended bill 
of its own. Such a provision for discussion, espe- 
cially if accompanied by public hearings, may be a 
great benefit. 

97. Impossibility of Amendment 

The initiation of laws by private persons, instead 
of by public authority, has some practical incon- 
veniences. The proposal is framed by men who are 
earnestly in favor of it, and there is no chance to 
amend it. In some states a referendum may be 
demanded against part of a statute. That has, no 
doubt, an objectionable side, because it mutilates a 
plan that may be acceptable only as a whole. But 
in the case of the initiative nothing of the kind is 
permitted. The people must accept or reject as a 
whole what is offered them, no matter how much 
they might prefer a different measure, for the public 
has no control over the questions it will answer. 
When a measure is proposed by initiative there is 
no chance for compromise with those who perceive 
objections to some of its provisions. Compromise, 
as we have already remarked, connotes evil things 
in the popular imagination, but it is the life-blood 
of healthy and enduring legislation, for it is the 



220 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 98 

means by which the centre of gravity of public 
opinion is found. 

Under the initiative there is a peculiar danger 
of bad drafting of laws. The drafting of bills is 
none too good in our legislatures, but there the 
bill must at least pass two houses, and be read more 
or less critically by a number of people while oppor- 
tunity is still given to amend it. Whereas a bill 
framed by popular initiative practically cannot be 
altered after signatures have begun to be collected, 
in other words after it passes out of the hands of 
its framers and first friends; and whatever grave 
defects of drafting it may contain cannot be touched 
after the petition for a popular vote has been filed, 
that is, after its opponents have a chance to criticise 
it. The judicial procedure amendment of Oregon 
is an example of bad drafting that would certainly 
be less likely to occur if the bill had been submitted 
to the examination of a committee on the judiciary 
in the legislature. A still worse case was that of 
the law forbidding free passes on railroads for 
members of the legislature, which contained no 
enacting words and was therefore without effect. 1 
There would certainly be nothing inconsistent with 
the principle of the initiative in requiring all pro- 
posals to be submitted to a legislative draftsman 
for criticism and suggestion. 

98. Does the Public Initiate? 

We speak of the initiative as a method whereby 
the people can propose laws, and we are inclined 

1 Cf. Political Science quarterly, December, 1908, p. 600. 



§98] Does the Public Initiate? 221 

to attach some peculiar importance to a bill be- 
cause it originates directly with the public. Let us 
consider a moment precisely what we mean by that. 
In comparing the English criminal procedure, in 
which the offender is commonly prosecuted by 
private persons, with the system prevailing in other 
countries, where the matter is in the hands of 
a public prosecutor, Professor Maitland insisted 
that the English plan is really public prosecution 
because any member of the public can instigate 
it; whereas according to the accepted usage the 
term is applied to prosecution only at the instiga- 
tion of a public officer. If we look at legislation in 
the same way, we may ask ourselves whether the 
initiation of laws is properly called public when 
conducted by private persons, or when intrusted 
to representatives chosen by the public for the 
purpose. A discussion of the meaning of words is 
futile except so far as it throws light upon the 
principles involved. Now the initiative enables a 
number of private and irresponsible persons to 
propose any legislation they please without regard 
to the wishes of the general public. Often that is 
unobjectionable, because the people can simply 
reject the law; but the art of government consists 
in reconciling and smoothing over differences, as 
well as in deciding them. There are many questions, 
of a religious or racial character, for example, which 
the good sense of the community refuses to raise, 
but which fanatics are anxious to bring forward. 
Is it better that the representatives of the public 
in the legislature should have power to suppress 



222 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 98 

such proposals, or that a fraction of the citizens 
should have a right to provoke a popular vote upon 
them even when public opinion is against permitting 
this? From the point of view of expediency there 
is much to be said on both sides. On the one hand 
the inflaming of anti-Semitic feeling in Switzerland 
by the proposal to forbid the manufacture of kosher 
meat was probably a misfortune; but, on the other 
hand, a legislature which has power to dismiss such 
questions may suppress others that ought to be dis- 
cussed. Whether expedient or not it is hard to see 
how the right of a small minority to raise issues 
uncomfortable for the majority is giving effect to 
public opinion. May not the public properly de- 
mand evidence that the proposal issues from a really 
considerable popular demand? For this reason 
there is a tendency in some of the states adopting 
the initiative to require a larger percentage of voters 
to bring forward a law than appears in the earlier 
practice. 

The more eager advocates of direct legislation 
resent any suggestions for restrictions upon the 
use of the initiative. But in this they seem unwise. 
New ideas ought to struggle against opposition, 
to prove their worth against a fire of criticism, 
before they are victorious; otherwise they may be 
adopted in haste and lead to repentance at leisure. 
A slow progress under the gradual pressure of a 
growing public sentiment does more for the advance 
of civilization than a more rapid movement followed 
by reaction. Nor is the danger only that measures 
will be adopted incautiously, for the premature 



§98] Does the Public Initiate? 223 

forcing of a popular vote upon an excellent proposal 
may result in a defeat which will retard its ultimate 
adoption. The most valuable institution is not 
that which bears the earliest, but that which bears 
the best, fruit. 



CHAPTER XV 

REFLECTIONS ON DIRECT LEGISLATION 

It has been said that the initiative corrects the 
legislature's sins of omission, the referendum its 
sins of commission. 1 The objects of the two are 
quite distinct. The referendum may prevent laws 
that the people do not want, but it produces no 
legislation; while the initiative gives an opportunity 
to enact measures the people may desire, but it 
hinders no bad laws. Each of them has its merits 
and defects, its advantages, its dangers and its 
proper limitations. Hence under the conditions of 
any community it may be that one of them will 
prove beneficial and the other not, or that they may 
be wisely applied to different subjects and with 
different restrictions. Yet there are some general 
considerations that apply to both, especially in 
relation to the question how far, and under what 
conditions, a popular vote upon a measure is an 
accurate expression of a real public opinion. 

99. Trustworthiness of the Result 

We have observed that the vote on measures is 
almost invariably smaller, often very much smaller, 
than the vote for the chief elective officers; and if 
we may assume that the size of the vote indicates 

1 Professor L. J. Johnson, The Initiative and Referendum, an Effec- 
tive Ally of Representative Government, p. 5. 

224 



§99] Trustworthiness of the Result 225 

the number of persons who have a serious opinion 
on the question, it bears upon the probability of a 
true public opinion in the community as a whole. 
We have noted cases where the majority by which 
the question was decided has been exceedingly 
small, and where the number of citizens who did 
not vote on the measure at all was as large, or even 
much larger, than the votes cast for or against it. 
The necessity for a decision in such a case may 
require that the majority, however minute, have 
their way, and those who do not vote may well be 
held not to object to the law; but it seems like an 
abuse of terms to speak of the result as an expression 
of a public opinion. The well-known fact that there 
is almost always a larger vote for representatives 
than for measures would appear to show that 
there is more truly a public opinion on the choice 
of men than on laws; yet the reason commonly 
given for direct legislation is that the representa- 
tives do not reflect the opinion of the people. 
Cases of narrow majorities on small votes may not 
be frequent, and there can be no doubt that a 
popular vote often expresses public opinion, but the 
immediate question before us is whether it always 
does so, and for this we are not confined to specu- 
lations about probabilities. 

The possibility that a popular vote may not 
express the real views of the electorate is apparent 
from the sudden changes of opinion in Oregon to 
which reference was made in the last chapter. 
Another example was given in Massachusetts some 
years ago. In 1903 the legislature passed an act, 

15 



226 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 100 

known as the Luce Law, to create direct primaries, 
with a provision that it should go into effect in any 
town if adopted by vote of the inhabitants. A 
number of towns adopted it at once, and repented 
almost as quickly. They went to the legislature 
the next year, declared that they had acted hastily 
without appreciating the effect of the measure, and 
asked to be relieved from the consequences of their 
votes. One representative asserted that half of 
his fellow-townsmen had supposed they were voting 
on the question of local option in the sale of liquor. 
It so happened that when these appeals were made, 
the House of Representatives was ringing with 
oratory in favor of a constitutional amendment for 
a general referendum, and the spectacle of towns 
begging the legislature to undo by statute what 
they had done by popular vote, contributed largely 
to the rejection of the amendment. 1 

100. Delay of Legislation by Popular Votes 

Even if it could be assumed that the popular vote 
always expressed a real public opinion, there would 
be some disadvantages to be balanced against the 
benefits. We have seen that the initiative may 
be used to bring forward proposals which, though 
rejected, arouse bitter religious or race animosities 
that had better not be stirred; and so in the case 
of the referendum although the people ratify the 
act referred the mere delay in enactment may do 
harm to the community. 

1 " Direct Legislation," by W. Rodman Peabody, in the Political 
Science Quarterly, September, 1905. 



§ 100] Delay of Legislation by Popular Votes 227 

A case of this kind occurred in Oregon. A 
referendum was filed against the appropriation made 
j )V the legislature in 1905 for the support of the 
state university. The act was ratified at the next 
election in 190G, but in the meanwhile the professors 
were exposed to the danger of receiving no pay for 
the services they were rendering. The next year 
the legislature doubled the appropriation, and again 
a referendum was filed, which was voted upon by 
the people in 1908 with the same result and the 
same treatment of the instructing staff. Finally 
in 1911 a special increase was made and on that 
occasion the popular vote went against the act, as 
well as against a special appropriation for a uni- 
versity library. In the first two cases the vote 
was in favor of the grants, and it may be argued 
that as the professors were willing to take the risk, 
and eventually received their pay, no harm was 
done. But this is not true. Apart from the 
unfairness of placing faithful public servants in 
such a position as the professors were forced into, 
the university itself suffers, and will continue to 
suffer, from the occurrence. Every institution of 
learning depends for its excellence upon the high 
quality of its teachers, and risks of this nature 
which make one university less desirable than 
others, tend to deter the best men from accepting 
or retaining chairs therein. A referendum on the 
increase is clearly a very different thing from one 
on the whole appropriation, which enables a small 
minority of the citizens to stop a branch of the 
public service altogether or impose upon the em- 



828 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 101 

ployees a danger of intolerable loss of pay. For 
this reason it is provided in Missouri, for example, 
that the referendum shall not apply to aets making 
appropriations for the current expenses of the state 
government, for the maintenance of state institu- 
tions or for the support of the public schools. 

101. Indirect Effects of Direct Legislation 

The more remote consequences of any political 
institution are often of greater importance than 
its immediate results. Opponents of direct legisla- 
tion insist that it will reduce the importance and 
therefore the character of the legislature, while 
its advocates claim that it will tend to exert a 
greatly beneficial influence upon the representatives. 
In explaining the fact that a popular vote was not 
demanded on any law in South Dakota for a number 
of years after the right was created, the Governor 
of the State wrote, " Since this referendum law has 
been a part of our Constitution we have had no 
charter-mongers or railway speculators, no wild-cat 
schemes, submitted to our Legislature. Formerly 
our time was occupied by speculative schemes of 
one kind or another, but since the referendum has 
been made a part of the Constitution these people 
do not press their schemes upon the Legislature; 
hence, there is no necessity of having recourse to a 
referendum." 1 If such a change is permanently 
accomplished it means an improvement of the 
first magnitude in a number of states; but last- 
ing results are not produced at once, and many 

1 Quoted in the Arena, Aug. 1902, p. U4. 



§101] Indirect Effects of Direct Legislation 229 

years must pass before the final account can be 

made up. 

We turn naturally to Oregon, as the state that 
has made the greatest use of direct legislation, to 
inquire the effect upon the representative body. 
We have opinions upon the subject expressed by 
the leading opponent and advocate of the insti- 
tution. Mr. Frederiek V. Ilolman remarked in 
February, 1911, "In reply to the contention that 
this 'reserve' power would improve the character 
of the legislature I will state, without fear of con- 
tradiction that there has been no substantial change 
in the kind of legislators since the adoption of this 
amendment." l On the other hand Mr. William 
S. U'Ren, speaking of the legislative session of 1911, 
said, "Taken altogether, the session was the most 
complete demonstration we have had in Oregon of 
the need for a proportional system of electing 
members of the legislature, and for a complete 
reorganization of the state government for the pur- 
pose of getting business results instead of politics. 
. . . The members of the legislature were a very 
fair lot of men individually and above the average 
of intelligence, but the session was one of the worst 
Oregon has had for log-rolling, hasty action and 
partisan voting, with small consideration for the 
merits of bills. The legislature was not at all 
representative of the people." 2 This is not so en- 
couraging, although some allowance may be fairly 
made for exaggeration by men who are urging a 

1 Chicago Civic Federation Bulletin, No. .'J, pp. 1 1—1*. 
8 Equity, July, 1911, p. 113. 



230 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ loi 

now reform on the one hand, or extolling the merits 
of one they have achieved on the other. 

A reform often works better at the outset than it 
does later, because the moral impulse that carries 
it through causes good men to take part in adminis- 
tering it. The real test comes later when the first 
enthusiasm has cooled, when the reformers are busy 
with other things, and the professional politician, 
whose trade depends on being at work while others 
are not, has had a chance to try his hand at the new 
machinery. We do not know that a combination 
of the boss and special interests will not be able to 
control the smaller popular vote cast on measures 
as completely as the larger popular vote cast for 
representatives. It will take time, as it took time 
to control elections, but the intrinsic difficulties 
are not necessarily greater in one case than in the 
other. It has been said that reformers can succeed 
only by changing the political machinery faster 
than the professional politicians can learn to manip- 
ulate it, but that is a confession of failure for 
democracy. The real question is whether direct 
legislation is so adjusted to the means of forming 
a real public opinion that the people can decide 
intelligently all the questions presented to them 
without unusual effort, and without the aid of 
people who find a profit in steering them. Badly 
adjusted machinery is the opportunity of the boss 
and the combination. Professional politicians ob- 
tained control of elections because the people were 
called upon to do more than they could do without 
help, and the more the people are asked to decide 



§ KK>] Measures Suited for Popular Votes 231 

(.notions in which they are not as a whole seriously 
interested, the greater will be the opening for the 
boss and his allies. 

102. Measures Suited for Popular Votes 

All this does not mean that the referendum and 
initiative will not prove valuable when used in the 
appropriate way. It means simply that they are 
hot so perfect as some of their advocates appear 
to assume, and that they ought to be used with a 
careful attention to the conditions in which they 
can be successfully applied. The earlier use of the 
referendum in America was restricted to constitu- 
tional questions and to certain specified matters, 
for the most part of a kindred nature; but in the 
recent adoption of a general referendum no serious 
attempt has been made to consider upon what 
classes of questions a genuine public opinion can 
be readily formed and to confine popular votes to 
these. 

One inherent difficulty lies in the fact that the 
people are asked to vote upon a complete statute, 
which is usually hard to understand, however well 
it may be drawn, because it involves many facts 
connected with the application of the general 
principle. Of these the public is more or less 
ignorant, as well as of the reason for provisions 
made to meet valid objections. Such a difficulty 
is especially great in acts affecting public service 
companies or granting franchises, and involving 
in the main applications of principles, on which 
there is often no dispute, to cases where most people 



232 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ log 

have strong prejudices on both sides but know 
very little. 

The class of measures in which legislators delib- 
erately defy public opinion is that which involves 
jobbery, but thrs is a class about which the people 
at large are little competent to form opinions; and 
therefore the referendum is least likely to furnish a 
trustworthy remedy in the cases where the repre- 
sentative body most grossly misrepresents the 
public. If the people cannot, by election or other- 
wise, provide a body that can be trusted to deal 
with such matters honestly and wisely, then a 
popular vote, however ignorant, however far from 
expressing a real public opinion, is better than 
jobbery; but it is at best an imperfect instrument 
for the purpose. So strong is the distrust of the 
legislature in affairs of this kind, that in some 
states — as in Maine, for example — it is provided 
that a vote of emergency withdrawing an act from 
the referendum shall not be used on acts granting 
franchises, a precaution that may be required by 
the conditions. 

If it be true that the people are more capable of 
forming opinions on general principles and moral 
issues than on a mass of details, then the referendum 
would appear to accomplish its object better in 
questions of the former class, and details should be 
referred to popular vote as little as the trustworthi- 
ness of the public servants will permit. In referring 
to Swiss examples in this connection we must 
remember that everywhere in continental Europe 
the statutes go into detail less than they do in the 



§ 103] Will not Bring the Millennium 233 

United States; that much which is embodied in 
the text of an American act is left in Europe to be 
completed by executive ordinance. The objections 
to submitting to popular vote a comprehensive and 
coinpl° x law, or one requiring an accurate knowledge 
of unfamiliar facts is even greater in the case of 
the initiative, and could be prevented without 
impairing seriously the object of that procedure. 

103. Direct Legislation will not Bring the Millennium 

That direct popular action upon laws, when 
wisely and scientifically applied, will prove highly 
useful in certain conditions of society we may well 
believe without expecting it to usher in the millen- 
nium. All theories based on the assumption that 
the multitude is omniscient are fallacious, and so 
are all reforms that presuppose a radical change in 
human nature. It is easy enough to prove that 
any form of government will work like a charm if 
everyone who has a share in the public authority 
Is spotless in wisdom and character; and there has 
probably never existed a political system of which 
men have not tried to demonstrate the perfection. 
Mankind is, and so far as we can see is likely to be, 
composed of some very good people, some very bad 
ones, and a large number who are well meaning, but 
more or less indolent and indifferent when their 
personal sympathies or interests are not touched; 
and the test of any institution is the fruit it will 
bear in a community of that kind. 

People are constantly expecting the millennium 
from some political contrivance that proves after- 



234 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ io ; j 

wards disappointing, and Americans from their 
love of machinery are perhaps peculiarly susceptible 
to this feeling. One panacea of promise in its 
day was representative government; another was 
universal suffrage; a third, the checks and balances 
of the American constitutional system. The de- 
basement of party government in the United States 
has been traced to the state and national nominat- 
ing conventions, which replaced the party caucuses 
in the legislatures and in Congress; 1 but in fact 
the convention was adopted because the legislative 
caucus was thought undemocratic. Let us not be 
led astray by generalizations. Each institution has 
its limitations and will work well only within those 
limits. 

It is a significant fact that the demand for the 
referendum and initiative is as a rule strongest in 
those states where the constitutions are longest and 
most elaborate in their restraints upon the legisla- 
ture, where that body has been most severely limited 
in the frequency and duration of its sessions; just 
as the recall of judges is urged with the greatest 
earnestness where they are popularly elected for 
short terms, rather than where they are appointed 
for life. In short the demand has generally been 
loudest where the reliance upon the integrity and 
capacity of the representatives has been least. Now 
if direct legislation were advocated on the ground 
that while representative democracy had been a suc- 
cess this would be better still, well and good; but 

1 Memorial Relative to a National Initiative and Referendum, 
May 25, 1908. Senate Doc., 60 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 516, pp. 4-5. 



§ 103] Will not Bring the Millennium 235 

if it is urged as an attempt to retrieve a failure 
by the people to work representative institutions, 
then it is the result not of confidence, but of distrust 
in the capacity of the people, and does not augur 
well for the future of popular government. 



Part IV 

The Regulation of Matters to which Public 
Opinion Cannot Directly Apply 






Part IV 

The Regulation of Matters to which Public 
Opinion Cannot Directly Apply 



CHAPTER XVI 

REPRESENTATION BY SAMPLE 

The fundamental assumption of popular govern- 
ment is that public opinion should be carried into 
effect, provided, of course, that it is an enduring 
opinion, not a mere passing whim liable to be soon 
reversed; and there are two reasons why this should 
be done. The first is based, not on any supposition 
that the opinion of the people is always right, but 
on the belief that it is on the whole more likely to 
be right than the opinion of any other person or 
body which can be obtained. The second reason is 
that contentment and order are more general, and 
the laws and public officers are better obeyed, when 
in accord with popular opinion, than otherwise. 
It is unnecessary to discuss here the validity of 
these reasons, for we are dealing, not with the 
theoretical merits, but the methods of operation, 
of democracy. It is enough for us that these 
principles are the assumptions on which popular 
government rests. 

In the preceding chapters we have considered 

239 



240 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 104 

under what conditions a genuine public opinion can 
exist, by what means and to what extent it can be 
faithfully expressed; and we have seen that there 
are many matters on which the public can have 
no real opinion. How can these be regulated in a 
democracy? 

104. Three Methods of Delegating Authority 

The power to deal with questions which the 
people do not decide directly must be committed 
to some authority selected for the purpose, and the 
persons so designated may be intended to act in 
any one of three ways. (1) They may be chosen to 
express the opinion of the public, when there is 
one; (2) they may be appointed to exercise their own 
peculiar knowledge or skill in acting upon the 
questions that come before them; (3) they may be 
set apart to use their judgment as fair samples of 
the people, on the supposition that their opinion 
will be the same that the public itself would form 
if it could spend time enough to examine the matter 
thoroughly. Of course these objects are not rigidly 
separated in practice. An officer of state may be 
expected to act in two, or it may be in all three, 
ways. He may be in some matters the mouthpiece 
of public opinion, in others he may exercise his 
special professional skill, and in still more he may 
act as any intelligent citizen would; but it is only 
by keeping the three objects distinct in our own 
minds that we can have clear ideas about them. 
Let us, therefore, take examples where each of them 
stands alone. 



§ 104] Methods of Delegating Authority 241 

A member of the electoral college for the choice 
of the President is selected solely to express the 
opinion of the voters. He is not to use his own 
peculiar knowledge, or to make up his mind as an 
impartial citizen upon the evidence he hears, but 
simply to cast his vote in accordance with the 
mandate he received at the polls. Of this function 
of expressing the popular will nothing more need be 
said here, because it has already been treated in 
the discussion of representative government. The 
problem before us now is that of dealing with mat- 
ters upon which the public has no opinion, and 
these must be delegated to persons who are to use 
their own special qualifications or to act as samples 
of the people. 

As an example of a person selected to use his own 
peculiar capacity we may take the case of a surgeon 
at a city hospital. He is certainly not intended to 
carry out the popular opinion in operating on a 
patient, nor is he supposed to act as an average 
member of the community might be expected to 
do with the same facts before him. On the con- 
trary he is employed to use his personal knowledge 
and skill, and he is selected because his professional 
opinion is believed to excel, and therefore to differ 
from, that of the unskilled man. 

The same principle applies to a general and a 
judge. In conducting a campaign or deciding a 
point of law they ought not to listen for the signs 
of popular applause, nor do we appoint civilians 
as generals, or laymen as judges. Everyone would 
be shocked if generals were ignorant of tactics, or 

16 



242 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 105 

if judges were not lawyers by profession and failed 
in deciding cases to apply the science of the law. 
This function of special qualifications in government 
will be discussed more fully in the chapters on the 
use of experts in the public service. 

105. The Jury a Sample of the Public 

Of the third method, that of public opinion by 
sample, we have a singularly good illustration at 
hand in the Common Law jury — an institution 
used for matters about which the people at large 
cannot form a real opinion based upon familiarity 
with the facts. Service on a jury is irksome; to 
sit on more than one jury at a time is impossible; 
to read the evidence in all the cases that are tried 
in a single populous county is beyond the powers 
of any citizen; and therefore the whole people 
cannot by any stretch of the imagination be sup- 
posed to possess knowledge enough of the evidence 
in all the cases in court to have an intelligent opinion 
of them. But the jury-men are a sample of the 
great and general public, whose verdict may be 
taken to express what the opinion of the whole 
people would be if everyone heard the evidence; 
and they are drawn, as we draw a sample from a 
bale of merchandise, by a process designed to 
secure average, not selected, specimens. 

Of course the sample must not only be a fair one, 
but it must remain so. It must not be open to 
corrupting influences or pressure, and that condition 
might prevent the use of the jury in some countries. 
The assertion has been made, for example, that it 



§ 106] The Object of Rotation in Office 243 

cannot be adopted for the natives in India, because 
they would not convict rich offenders. Even with 
all our traditions, all our inherited experience, the 
jury is not a perfect instrument; and everyone 
knows that it would be a mere mockery if it were 
not encompassed by elaborate safeguards to in- 
sure an impartial hearing, deliberate consideration, 
and a judicial attitude. The jurors are brought 
into the court room, and solemnly instructed in 
their duties by the judge; they are seated together, 
apart from other people, while the case is being 
tried; they are compelled to hear all the evidence, 
and permitted to hear no evidence whose tendency 
to cause a bias is out of proportion to its proper 
probative value; newspapers are restrained under 
penalty of contempt of court from prejudging the 
case during the trial; the questions at issue, which 
have been carefully defined, are argued by counsel 
for each side; then the judge charges the jurors 
gravely; and finally their verdict must be unani- 
mous. 1 Moreover, the judge can order a new trial 
if anything irregular or improper has occurred. 

106. The Object of Rotation in Office 

Public opinion by sample has played a larger part 
in popular government than is commonly recognized, 
and many devices have had that end more or less 
consciously in view. This is probably true, for 
example, of the principle of rotation in office. No 
doubt jealousy, and a conviction that everyone in 

1 Cf. Graham Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, pp. 209-10 on 
the impressiveness of the formalities surrounding the jury. 



244 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 107 

turn has a right to enjoy the sweets of authority, had 
something to do with it; but we must not fail to 
observe also the feeling that a new man, coming 
fresh from the people, will be in closer touch with 
popular opinion and will be free from official habits, 
or, in other words, a fairer sample of the public. 
This is the reason that jury-men serve short periods 
and are constantly replaced by a fresh panel. 

To show that this phenomenon was perfectly 
natural, not due to the " political cussedness " of our 
forefathers, as many good people would seem inclined 
to imply, an example may be cited of very recent 
occurrence and far removed from politics. Some 
years ago a wave of democratic sentiment, of more 
than ordinary strength, swept over the under- 
graduates at Harvard College; and one of its first 
results was the adoption of a rule that no class 
president should hold office for two successive years. 
From the standpoint of utility this was a misfortune, 
for the president of a class is a public-spirited officer 
of great importance, who has the welfare of his 
classmates very much at heart and whose value 
grows as he comes to know them better. Nor was 
it a case where the number of men who could hope 
to fill the place was considerable; but it seems to 
have been felt, somewhat blindly, to be in accord 
with democratic principles. 

107. The Use of the Lot 

Another device of the same kind has been the 
selection of public officers by lot. Commentators 
have expended much ingenuity in trying to explain 



§ 107] The Use of the Lot 245 

why Aristotle and his contemporaries regarded the use 
of the lot as democratic; and on the part of writers 
in the English language this is the more remark- 
able because they have had the example of the Com- 
mon Law jury staring them in the face. No doubt 
election in Greece involved a danger of the choice 
of rich men, and with party lines drawn as they 
were that meant a peril to the existing form of govern- 
ment in a democratic state. It is not improbable, 
however, that one reason for using the lot to fill the 
public offices at Athens was the same that has caused 
it to be used for centuries in the case of the jury. 
Mr. Headlam remarks that "mediocrity in office was 
its object, because this was the only means of ensuring 
that not only the name but also the reality of power 
should be with the Assembly." 1 Mediocrity, or in 
other words an average sample of the public, is cer- 
tainly the object in drawing a jury by lot, for im- 
partiality could be secured, as in the case of judges, 
by other means. Mr. Headlam is no doubt right 
that one object in seeking mediocrity was to insure 
the supremacy of the Assembly; but may not the 
Greeks, like our own ancestors when insisting on 
rotation in office, have felt the need of selecting the 
public officers from men on a level with the ordinary 
citizen, and of keeping them on the same plane. 

The lot was used freely in the mediaeval cities 
also, and notably in Venice where it had its most 
celebrated application in the machinery for the 
election of the Doge. The first step was the appoint- 

1 Election by Lot at Athens, Cambridge Hist. Essays (No. IV.), 
p. 32. 



246 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 108 

ment by the Great Council, of a committee which 
was then alternately reduced by lot and enlarged by 
coaptation until its membership depended very much 
on chance; and thus the choice of the Doge was 
placed in the hands of a body whose composition 
could not be determined by the personal or party 
factions in the Council. To cut off the political 
parties from activity in the election of the chief 
magistrate of the country may seem strange, but we 
must remember that the mediaeval Italian states 
were torn by factions based upon family quarrels, 
rather than divided into parties by differences of 
opinion on general policy. 

108. Selected Samples of the Public 

The Doge was elected by what may be called a 
sifted or selected sample of the Great Council; and 
this brings us to another point. A sample of the 
public, in order to accomplish its purpose, is not 
necessarily an average sample, but may be a selected 
sample, or a sample from a selected body. The 
English special jury is drawn from persons with some 
property qualification, and of late years it has been 
growing in popularity with litigants, who have a 
right to demand it if they please. v Such a jury is 
intended to represent, not the average public, but 
the average of the better educated part of the public; 
and in the same way public officers, not appointed 
by lot, but elected by the people and therefore 
presumably chosen for some superiority of intelli- 
gence, experience, or character, may in fact be used 
as selected samples of the public. The question 



§ 108] Selected Samples of the Public 247 

whether they act in this way, or as men designated 
to exercise special personal qualities, depends on 
their attitude towards their duties as well as on 
the method of selection. A general or a surgeon 
who endeavored to act as a man of good sense, but 
without special training, might act under the circum- 
stances would be unfit for his place; but this is not 
true of a member of the legislature or even of a 
governor. In fact a large part of their work consists 
in doing that very thing, and in so far as they do it 
they are acting as samples, as selected samples no 
doubt, but still as samples of the general public. 

The vast number of questions on which the public 
cannot form an opinion must, as we have seen, be 
referred to someone for decision; and when, as com- 
monly happens, the difficulty consists not in a lack 
of technical knowledge or fitness, but simply in a 
lack of familiarity with the facts, the matter may 
properly be referred, not to an expert, but to a sam- 
ple, and preferably a selected sample, of the public. 
No doubt expert assistance is usually needed, but 
the decision can often be confided to the good judg- 
ment of intelligent and faithful men without profes- 
sional qualifications. This is true, for instance, in 
applying general principles of legislation to local and 
private matters, where the main problem is to deter- 
mine whether the facts in the particular case justify 
the application of the principle. The persons in- 
trusted with that 'duty are performing substantially 
the function of a selected jury, and their conclusion 
may be supposed to be that which the intelligent pub- 
lic would reach if it could conduct the investigation 



248 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 109 

directly. But in order that the result may be satis- 
factory the persons selected must be impartial, must 
act, not on their own knowledge, but on evidence, 
and the procedure must be such as to insure a full 
and fair presentation of the question. 

109. Private Bill Committees in Parliament 

The select committees to which private and local 
bills are referred in the British Parliament furnish 
an example of such a procedure. Until about sixty 
years ago these committees were made up in large 
part of known advocates and opponents of the 
measures to be considered, in order that they might 
be able to urge their views; but first in the Lords, 
and afterwards in the Commons, a practice was 
adopted of composing them of a small number of 
wholly impartial members, whose duties should be 
of a judicial character. The committee sits like a 
court, and hears evidence and argument presented 
by barristers retained on behalf of the promoters 
and opponents of the bill. The hearing is in effect 
a trial of a cause between contending parties, who 
seek to prove their claims as they would in a 
suit at law. In that trial the members of the 
committee play the part of jurors, save that being 
men of broader education and experience than 
ordinary jury-men, and being fortified by the august 
traditions of Parliament, the members do not need 
to be surrounded by the same safeguards. In its 
composition an English private-bill committee is 
essentially a sample of the House. For chairman, 
indeed, a man is selected who has had experience in 



§ 110] Committee Hearings in America 249 

work of this kind, but the rest of the members are 
chosen from the body of the House without regard 
to special fitness, simply to go through a mass of 
facts which Parliament itself could not undertake 
to examine; and it is because they are a fair sample 
that the House almost always ratifies their con- 
clusions. 

110. Committee Hearings in America 

The same function is performed to a less extent 
by the committees of American legislatures. The 
members, no doubt, are by no means all selected on 
the basis of impartiality. As in the old committees 
of Parliament on private bills some of them hold 
decided views on the policy to be pursued, and an 
effort is made to appoint men to the committees 
on the subjects in which they are interested. Still 
many of the members are impartial in regard to the 
bills that come before them, and this cannot fail to 
happen where every member of the legislative body 
must be given a seat on some committee. More 
important is the fact that the committees often give 
public hearings, and in doing so act in a semi-judicial 
character. 

The subject of public hearings by American legis- 
lative committees has hitherto received far less 
attention than it deserves. They do not seem to 
have been described or discussed in any book until 
the recent work of Professor Reinsch on American 
Legislatures, and he devotes to the subject less 
than one page. 1 Yet they perform a service highly 

1 P. 174. 



250 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ ill 

beneficial in some states, and capable of increasing 
usefulness in others. They are an American institu- 
tion which exists in no other country. In England a 
private bill committee hears evidence presented by 
the parties who have a legal interest in the matter, 
but it hears no one else; while a select committee 
on a public bill examines only the witnesses it chooses 
to summon, and although a person of sufficient 
prominence would no doubt be summoned if he 
wished to appear, that is not at all equivalent to a 
public hearing where everyone has a right to be 
present and state his views. Nor has the writer ever 
met with anything of this kind in any other legislative 
body in the world. 

111. Public Hearings in Massachusetts 

The public hearing is a familiar institution through- 
out American political life, being used not only by 
legislative bodies, but occasionally also by councils, 
committees and administrative officers of all kinds; 
and in fact a request for it is hard to refuse. It has 
been developed very completely in the legislature 
of Massachusetts, where it has become so much a 
regular part of the procedure that every committee 
always gives a public hearing on every bill if any- 
one wants to be heard. The hearings are regularly 
advertised in the newspapers, and in the case of any 
particular bill a special notice is sent to a person who 
asks for it. Ordinarily everyone has a chance to 
express his opinions ; but when the number of people 
attending is large — and it may run into the hun- 
dreds — a lawyer is usually employed on each side 



§111] Public Hearings in Massachusetts 251 

by the chief supporters and remonstrants. He is 
recognized by the committee as counsel for his clients, 
and takes charge of the case, presenting the evidence 
and arguments as he thinks best. In fact the hearing 
is conducted much like a trial in court, save that 
the strict legal rules of evidence are not applied. 

In American legislatures every bill when presented 
is regularly referred to one of the many standing 
committees, and in Massachusetts all the commit- 
tees of that kind, except those on the Judiciary, on 
Ways and Means, and on Elections, are joint bodies 
representing both branches of the legislature. Even 
the few separate committees often sit jointly, so 
that a hearing before a single body almost always 
suffices for both houses, 1 a condition which tends to 
enhance the importance of the hearing. 

The figures for a session will show how universally 
hearings are granted in Massachusetts, and how 
freely the public uses the privilege. 2 In the year 
1910, the bills and petitions referred to committees 
numbered 1634. On 33 of them no hearing took 
place, either because they were sent to some com- 
mission for consideration, or because they were 
introduced late in the session and pushed through 
in haste. On the remaining 98 per cent, hearings 
were given on one or more days, in 1432 cases the 
hearing being finished at the first sitting, in 138 a 

1 Of the 1634 bills and petitions referred to committees in 1910, 
only thirty-five were considered separately by a committee representing 
one house. 

2 These statistics were compiled for the author by Mr. Henry W. 
Cleary from the weekly editions of the Bulletin of Committee Hear- 
ings issued by the legislature. 



252 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ ill 

second day being required, in 19 a third day, in 10 
four days, in 4 five days, in 4 six days, in 3 seven 
days, while one measure consumed twelve days. 

It must be observed that this procedure applies to 
bills of all kinds, public, private, and local, and is 
thus a part of the regular machinery for legislation 
of every class. On matters of a purely local or private 
nature the people who appear are, of course, mainly 
those interested therein, but on public measures 
leading citizens of the state constantly attend and 
express their opinions. This is true of questions 
political, philanthropic, educational, and in fact of 
all matters touching the general welfare. Nor is the 
attendance by any means confined to officers and 
members of organizations formed to promote a public 
object, but extends to people of all sorts, and thus 
the legislature has a chance to learn the state of 
mind of the community in all its phases. 

By this process of hearing evidence and argument 
the committee acquires a semi-judicial attitude. 
It comes to look on itself as sitting in judgment upon 
the matters presented to it, rather than as acting on 
its own initiative; and this to an extent that is at 
times surprising. Some years ago a most high- 
principled member of the Massachusetts House, in 
talking about a bill which he thought very bad, 
remarked that the legislature could not be blamed 
for passing it if the citizens who objected to it would 
not oppose it before the committee. 

In the best sense the procedure is extremely 
democratic, for it gives the whole people a chance 
to take part in legislation at the formative stage. 



§111] Public Hearings in Massachusetts 253 

But it is by no means democratic in the false sense 
that the opinions of all men are given equal impor- 
tance. The views presented are weighed, in accord- 
ance with the knowledge of the subject shown by the 
witnesses and with their standing in the community. 
The people who address the committee are not 
regarded as so many voters to be conciliated, be- 
cause they cannot be constituents of more than one 
or two of the members, and may very well not be 
constituents of any of them. A committeeman from 
New Bedford, for example, may have the greatest 
respect for the opinion of a prominent citizen of 
Boston, but he does not ordinarily care a straw for 
his vote. So far as he is conscientious and disinter- 
ested his object, after listening to the testimony, is to 
discover what ought to be done. One is, therefore, 
justified in speaking of the committee as a sample of 
the legislature, set apart to hear evidence which the 
whole body could not hear, and which without such a 
procedure could not be presented at all. 

If in the case of local and private matters the 
committees could be freed from all interested motives 
and all improper influence, and still more if, like the 
English committees on private bills, they could be so 
formed as to escape wholly from the suspicion of such 
things, they would be even more valuable than they 
are. America is the only country where questions 
that do not affect the whole community, and require 
for their decision a careful study of details, are thrown 
into the vortex of legislative politics. On the con- 
tinent of Europe they are habitually regarded as 
falling into the province of administration, and de- 



254 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 112 

cided by the executive, while in England, though 
treated as legislative matters, they are subjected to 
a special procedure of a wholly different character 
from other bills. The practice of public hearings 
opens a road to a system of that kind which might 
well be carried farther. 

112. Public Hearings in Other States 

All people in Massachusetts, who are well qualified 
by experience to form an opinion ascribe much of 
the merits of the legislature to the custom of public 
hearings. But on this subject Professor Reinsch 
says: "The potential influence of committee hear- 
ings to bring to bear upon legislative action the 
opinions and desires of the public in a truly demo- 
cratic manner, has scarcely been realized outside 
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In that 
state, committee hearings are a very important part 
of legislative action . . . but the General Court of 
Massachusetts is in all respects nearest the people, 
and most responsive of any American legislature to 
intelligent public opinion." x So far as this last 
remark is true, a reason for it, as Professor Reinsch 
observes, is to be found in the fact that Massa- 
chusetts is one of the states whose capital is in 
the largest city. This has the double advantage 
of making a sojourn at the legislature attractive 
to its members, and making it easy for citizens to 
attend committee hearings. The first advantage 
is subtle, though real, and applies everywhere; for 
even the charm of a seat in the House of Commons 

1 American Legislatures, p. 174. 



§ 112] Public Hearings in Other States 255 

would be much reduced if Parliament sat at Not- 
tingham instead of London. 

The second advantage is more obvious. To go to 
Albany or Harrisburg, or Springfield for a commit- 
tee hearing involves a day's journey, and the most 
public-spirited citizen cannot be expected to under- 
take it often. But from their residences, or places 
of business, about half the citizens of Massachusetts 
can reach the State House in less than an hour, and 
perhaps a quarter of them in twenty minutes; so 
that public opinion or special knowledge can be 
brought to bear on the legislature with a very small 
expenditure of time and effort on the part of the 
community. 

One who has made a far less thorough study of 
legislative action outside of Massachusetts than 
Professor Reinsch must hesitate before questioning 
his conclusion, and yet it may be suggested that he 
goes too far in speaking of the influence of committee 
hearings as scarcely realized outside that common- 
wealth. No doubt there are other states where 
matters determined in Massachusetts by committees, 
on the evidence presented to them, are settled by a 
boss or a private conference of political chiefs; but 
that is by no means true everywhere, nor are all 
questions so disposed of anywhere. No doubt 
committee hearings are in more general use in Boston 
than in most of the state capitals, yet extensive 
inquiries conducted by the writer seem to make it 
probable that the practice is not wholly unknown in 
any of our legislatures, while in many of them public 
hearings before committees are not uncommon and 



256 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 113 

have a distinctly beneficial effect. Their use and the 
extent of their influence vary, of course, with the 
nature of the subject, and hence the answer one is 
likely to receive will differ with the class of question 
in which the person speaking happens to be interested. 
In matters like education, which are not closely 
connected either with politics or with private 
interests, public hearings have the best chance of 
playing an important part; but in many places they 
are by no means confined to subjects of that char- 
acter. They are probably growing in use and 
destined to gain in importance. In Wisconsin, for 
example, a deliberate attempt is being made to 
encourage them. They are, indeed, a highly valu- 
able element in popular government; and this is the 
more true because with the elimination of thorough 
discussion from our representative bodies, due partly 
to the increase of legislative business, partly to the 
cutting down of time, and partly to the large propor- 
tion of new members, most of the real work must be 
done through public opinion by sample in the form 
of committees, and committees without public 
hearings are cut off from their best source of light. 

113. The Three Objects that Public Officers Serve are 
Often Combined 

We have considered separately the three functions 
that public officers are intended to fulfil, and we have 
passed in review pure examples of each of them; but 
as we saw at the outset all three duties are in prac- 
tice constantly combined in the same office. This 
is true to a greater or less extent of all the members 



§ 113] Objects that Public Officers Serve 257 

of legislatures and elected councils, and of all 
presidents, governors, and other potentates chosen 
by popular vote. Elections for any of these positions 
are partly an expression of public opinion on certain 
issues that have become prominent; partly a selec- 
tion of persons peculiarly fitted by their knowl- 
edge or experience to exercise their own judgment; 
and partly a choice of persons to represent the 
ordinary good sense of the community, and bring to 
bear on the questions that arise, not expert knowl- 
edge, but the general qualities whereby any healthy 
public opinion is formed. On different occasions one 
or other of these aspects of a political office may be 
given special prominence, but it is rare that any of 
them is wholly absent. 

A large part of the work of men in legislative or 
executive positions, and, indeed, of all officials who 
are not experts, consists in dealing with the questions 
presented to them as any other sensible man might 
do. That is the reason why good sense is usually 
more important in public posts than remarkable 
talent. In ordinary times it is not essential, nor 
always desirable, that the holder of a great office 
should have genius or originality, that he should 
possess the imagination required for eminence in 
literature, art, science, invention or industrial 
enterprise. What is needed is quick apprehension, 
broad sympathy, and sound judgment, for the public 
officer should be rather the balance-wheel than the 
mainspring of government. Genius and originality 
often make mistakes. Many inventors and leaders 
in commercial ventures, although discoverers of a 

17 



258 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 114 

path to future wealth, have died bankrupt, because in 
innovation there is risk. The road of progress is 
paved with failures that have made the way possible 
for others, and the risks which have caused them 
are quite justified in private life; but it is not right 
to speculate with public interests. Innovators are 
invaluable to the state, if they are under control, 
and the men who control them ought to represent 
the general good sense of the community. 

The fact that the different classes of functions are 
so frequently combined, and must inevitably be so, 
makes it important to surround the performance of 
each with the safeguards appropriate to that function. 
When a legislator or officer is acting as a sample of 
the public he should be placed in the full light of 
publicity, made to feel that his duties have a judicial 
character, and should receive the kind of information 
to be derived from a well-conducted hearing. Such 
a hearing is quite different in its object from a cabinet 
council or a business transaction, and nothing but 
evil can come from blending the forms of different 
kinds of proceedings together. 

114. Selection of Different Kinds of Officers 

We are in the habit of speaking as if the election of 
public officers were the easiest thing in the world. 
It requires the voter only to mark his ballot, and drop 
it into a box. Yet the value of the vote depends, 
not on the mechanical act, but on the intelligence of 
the choice; and it is sometimes strange to compare 
the readiness with which the whole people elect a 
governor and the painful solicitude of the managers 



§ 114] Selection of Different Officers 259 

of some large concern in selecting a man for an office 
certainly not more important. Examples from com- 
mercial life are now anathema, but there is no harm 
in observing how often the trustees of a college or 
university search long and anxiously for a president. 
Do we not recognize enough the greater difficulty 
of choosing good public officers in some cases than 
in others? 

To revert for illustration to the comparison made 
in an earlier chapter between Parliament and an 
American legislature; in both countries new ques- 
tions arise which the representative, guided neither 
by public opinion nor by special knowledge of his own, 
must decide by the light of ordinary common sense, 
questions, in short, that place him in a position 
where he must act as a good , sample of the public. 
But those cases arise with very different frequency 
in the two bodies. Owing to the exigencies of the 
parliamentary system, a member of the House of 
Commons almost always follows his party leaders on 
questions of a public nature, save in some peculiar 
case where the interests of his constituents are 
manifestly opposed. The election of a member of 
Parliament is, therefore, mainly an expression of 
opinion on certain broad issues, and the choice of a 
man who will support the leaders of one of the 
political parties. The voter does not select those 
leaders. He does not designate them in a primary, 
caucus or convention, or prepare a platform for them. 
They are developed in the warfare of the House, and 
come before him with their issues formed. In short 
the people have the simplest of all political decisions 



260 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 114 

to make, that of choosing between two wholly framed 
alternatives by voting for one or other of the candi- 
dates for a seat where personality is of secondary 
consequence. 

In America, where the representative is far more 
free to act on each question as his judgment dic- 
tates, the selection of the man is more important. 
The machinery for nomination and for a declara- 
tion of policy, which has given us so much trouble, 
becomes very serious, for thereby the people take in 
reality a much more onerous part in government than 
they do in England. The selection of adequate 
representatives and public officers is, therefore, a 
very difficult matter in America, more difficult per- 
haps than anywhere else in the world, and yet we mul- 
tiply the difficulty with a light heart by increasing 
unnecessarily the number of elective officers, and 
complain that they are not so good as we are entitled 
to have. 

Moreover, we do not confine elections to those 
kinds of officers that the people are most likely to 
choose wisely. A distinction may be roughly drawn 
between three classes of public servants according 
to the functions they are chiefly intended to per- 
form: those who are chosen to express the opinions 
of the people; those who are appointed to use 
their own personal knowledge or skill; and those 
who are intended to act as fair samples of the 
public on the questions that may be brought before 
them. The people can certainly choose a man to 
express the opinions they have already formed, or 
to act as a sample of the public on questions that may 



§ 114] Selection of Different Officers 261 

arise, far better than they can select a man, tech- 
nically trained, to use his own expert judgment. 
They know their own opinion, and they can easily 
ascertain whether a candidate for office will express 
it honestly. They recognize a fair sample of the 
public, gifted with common sense, when they see 
him; but they know little about experts. A prudent 
President or Governor in appointing a technical 
officer does not ordinarily rely on his own impres- 
sions; but seeks advice which is not within reach of 
the public. The people are not in a position to 
obtain or weigh such advice, and hence are poorly 
qualified to choose the general for an army, the sur- 
geon for a city hospital, or a judge. The election of 
judges by popular vote would not, indeed, work so well 
as it does, were it not for the great influence of the 
legal profession throughout American politics; and 
every sensible man will admit that to choose a general 
or a surgeon by popular vote would be a grave mis- 
take. As Chief Justice Ryan tersely expressed it: 
"Where you want skill you must appoint; where 
you want representation, elect," and that will remain 
true unless we are to push to its logical extreme the 
dogma of popular infallibility. 



CHAPTER XVII 

EXPERT ADMINISTRATORS IN POPULAR GOVERNMENT 

A discussion of the proper method of appointing 
technical officers opens the great subject of the 
function of experts in popular government. Presi- 
dents, governors, and mayors cannot be experts in all 
the matters with which they are called upon to deal, 
nor as a rule are they thoroughly expert in any of 
them; and in fact this is generally true of officers 
elected to administer public affairs. We cannot, 
therefore, avoid the question whether they do, or do 
not, need expert assistance if the government is to 
be efficiently conducted. The problem is not new, 
for the world struggled with it two thousand years 
ago. The fate of institutions has sometimes turned 
upon it, and so may the great experiment we are 
trying today — that of the permanence of democracy 
on a large scale. Americans pay little heed to the 
lessons taught by the painful experience of other 
lands, and Charles Sumner expressed a common 
sentiment when he remarked sarcastically his thank- 
fulness that they knew no history in Washington. 
Our people have an horizon so limited, a knowledge 
of the past so small, a self-confidence so sublime, a 
conviction that they are altogether better than their 
fathers so profound, that they hardly realize the 
difficulty of their task. We assume unconsciously, 

262 



Experts in Popular Government 263 

as a witty writer has put it, that human reason began 
about thirty years ago; and yet a candid study of 
history shows that the essential qualities of human 
nature have not changed radically, that men have 
little more capacity or force of character than at 
other favored epochs. Some improvement in stand- 
ards has, no doubt, taken place, and certainly the 
bounds of human sympathy have widened vastly; 
but there has been no such transformation as to jus- 
tify a confidence that the men of the present day 
can accomplish easily and without sacrifice what to 
earlier generations was unattainable. 

We have already observed that a means of making 
democracy on a large scale possible in the modern 
world, although it had not proved so in the past, was 
thought to have been found in the device of repre- 
sentation. This was supposed to enable a large 
country to govern itself as small communities alone 
had hitherto succeeded in doing. But we have seen 
also that the faith in representative government as 
a universal means of solving political problems has 
markedly declined of late, and that the conditions 
under which it has worked must be improved 
or it will not by itself bring us to our goal. It is well 
then to inquire whether there were not other defects 
in the older forms of democracy which are still with 
us, and which a calmer judgment, an unimpassioned 
study of political phenomena, may help us to remove. 
In doing so we ought not to forget that the century 
during which democracy on a large scale has endured 
is a brief span in history, and offers no conclusive 
proof of the deeper currents of human destiny; that 



264 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 115 

in seeking to solve the riddle of man's social organi- 
zation we must take long views, and not allow 
ourselves to be overwhelmed by the clamor, the 
complaints, and the enthusiasms of the moment in 
which we live. 

115. Lack of Experts in Athens 

No profound knowledge of history is needed to 
perceive that the republics of the ancient world made 
very little use of experts in the public service. The 
two of which we know by far the most are those of 
Athens and of Rome, and in some important respects 
their methods of dealing with public office were 
similar, since in both the officers were appointed, 
as a rule, for a single year, and were practically not 
reeligible. The theories of democracy, as then 
understood, were carried farthest in Athens, where 
most of the offices were collegiate and many of them 
were filled, not by election, but by lot, every free 
citizen being deemed fit to occupy any civic position 
in the state. Under these conditions, an official 
could have no expert knowledge of the work to be 
done in his department, however familiar he might 
be with the discussion of political questions in the 
assembly; nor could he in the short space of a year 
acquire any considerable experience in the man- 
agement of his office. In short, the administration 
was conducted by amateurs. Nor were these men 
assisted by expert subordinates or advisers. There 
were, no doubt, slaves in the service of the state, 
to do the purely routine work of keeping accounts 
and the like, and sometimes, at least, a professional 



§ 116] Lack of Experts in Athens 265 

architect was appointed to plan a public building; 
but as a rule all administrative work involving the 
exercise of discretion was performed by citizens 
holding office for a year only, without any aid from 
experts or persons familiar by experience with the 
duties of the position. There appear to have been 
no government engineers for constructing roads, no 
naval architects, no professional generals, no expert 
financial officers. The collection and expenditure of 
the revenues, the direction of a war, and the fitting 
out of the fleet, were intrusted to unskilled men 
selected in most cases by lot. Such a system, as we 
have seen, was considered by the Greeks themselves 
essential to democracy, for it tended to proclaim and 
preserve the equality of all the citizens. It did not 
work badly in a simple community where the various 
branches of the public service involved few things 
with which an ordinary citizen might not be familiar 
in his daily life, and of course it worked well while a 
Pericles directed the affairs of state outside of public 
office, as a sort of glorified boss. But the system was 
hardly equal to a severe strain, and we may safely 
assume that it contributed to the downfall of Athens 
before the blows of a highly organized monarchy of 
the same race under Philip of Macedon. 

116. Expert Administrators in Rome 

The Romans carried both the theory and the prac- 
tice of democracy less far than the Greeks, yet the 
principle of rotation in office was rigidly applied, 
and the result, very different from that in Athens, 
has a more direct lesson for us. Under the republic, 



266 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 116 

the officials were chosen only for a single year, and 
as a rule were not reelected. It is true that the 
government was in the hands of a ruling class, and 
that no one could hold a higher magistracy who had 
not previously filled the lower ones in the official 
ladder, so that the higher officers had enjoyed some 
experience in public affairs; but no single office was 
held by anyone more than one year, and there was 
nothing remotely resembling a permanent civil ser- 
vice. Every man was quite new to the administrative 
office he might fill, and left it before he had time to 
learn much more than he knew when he came in. 
This constitution worked well enough so long as Rome 
was a small Italian state with simple industries and 
few foreign complications; but when she acquired 
dominions beyond the seas, when the contact with 
the East destroyed her old traditions of discipline, 
when instead of governing a small town and an 
agricultural district, her people were called upon to 
rule a huge metropolis, to administer vast provinces, 
to regulate the commercial affairs and control the 
political destinies of the western world, the system 
broke down. 

After the lack of experts in the public service began 
to be of serious consequence Rome, unlike Athens, 
came into conflict with no people at all her match 
in political or military qualities, and the republic 
was brought to an end, not by external forces, but 
by internal weakness and constitutional instability. 
Of course there were other causes contributing to its 
downfall; of course it is easy to point to particular 
men at whose hands the constitution suffered vio- 






§ 116] Expert Administrators in Rome 267 

lence; of course it is impossible to distinguish sharply 
between the occasion and the underlying cause; 
but surely it is abundantly clear that government by 
a succession of amateurs, without expert assistance, 
had proved itself hopelessly incapable of maintaining 
an orderly administration on so gigantic a scale. 
The state had outgrown its machinery, and the 
empire by creating a new organization prolonged 
its life. 

Augustus and his earlier successors had no idea of 
setting up a bureaucracy to administer their domin- 
ions. In the main they merely took over, as each 
exigency arose and without a definite plan, those 
matters that were in sore need of attention. The 
former transitory officials of the senatorial class being 
unable to cope with the great problems of the day, 
one duty after another passed into the control of 
the head of the state and his personal subordinates; 
and it took three centuries to complete the process. 
Meanwhile the administrative machinery for dealing 
with these matters was being gradually developed; 
but again, not on a deliberate systematic plan, but 
in the earlier stages, at least, by adopting the means 
nearest at hand. During the century following 
Augustus, the Emperors used for this purpose to a 
great extent the freedmen attached to their own 
households and trained to conduct their private 
affairs on a large scale; but as time went on these 
were replaced by free citizens, drawn for the upper 
grades of the service from the order of knights, and 
thus a permanent civil service grew up, which men 
of ability entered young and followed for life as a 



268 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 117 

career. 1 It is this administrative system, apparently 
derived in part from the practice of the Egyptian 
monarchy, that produced and crystallized the forms 
of Roman law and government. The preservation 
of the Roman dominions for so long a period, as well 
as the far longer life of the Eastern Empire, must 
be attributed in great part to the adoption of the 
imperial form of government with its large use of 
trained expert officials; and to the same source must 
be ascribed also the overmastering influence of Roman 
civilization upon the modern world. 

117. Experts in Monarchies and Democracies 

Throughout the Middle Ages, and indeed until a 
hundred and fifty years ago, democracies were small, 
or turbulent and ephemeral. Venice was, no doubt, 
a powerful and prosperous republic for many centu- 
ries, but, far from being democratic, was an aristoc- 
racy of a restricted type, and furnishes no exception 
to the general rule that democracies have in the 
past been small or short-lived. At the close of 
the Middle Ages the great states of modern Europe 
began to assume their present form, and in every 
case they were ruled by monarchs who employed, 
not officials appointed for short terms and replacing 
one another by rotation, but men whom they retained 
permanently and who were skilled in the art of 
administration. The new monarchies meant govern- 
ment by experts, and that was one of the chief secrets 
of their efficiency and predominance. 

1 Die Kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten bis auf Diocletian. Otto 
Hirschfeld. 2d ed., 1905. See especially the concluding chapter. 



§ 117] Experts in Monarchies 269 

Now the fact that monarchies have habitually 
employed permanent administrators, while democ- 
racies have shown a preference for rotation in office, 
is not an accident. It is a natural result of the 
different principles on which the two forms of 
government are based. The use of experts is as 
normal in a monarchy or an aristocracy as it is 
foreign to the genius of a democracy. A monarch 
tends to retain in office the men he has learned to 
know and trust, who have become experienced in 
carrying on his business. If he is jealous, irritable, 
or captious, he may quarrel with them from time to 
time, or if something goes wrong he may make a 
scapegoat of one of them; but in the long run he saves 
himself trouble and worry by keeping about him the 
servants whom he has found faithful and efficient; 
and he does so whether he is himself good or bad. 
If he is good, he retains good men; if bad, men who 
will carry out his evil designs; but in any case men 
faithful to him. The head of a great industrial 
enterprise would not think of changing his subordi- 
nates every year or two. Whether honest or corrupt, 
whether generous or oppressive, he wants under him 
men who have proved themselves efficient for his 
purposes; and a monarch is in the same position. 
He keeps his servants so long as he is satisfied with 
them ; and if one of his chief officers dies he is inclined 
to fill the place with a man who has made his mark in 
a lower post. His ministers, being permanent, are 
prone for the same reason to retain their own sub- 
ordinates, promoting them to higher places as they 
show the ability, or subservience, required; and 



270 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 117 

thus a monarchy tends to produce a corps of expert 
administrators in every department, its public ser- 
vice becoming a career which a man enters young 
and follows through life. The service is not always 
good; it may become stagnant or rigid, and its 
members negligent, oppressive, or corrupt. There 
have been admirable bureaucracies, and there have 
been execrable ones, but even the worst of them have 
shown a certain durability derived from the expert 
character of their members. In spite of the gravest 
vices, they have given to the governments they have 
served a permanence beside which the democracies 
that existed on a large scale until a hundred years 
ago have seemed ephemeral. 

Permanence in the tenure of public office is, on 
the other hand, unnatural to a democracy. The 
habit of repeated reelection is, indeed, occasionally 
found — especially where a strong infusion of aris- 
tocratic feeling persists under popular forms, as in 
some of the rural cantons of Switzerland — but in 
general democracies tend, as in Athens, to frequent 
changes in office. That is partly because the people 
are afraid of losing their power or freedom under 
permanent officials. In this connection, indeed, 
it is interesting to compare in America the pop- 
ular distrust of permanent administrators with the 
absence, until the last few years, of any widespread 
popular distrust of professional politicians; a differ- 
ence largely due to the fact that the politicians mix 
with and court the people, taking pains to appear 
on a level with them, while the permanent official 
stands apart and remote. A boss, it is true, some- 



§ 118] The Need of Experts Today 271 

times holds himself aloof, but at least he distributes 
favors and is regarded as a benign special providence. 
Another reason for the democratic dislike of 
permanence of tenure grows from an insistence upon 
equality, demonstrated by giving every man a sub- 
stantial chance to take part in the administration 
of public affairs. Men desire not only to be well 
governed, but also to feel that they are governing 
themselves, and the readiest way of reaching this 
result is to throw the offices open to all aspirants. 
We do not need to go back to the ancient world to 
learn a common principle of human nature. We 
can look about us. Among our forefathers, as among 
the Greeks, rotation in office was a corollary of 
democracy, and while the word has become obnoxious 
the practice has not lost its attractions. Rotation 
in office is based upon the same principle as the use 
of the lot in Athens, for it purports to give each man 
an equal chance at office, and to insure the control of 
public affairs by public opinion. It is, perhaps, the 
simplest, but not necessarily the sole or the best, 
method of securing that control, and one may wisely 
inquire whether it is not inconsistent with efficiency, 
and whether some more effective method of attaining 
the result cannot be found. 

118. The Need of Experts Today 

The first question, therefore, is whether experts 
are as much needed in modern governments as they 
have been in large states in the past; and the answer 
must clearly be that they are needed much more. 
The habit of frequent changes of officials, which 



272 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 118 

means administration by persons without special 
skill in the public duties they undertake, may work 
well enough in a small, primitive community, such 
as Athens in her earlier days, or New England a 
century ago, or the Western frontier settlements at 
a later time, where the common experience of ordi- 
nary men was such as to fit them to deal intelligently 
with the plain questions that came before the public 
officer. It worked well enough under the conditions 
that enabled a private citizen to take up a new busi- 
ness at any time without previous preparation. 
In short, it is good under the same conditions, and 
to the extent, as government by sample, and it is 
good no farther. 

Now in private affairs we have reached a stage 
where the complexity of civilization, the growth of 
accurate knowledge, the progress of invention, and 
the keenness of competition which renders a high 
degree of efficiency alone profitable, have brought 
about the specialization of occupations. We no 
longer believe in America today that a man who has 
shown himself fairly clever at something else, is 
thereby qualified to manage a railroad, a factory, 
or a bank. Are we better justified in assuming that 
an election by popular vote, or an appointment by 
a chief magistrate, confers, without apprenticeship, 
an immediate capacity to construct the roads and 
bridges, direct the education, manage the finances, 
purify the water supply, or dispose of the sewage of 
a large city; and this when it is almost certain that 
the person selected will not remain in office long 
enough to learn thoroughly a business of which he 



§ 118] The Need of Experts Today 273 

knows little or nothing at the outset? In industrial 
enterprise, in business concerns, the use of experts 
of all kinds is, indeed, constantly increasing. They 
have revolutionized some industries, and are indis- 
pensable in many more. Nor do we merely seek for 
men who have gained experience in practice. In one 
profession after another we have learned to train 
them carefully in the theory of their work, taking 
them young and educating them for it as a distinct 
career. Sixty years ago, for example, there was 
scarcely a school of applied science in the country, 
but now they are everywhere, and they can hardly 
turn out students fast enough to supply the demand. 
They are ever adding new departments, while our 
universities are creating new specialized schools, 
and thus adding to the number of professions. We 
are training men today for all services but that of 
the public. 

To the argument that the use of expert knowledge 
in private industries has been growing, and that the 
need thereof in the enlarging sphere of governmental 
action must be growing also, it will be answered that 
popular education has been greatly extended, and 
hence the capacity of the people to deal with public 
questions is larger than ever before. This is, of 
course, an important factor in the problem of popu- 
lar government. Elementary education is so nearly 
universal and compulsory today, that illiteracy is 
fast disappearing among the voters everywhere; 
and we may assume that as time goes on the schools 
will become more efficient and thorough, although 
probably more specialized, than at present. But 

18 



274 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 119 

the bounds of human knowledge are growing faster 
than education. A Casaubon, who had mastered 
everything known in his day, has long been an 
impossibility; and with the vast progress of research 
in all fields, specialization in knowledge is daily 
becoming greater and greater. Hence we have every 
reason to believe that diffusion of information will not 
relieve the world of the need of experts; but that, 
on the contrary, the more men learn the more they 
will require the services of those who know the most 
about particular subjects. 

119. Limited Use of Experts in American Government 

It will be answered also that experts are used 
now for all professional work; that only a lawyer is 
made a government attorney or corporation counsel, 
only a physician is appointed health officer, only an 
engineer is employed to design a steel bridge, only 
an architect to plan a public building. This is 
true; and it means that the great professions, which 
have secured general recognition in the community, 
have been strong enough to insist that strictly 
professional work must not be intrusted to men 
who have had no professional training or experience. 
So far as it goes that is good; but what do we mean 
by professional work? We do not in practice include 
all work requiring special knowledge or experience in 
order to be well done, for we apply the principle only 
in the case of a few leading professions. We do not 
insist or demand, for example, that our postmasters, 
our collectors of customs, our superintendents of 
streets, the administrators of our finances for the 



§ 119] Experts in American Government 275 

nation, state, or city, shall have any familiarity with 
the affairs they are to conduct, or any special quali- 
fications for their duties; and yet these matters are 
often nearly as complex, and require nearly as much 
technical knowledge, as some of the recognized 
professions. They require quite as great skill as many 
positions in private employ to which one would not 
think of appointing an untrained man. Are we wise 
in intrusting such duties to a periodically shifting 
body of officials drawn for political motives from an 
inexperienced public? The question is not meant to 
imply that the political heads of departments ought 
to be experts; for, as will be shown later, we need in 
the public service both expert and lay elements, and 
the latter may well take the form of a non-profes- 
sional head to a department, provided he has under 
him thoroughly competent, permanent experts. But 
in many branches of the public service, central and 
local, we have no experts at all, no permanent 
officials playing an important part in the administra- 
tion; and even in those matters, like legal, medical, 
or engineering work, where experts are regularly em- 
ployed, we rarely allow men to remain in office long 
enough to acquire that familiarity with their peculiar 
problems which confers efficiency and authority. 

We are slowly making progress in these ways. 
The scientific departments at Washington are filled 
with men of the highest attainments, whom we may 
hope to see retained in spite of political changes. 
We have made progress also in civil service reform. 
Yet this practice, which was derived from England, 
was applied at first only to positions of the lower 



276 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 119 

grade, where the work is mainly of a clerical or 
mechanical character. A vast benefit has been 
gained by taking these places out of the field of 
political patronage and party spoils; but the system 
has been applied very little to posts requiring the 
exercise of considerable administrative discretion. 
We cannot estimate what we have suffered in our 
great public departments, like the Treasury and the 
Post Office, from the fact that we have not had per- 
manent under-secretaries, thoroughly familiar with 
the business and its needs, and striving through a 
long period of years to improve the service. No 
cabinet officer holding his post for a single adminis- 
tration, or less, can possibly supply that want. It 
may be noted also that the United States is the 
only great nation with a popular government today 
which has not permanent officers of that kind, and 
it is they who keep the machinery of government 
elsewhere in efficient working order. 

If democracy is to be conducted with the efficiency 
needed in a complex modern society it must over- 
come its prejudice against permanent expert officials 
as undemocratic. It might as well be alleged that 
skilled engineers and modern inventions were un- 
democratic in war; that a true republic ought to 
go into battle with bows and arrows against machine 
guns worked by trained soldiers. In fact, the 
disadvantage at which our cities fight with great 
public service corporations is largely due to the 
difference in the calibre of the officials employed. 
What chance, for example, has a city represented 
by a solicitor, who is perhaps changed at every 



§ 119] Experts in American Government 277 

election, and is paid a small salary, against a great 
corporation which retains the best legal talent and 
pays for it many times as much? And what is 
true in a legal contest is true also of comparative 
efficiency in all directions. A democracy, like every 
other community, needs the best tools that it can 
find, and the expert of high grade is the best living 
tool of modern civilization. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

EXPERTS IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 

120. Cities in America are of Recent Growth 

The defects of American methods are most 
obvious in municipal government, for our failure 
there to attain anything approaching our ideal of 
democracy is beyond question. Future historians 
will have no difficulty in assigning a cause for 
American shortcomings in this quarter. They will 
point out that in Europe cities existed before the 
dawn of history; that the institutions of the Roman 
world developed in the main out of urban conditions, 
and were always deeply tinged with municipal 
ideas. They will note that in the Middle Ages, 
when the national organization was essentially 
feudal and rural, the cities had a vitality of their 
own and presented the nearest approach on a con- 
siderable scale to self-government. They will ob- 
serve, in short, that urban administration is by no 
means a new thing in modern Europe. On the 
other hand, they will perceive that local government 
in America was at the outset almost entirely rural 
in character, and long continued to be mainly 
adapted to rural needs. The* result is that while 
the problem of rural administration has given rise 
in the last half century to quite as serious consider- 

278 



§ 120] Cities in America of Recent Growth 279 

ation in Europe as the management of cities, this 
has been very far from the case in the United States, 
where local government, outside of the large towns, 
has followed a course so smooth that until scholars 
undertook a study of the subject, few men had any 
clear conception of rural institutions beyond their 
own section of the country. The very absence of 
general discussion of the subject shows that, while 
there is a great diversity in the rural organization 
in different parts of the nation, each system has 
grown normally from prevailing conditions, and is 
fairly well suited to local needs; whereas in the case 
of municipal government, where conscious imitation 
has been far more common, discontent is well-nigh 
universal throughout the land. 

In the charters of American cities the separation 
of executive and legislative organs, and the division 
of the latter into two branches, was copied from 
the state and national governments, although these 
principles had no proper application, because a city 
government is essentially an administrative, not a 
legislative, concern. Moreover, wide as the diver- 
gence is today between the forms of rural and urban 
government in America, some principles appear to 
have been carried over from one to the other without 
regard to their fitness. The needs of a rural com- 
munity are comparatively simple, and are readily 
understood by any intelligent man. This was par- 
ticularly true half a century ago. The care of the 
roads and of elementary schools, the assessment 
of taxes on farms and live stock, the impounding of 
stray cattle, were matters within the knowledge of 



280 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 121 

everyone, and could be managed well enough by 
farmers of good sense chosen by their neighbors for 
the purpose. No special training was needed, no 
corps of experts; and rotation in office, if not too 
rapid, did not seriously interfere with efficiency. 
But such a custom is quite out of place in the 
administration of a large modern city, complicated 
as it must be by a variety of public services, most 
of which use the results of recent scientific discovery 
and mechanical invention. The problems arising 
in the supply of water, the disposal of sewage, the 
maintenance of streets and bridges with their 
numberless uses for wires and pipes as well as for 
travel, the provision for rapid transit, the elaborate 
system of public education, and the treatment of 
disease, pauperism, and crime, are not matters with 
which even the most intelligent citizen is made 
familiar in the pursuit of his ordinary vocation. 
They can be mastered only by special study or long 
experience, and they can be dealt with efficiently 
only by persons who have mastered them. 

121. The Lesson of European Cities 

It is generally admitted that our large cities are 
less well governed than those of Europe, and many 
wise men believe that we can learn something from 
their longer experience. But transplanted political 
institutions are likely to be barren unless the roots 
are carried with them. There are said to be monkeys 
in Africa so imitative that they copy faithfully the 
huts of men, and then live on the outside of them 
instead of the inside. Political imitation is not free 



§ 121] The Lesson of European Cities 281 

from this danger of copying the obvious, while 
failing to perceive the essential, in the working of 
a foreign government. Now the vital difference 
between American and European cities, more funda- 
mental than any outward form of organization, is 
the fact that municipal administration here is usually 
conducted by inexpert temporary officers, whereas 
in Europe it is virtually in the hands of permanent 
experts, controlled to a greater or less extent, but 
never suppressed, by elected councils. 

In Germany, a country where the bureaucracy 
does not seek shelter from the public gaze, the 
influence of expert officials in municipal government 
is self-evident. There is an elective city council, 
and the committees to which the various branches 
of the administration are intrusted contain unpro- 
fessional members; but the chief magistrate of the 
city, the burgomaster, is strictly a permanent pro- 
fessional administrator, and the business of the 
city is in the main conducted by him and by the 
other permanent officials for whom municipal work 
is a life-long career. In France and England the 
authority of the permanent officials is less apparent 
and one must look beneath the surface to see it. 
The statutes are, indeed, almost silent about their 
qualifications, their tenure, and their duties, but in 
practice their influence is little less powerful because 
concealed. 1 In England the council and its com- 
mittees purport to do everything. Yet by working 

1 For the influence of the permanent officials see Professor W. B. 
Munro's The Government of European Cities, and for the English 
cities see also the writer's Government of England, chap. xl. 



282 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 122 

through these committees and their chairmen, the 
town clerk, the borough surveyor, the tramway 
manager, the engineers of the water and gas works, 
and their colleagues practically carry on the adminis- 
tration of the city; and in general it may be said 
that the excellence of the service is roughly in pro- 
portion to the strength of their influence. As in 
every other part of the British government, un- 
written conventions are more powerful than formal 
organization, and while the forms are carefully 
observed and even paraded, the real forces work 
unseen in the background. For this reason observers 
often discover the action of the permanent officials 
in the government of an English city today as little 
as Montesquieu perceived the effect of the cabinet 
in restricting the personal authority of the King. 
Even the British public servant does not talk of it, 
and perhaps does not think much about it, until con- 
fronted by a system in which it is lacking, and then 
the contrast strikes him forcibly. Mr. Dalrymple, 
the manager of the Glasgow tramways, reported 
to the mayor of Chicago that it was hopeless for 
the city to think of operating the street railroads so 
long as the officials were appointed for short terms 
from political motives. 

122. The Model Charter Discourages Experts 

Until recently our municipal reformers have not 
appreciated the importance of this matter. They 
have fixed their attention mainly upon devices that 
would tend to promote the selection of good citizens 
for public office, and have not perceived clearly 



§ 122] Model Charter Discourages Experts 283 

enough that the best elective officers are in the long 
run as helpless without good permanent adminis- 
trators as the latter are with a bad mayor and council. 
The failure to grasp this point is evident from the 
model city charter prepared by the National Munici- 
pal League in 1899, Read in the light of reports 
which explain it, that plan was certainly intended 
to encourage permanence of tenure by the heads 
of departments 1 ; and yet under the arrangement 
proposed, they were highly unlikely to be men who 
devoted their lives to administrative service as a 
career. They could be removed, it is true, only 
with a statement setting forth the reasons therefor, 
which must not be their political opinions; but 
everyone knows that such a provision does not 
prevent removal for political reasons where the 
mayor has unrestricted power to appoint the suc- 
cessor. What sort of a position were they intended 
to occupy? In a small city it is conceivable, though 
unlikely, that the mayor might be the sole executive 
officer who took part in politics, who held by an 
uncertain tenure, and that he should supervise a 
corps of permanent heads of departments. But in 
a large city, this would be beyond his powers, and 
although there have been occasional cases of heads 
of departments in our large cities who have held 
office continuously for long periods through changes 
of administration, such cases have, for obvious 
reasons, been extremely rare. It is not impossible 
for a mayor to have a cabinet of non-professional, 

1 A Municipal Program, adopted by the National Municipal League 
Nov. 17, 1899, pp. 80, 82. 



284 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 122 

temporary lieutenants each of whom superintends 
one or more permanent officials in charge of depart- 
ments as the English cabinet ministers superintend 
their permanent under-secretaries. In such a sys- 
tem, however, it is essential to distinguish clearly 
the positions of the layman and the expert; not to 
prescribe their duties minutely by statute, for that 
cannot be done, but to make the distinction itself 
obvious, to make it clear, by the absence of a sub- 
stantial salary or otherwise, that the temporary or 
political chief is not to administer the department 
himself, but merely to see that it is properly ad- 
ministered and to keep it in touch with public 
opinion. Now the model charter did not do this. 
It apparently assumed that the head of a depart- 
ment was to be its real administrative officer. 
Under these conditions it would probably not be 
easy, after the first flush of the reform movement 
had passed, to find either experts or laymen com- 
petent and willing to fill the position. Experts of 
high grade would not be anxious to serve unless 
they had reason to suppose that they would remain 
during good behavior; and citizens of marked execu- 
tive capacity would make a great sacrifice in giving 
up their regular occupations and devoting their 
whole time to public work for an indefinite period. 
Professor Goodnow, one of the authors of the model 
charter, has himself pointed out that heads of city 
departments are likely to be recruited too frequently 
from professional politicians rather than professional 
administrators or men of proved executive talent. 1 

1 City Government in the United States, p. 191 et seq. 



§ 123] City Government by Commission 285 

He has treated this subject in a very interesting 
way, and suggests in the passage already cited that 
only by means of boards of commissioners can 
permanence of tenure and popular non-professional 
supervision be secured; that single-headed depart- 
ments will fall into the hands either of an official 
bureaucracy, or of men who make a living out of 
politics and from lack of adequate training are 
often not competent to fill these offices. In several 
notable instances, boards of commissioners, usually 
unpaid, but aided by paid permanent experts, have 
certainly succeeded in combining the two elements in 
a highly satisfactory way; although it may be 
doubted whether Professor Goodnow is right in 
thinking this the only means to the end. 

123. City Government by Commission 

One of the chief merits of the new plan of placing 
the whole city government in the hands of a com- 
mission is the opportunity it affords of maintaining 
a corps of permanent administrators working under 
the supervision of the members of a board; for an 
elected commission is well adapted to the purpose, 
and its operation in this way would not interfere 
in the least with the other merits rightly claimed 
for it. 1 That, indeed, has been the course actually 

1 Mr. Ford H. MacGregor, in his City Government by Commission, 
pp. 25-26 lays down four essential features of the plan. First, a con- 
centration of all power and responsibility in a small body, instead of 
dividing it between an executive and a legislative branch. Second, elec- 
tion at large and not by wards. Third, the members of the commission 
the only elective officers of the city, with power to appoint all subordinate 
administrative officials. Fourth, the power to remove all such officials 
at will. None of these features is in the least inconsistent with the 



286 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 123 

pursued in Galveston, where the plan of government 
by commission had its origin and where its benefits 
have been most marked. The mayor receives a 
salary of $2,000 and is required by the charter to 
devote six hours a day to city work, but no such 
provision is made in the case of the other com- 
missioners who are paid only $1,200 and are said to 
give on the average two hours a day. They do not, 
we are told, undertake the actual management of 
the routine in their departments, which is done 
by the superintendents under them. They simply 
advise and direct, and thus men prominent in active 
business have been able and willing to serve the 
city as members of the commission. 1 

But in the later charters that excellent principle 
has not usually been followed. A feeling arose 
that the commissioners ought to be the actual 
administrators of their departments; and hence in 
Houston, the second city to adopt the plan, their 
salaries were doubled and they were expressly 
required to devote their whole time to the city. 2 
This idea has prevailed generally, and in most of 
the cities which have adopted government by 
commission, substantial salaries are paid to its 
members, intended apparently to be large enough 
to compensate them for their whole time. A few 
charters, indeed, such as those of Lynn, Massachu- 

existence of permanent expert officials in charge of departments which 
are supervised but not directly administered by the members of the 
commission. In fact all these features, except the election at large, 
exist in substance in the English cities where the administration by 
permanent officials prevails. 

1 MacGregor, op. tit., pp. 38-39. 2 Ibid., pp. 43-44. 



§ 123] City Government by Commission 287 

setts, and Baker, Oregon, go so far as to provide that 
the commissioners shall be specifically elected by the 
people to take charge of particular departments. 

Now election by popular vote is a very poor 
way of selecting expert administrators, because 
however good judges the people at large may be 
of a man's general intellectual and moral capacity, 
they have neither the means nor the leisure for the 
careful scrutiny needed to estimate his professional 
qualifications. An appointing body, if it does its 
duty, examines more evidence and considers more 
candidates before making a selection than the public 
can possibly do, and the best experts are highly 
unlikely to be willing to undertake a campaign to 
obtain the place. 1 Moreover, if expert adminis- 
trators could be chosen in this way, they could not 
be permanent, for that is in its nature inconsistent 
with representing a fluctuating public opinion as 
expressed in recurrent elections. Nor is it practi- 
cable to have expert administrators of high grade 
under commissioners chosen for the purpose of 
administering the departments directly and paid 
full salaries for so doing. It would be playing 
false to the people by taking pay for work not done, 
even if the double charge of full salaries to both 
commissioner and administrator were not prohibi- 
tive. Considerable salaries would, indeed, actually 
tend to eliminate men of large experience in affairs 
from the commission. A sense of civic duty will 

1 Mr. MacGregor (City Government by Commission, p. 49) remarks, 
" It is probably now generally recognized that it is easier to secure pro- 
fessional and technical men by appointment than by popular election." 



288 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 123 

induce many such men to devote their spare time 
to public affairs, but if they are expected to give 
up everything else they cannot afford it. The 
bigger the man, the more he earns in his private 
occupation, and the less adequate the compensation 
for his whole time; whereas a salary which involves 
a heavy sacrifice for him is very attractive to a 
smaller man. 

City government by commission has not yet been 
tried long enough to warrant a decisive estimate of 
its value. Every new plan works well for a time, 
because the movement for reform from which it 
springs brings good men to the front and places 
power in their hands. The real test comes in later 
years, when the momentum is exhausted, and the 
moral enthusiasm of the dawn has faded into the 
light of common day. The merit of the commission 
plan will probably depend upon the capacity it 
develops for providing expert administration; and 
this brings us to the delicate question of the proper 
relation between the expert who carries on the 
public service and the representative of the public 
under whom he serves. 1 

1 One of the few direct encouragements in any American city charter 
to the use of experts in municipal government is to be found in the new 
charter of Boston, which provides that an appointment by the mayor 
shall not take effect unless the civil service commission of the state 
certifies that the appointee is an expert or a citizen qualified by his char- 
acter and experience for the position. This is not a very long step, 
and makes no provision for the proper use of experts; but it was designed, 
by drawing attention to the need of them, to promote their selection, 
and it has not been without effect. 

A very incisive discussion of the function of experts in municipal 
government is contained in the Baldwin Prize Essay for 1912 by Arthur 
Dexter Brigham. 



CHAPTER XIX 

CONTROL AND RECRUITING OF EXPERTS 

Napoleon was of opinion that as law is a science, 
based on eternal principles of justice, the laws of 
a nation ought to be made by a body of scientific 
jurists, and hence that for this purpose a representa- 
tive assembly was out of place. He did not see that 
the principles of justice depend upon the conditions 
of the existing civilization, and it is to give these 
expression that a representative assembly exists. 
Our danger lies in an opposite direction. A democ- 
racy in giving effect to the popular will is liable 
to forget that running through all civilization there 
are eternal principles which cannot be violated with 
impunity. In fact there is a constant need of coop- 
eration and compromise between public opinion and 
expert knowledge. 

124. Cause of the Distrust of Experts 

The American people distrust experts in public 
life for the same reason that the Athenians avoided 
officers chosen for long terms. They do not see 
how such men can be kept in touch with popular 
thought, and made amenable to public opinion. 
They dread bureaucracies like those created by 
monarchy in continental Europe; and of the English 
system of permanent officials under the control of 

19 289 



290 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 124 

representatives of the people they are unaware 
because from its nature it conceals itself. The 
distrust is well founded to this extent, that if a 
modern popular government needs expert adminis- 
trators, it must also take care that they do not 
strangle it or thwart its wishes. Clearly the ordi- 
nary methods of keeping representatives in contact 
with public opinion, such as rotation in office and 
the prospect of a new election, or, in the case of 
appointed political officers, a change of incumbents 
following a change of party, are inapplicable, because 
they are inconsistent with permanence of tenure 
and expert service. Nor are they always effective 
in preventing the evils commonly attributed to 
bureaucracy. Do we not know that by reason of 
the inexperience of our removable officials the United 
States government is one of the worst debtors, one 
of the most uncomfortable concerns with which to 
do business, of all the well-meaning institutions in 
the world? Have we not all groaned at its grievous 
red tape? The fact is that an official who is new to 
his work, and does not feel secure in his position, 
finds his chief safety in making no departure from 
the established precedents of the office. Whatever 
the perils may be in countries which have inherited 
a self-sufficient bureaucracy from a monarchical 
past, there would be little danger here that permanent 
officials properly supervised by non-professionals 
would be more seriously out of touch with public 
sentiment than temporary officials supervised by 
professional politicians. 

The distrust of permanent experts has no rational 



§125] Relation of Experts and Laymen 291 

foundation if they can be kept in touch with public 
opinion through the control exerted over them by 
representatives of the people; and the constant 
practice in England shows that this is not in fact 
difficult, provided the proper relation between these 
two classes of officials is clearly understood and 
observed. But that is precisely the point on which 
at present we need to be educated. 

125. Ignorance of the Relation of Experts and Laymen 

Unfortunately, we often find in America, even 
among men with a wide experience in affairs, a 
strange ignorance of the relation which ought to 
exist between experts and the persons to whom they 
are responsible. There are many charitable insti- 
tutions, for example, in which the paid adminis- 
trative head is not present at the meetings of the 
board of trustees; and one hears the practice de- 
fended on the ground that it might be awkward 
to discuss his conduct if he were there — as if his 
work could be properly discussed except in his 
presence. Can anyone conceive of a successful 
railroad where the president was regularly excluded 
from the board of directors? No large or difficult 
enterprise can prosper without a permanent adminis- 
trative manager, and it is his function not only to 
carry out the policy laid down by his directors, but 
also to give them his advice, to suggest to them 
improvements, to convince them of the soundness 
of his views if he can; and this he is not in a posi- 
tion to do unless he appears in person and takes 
an active part in their debates. 



292 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 125 

Even in cases, therefore, where experts are 
employed, it is not uncommon to commit the 
blunder of not giving them a chance to exert a 
proper influence. An error of the opposite char- 
acter is often made by placing experts in positions 
which they ought not to fill. When our govern- 
ment undertook the construction of the Panama 
Canal the President, against his own better judg- 
ment, appointed engineers upon the commission to 
supervise the engineer in charge of the work. 1 
Shrewd observers prophesied at the time that 
trouble would ensue, and before long the commis- 
sioners were changed. Now, it is a fundamental 
principle that an expert ought not to be set to 
supervise another expert in the same line — unless 
as his superior officer. An expert on a board of 
directors is in danger of relying too much upon his 
own technical knowledge, instead of being guided 
by the closer information of the expert in charge 
of the work, and a paralyzing clash of opinions is 
likely to result. There are, of course, instances 
where any of these elementary rules can be violated 
with impunity on account of the character of the 
persons concerned. Some professional men have 
a sense of their duties so delicate that on a board 
of directors they avoid bringing their opinions on 
technical matters into conflict with those of their 
paid experts, but such men are rare, and the fact 
that they are occasionally found does not invalidate 
the general principle. 

1 Francis E. Leupp, Atlantic Monthly, June, 1912, p. 847. 



§ 126] Examples of the Proper Relation 293 

126. Examples of the Proper Relation 

These examples have been mentioned to show 
that, although our people may understand the use 
of experts in their own business, they are often 
unaware of the primary rules of the art in affairs 
outside of their daily experience. In our great 
private industries and educational institutions the 
true relations between experts and laymen have 
been worked out and applied. The president of a 
railroad and his subordinates are railroad men by 
profession, skilled experts, and if they were not, 
the road would' not be efficiently, progressively, or 
even safely, conducted; but the board of directors 
is composed of bankers, merchants, and other men 
of general business experience, who make no pretence 
to the technical knowledge required to manage the 
road. In fact they represent the business public — 
not by election, but by sample — and so far as the 
sample is not a fair one, and therefore the directors 
do not faithfully represent the business public, that 
public, and ultimately the railroad itself, is sure to 
suffer. In the same way, the presidents of colleges 
are experts, and most certainly the faculties are; but 
for boards of trustees they want, not professional 
educators, but broad-minded men of the world with 
scholarly sympathies. 

In public office we are constantly confusing these 
relations. We hear people complain, for example, 
that some candidate for the school board is not an 
expert in education, although the object of super- 
vision and control by the board is not to add to 



294 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 126 

the technical knowledge of the trained superin- 
tendent, but to supply the qualities which he lacks 
— the close touch with the popular point of view, 
and the sense of proportion that comes therewith. 
In some directions we have learned much within a 
generation, and in one service, that of education, 
we have seen a marked change in the attitude of 
the people toward their expert officials. To take 
an illustration from a single city, a score of years 
ago Boston had, indeed, a superintendent of schools 
who had been in office many years, but he was 
suffered to take little part in their management. 
He was not present at the meetings of the school 
board, and the most important of all functions, the 
selection of teachers, was performed by sub-com- 
mittees of the board, who conferred with the masters, 
but rarely consulted him. In fact it was said that 
his work consisted chiefly in writing an annual 
report. Now all this has changed. The superin- 
tendent is present at all the meetings, nominates 
the teachers, conducts the administration under 
the general direction of the board, and is the real 
executive head of public education, bearing to the 
board, as he should, a relation similar to that of 
the head of any industrial institution to the board 
of directors. A process of this kind has been 
quietly going on in many parts of the country, and 
thus the administration of the public schools, as 
well as the teaching of the children, is becoming a 
great profession, whose members have a permanent 
career in the public service — a career, by the way, 
as wide as the nation, for an officer who has made 



§ 127] Examples of the Proper Relation 295 

his mark in one place may be called to a position 
in another city. All this will greatly improve 
education; while, far from becoming bureaucratic, 
the administration of the schools has come into 
closer touch with the aspirations of the people. 
The teaching profession has become thereby more 
respected and more popular, as well as more in- 
fluential than ever before. If the other branches of 
city work could be put on a similar basis, the ques- 
tion of municipal reform would be wellnigh solved. 
Examples of expert management controlled by 
representatives of the public, are to be found through- 
out the political system of England, which was 
never that of an absolute monarchy, and has never 
become quite a democracy of the traditional type, 
but has ever carried the forms of one age over into 
the next and thus combined some of their virtues. 
The administration, national or local, is habitually 
conducted by a permanent official, who devotes his 
whole life to the career, and has under him a staff 
of permanent subordinates, professional like him- 
self, but acting under the constant supervision and 
control of a cabinet minister or a committee of the 
local council. The minister, or the committeeman, 
may learn much about the business if he remains 
long in office, but he rarely becomes, or pretends to 
be, an expert. 

127. The True Relation between Experts and Representatives 
of the Public 

The relation which ought to exist between the 
expert in charge and the non-professional under 



296 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 127 

whose control he acts has never been more acutely 
discussed than by Bagehot in the chapter on 
4 'Changes of Ministry" in his English Constitu- 
tion. The pith of the matter is in his quotation 
from Sir George Cornewall Lewis, "It is not the 
business of a Cabinet Minister to work his depart- 
ment. His business is to see that it is properly 
worked." The expert is essentially the executive 
officer who carries on the administration, suggests 
improvements, advises his chief on all questions of 
policy that arise, but gives effect loyally to any 
policy which his chief decides to follow. His chief, 
representing the public, ought not to administer 
directly, but keep the office from getting into ruts, 
stimulate it when lethargic, and lay down the 
general policy to be pursued. In short, the expert 
is responsible to his chief for good service, the latter 
to the public for the policy pursued and the general 
result. 

In order that the chief who represents the public 
should control the administration, it is neither nec- 
essary nor wise for him to go much into details, 
because the public wants not means but ends, not 
methods but results; and the layman is at the 
mercy of the expert in matters of detail, whereas 
if he confines his attention to results and is a man 
of force and good sense, he will produce an effect. 
Nor is it necessary that public sentiment should 
be brought to bear at every rung of the official 
ladder. It is enough that it is brought to bear at 
the top with strength enough to affect the whole 
structure. To change the policy of a railroad, the 



§ 127] Experts and the Public 297 

president does not need to replace all the employees, 
or even the ones in the higher posts. If they are 
capable men, and not mutinous, he needs only to 
steer them on a different course; and in the same 
way experience shows how a vigorous English min- 
ister can guide his whole body of officials, although 
no new man, except himself, comes into the depart- 
ment. In fact, the railroad president and the 
minister find it easier to carry out their policies 
than they would if all the men holding positions 
that require discretion were replaced by others, 
however intelligent, who were unfamiliar with their 
duties. The filling with politicians of all the im- 
portant posts in a national business, like the post 
office or the custom house, is not a means of bring- 
ing public opinion to bear on public work. It 
simply prevents any intelligent policy from being 
carried out. Apart from general questions of policy 
to be decided by the Postmaster General or the 
Secretary of the Treasury, what the public really 
desires is simply the maximum efficiency in the ser- 
vice, and that can be attained only by a corps of 
highly trained men in high administrative positions. 
It is for this reason that the frequent shifting of 
English cabinet ministers from one department to 
another is not inconsistent with efficient manage- 
ment. If they were to conduct their departments 
directly, such changes would mean inexperience and 
bad administration, but if their function is merely 
oversight, a fresh eye is not necessarily an evil, and 
may, as Bagehot insists, even be an advantage. In 
this connection it may be observed that since one of 



298 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 128 

the effects of popular government, with its rapidly 
shifting party majorities, has been a more frequent 
change of the political executive officers, there is the 
greater need of expert administrators to carry on 
the public service with the efficiency that modern 
civilization demands. 1 

128. Methods of Creating the True Relation 

The proverb that there are many ways of kill- 
ing a cat, and none of them always succeeds, is true 
of political machinery. The right relation between 
expert administrators and their political chiefs may 
exist under very different forms. It cannot be 
provided by law, because from their very nature 
the functions of the two classes of officers cannot 
be accurately defined. It is a distinction of influ- 
ence rather than of power. Nor can it be secured by 
adopting any particular organization. The impor- 
tant thing is to recognize the principle, and make use 

1 J. Ramsay McDonald, himself a socialist and a leader of the 
Labor Party in the House of Commons, says on this subject 
(Socialism and Government, vol. ii, pp. 34-35), " The apparent incon- 
gruity of a Minister being at the Education Office one year and the 
Admiralty the next, disappears when examined at close quarters. 
The Cabinet is not a collection of experts on any one subject. 
Were that so its corporate responsibility for government would be 
unreal. It is a committee of men of good common sense and intelli- 
gence, of business ability, of practical capacity, in touch with public 
opinion, on the one hand, and by reason of that, carrying out a 
certain policy, and, on the other, it is the controller of a staff of 
experts who know the details of departmental work. The perma- 
nent officials obey their minister; he obeys public opinion. The 
Cabinet is the bridge linking up the people with the expert, join- 
ing principle to practice. Its function is to transform the mess- 
ages sent along sensory nerves into commands sent through motor 
nerves. It does not keep the departments going; it keeps them 
going in certain directions." 



§ 128] Methods of Creating the True Relation 299 

of forms that will tend to emphasize it. The ex- 
pert is permanent, irrespective of changes of party, 
and therefore he must keep clear of politics in his 
office and out of it, and as his duties are quite 
apart from the political questions which the people 
are called upon to decide, he ought never to be elected, 
but appointed without limit of time. The political 
chief, on the other hand, whose functions are dis- 
tinctly political, ought to be in close touch with 
public opinion, and should from time to time give 
account of his stewardship. Hence he ought to 
come up for reelection or reappointment at intervals 
long enough to show what he has done, not merely 
to promise what he will do, 

Another mode of giving emphasis to the distinction 
between the two classes of officials is furnished by 
the matter of salaries. The expert ought to devote 
his whole time, and, in fact, his whole life, to the 
public service, preferably being forbidden to follow 
any profession or business of his own, and he ought 
to be paid a liberal salary, large enough to attract 
able men into the career. But the political chief 
ought not to receive a compensation greater than 
the sacrifice he is expected to make. A cabinet 
officer who must leave his home and live at the 
capital, and the mayor of a large city whose time 
must be wholly engrossed by municipal work, ought 
to be paid full salaries; but a member of a city 
commission, or the political head of a city depart- 
ment ought not, as a rule, to manage the details of 
his office and the work of supervision ought not to 
take so much of his time as to prevent him from 



300 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 129 

paying attention to his private affairs. He ought, 
therefore, to receive, if anything, only a compara- 
tively small compensation, and there is in such 
cases a distinct advantage in paying nothing because 
this tends to discourage the man who seeks office, 
not in order to render public service, but for the 
pay it brings. 

129. Recruiting Experts for the Public Service 

The question of selecting permanent adminis- 
trative officials is by no means a simple one. From 
England we have taken the idea of civil service 
reform, the plan of appointment by merit instead 
of political pull, and we have thereby reduced 
enormously the field of party patronage and spoils, 
but hitherto we have adopted the system only in 
part. We have applied it mainly to places requiring 
work of a mechanical or routine character, and very 
little to the higher offices involving the exercise 
of discretion. Complaints are heard from Wash- 
ington that a position which is permanent confers 
no real authority, while one that gives any scope 
for initiative is not permanent. The civil service 
examinations are, indeed, adapted to that condition, 
for they are designed primarily to test the immedi- 
ate fitness of the candidate for the duties he will be 
called upon to perform; and this is easy to measure 
in the case of mechanical or routine work, but very 
difficult to ascertain when initiative, resourceful- 
ness, good judgment, and willingness to assume 
responsibility are in question. These are personal 
qualities which a written examination reaches but 



§ 129] The Recruiting of Experts 301 

faintly. Civil service commissioners have, no doubt, 
authority to scrutinize the history of the candidates, 
with the reputation they have made in other posi- 
tions, and thus to ascertain their qualifications as 
any other employer might do; but so far as they 
exercise this function they occupy the place of 
appointing, rather than of examining, boards. In 
any case they are seeking to discover the immediate 
fitness of men already trained, not the future 
capacity of men still ignorant of the work. Yet 
this last is an important thing to do, because many 
branches of the public service have no counterpart 
in private affairs, and the knowledge they require 
can be obtained only by experience in the depart- 
ment itself. 

In great private industries employers do not 
seek mainly for persons already trained, but take 
promising young men, promoting them as they 
show talent, and this is in fact the practice of the 
British Government. When the Crown, after the 
mutiny, took over from the East India Company 
the administration of India, a commission was 
appointed to consider the method of recruiting the 
civil service there, and Lord Macaulay, who wrote 
the report, laid down the principle that the com- 
petitive examinations for appointment ought not to 
cover the special subjects needed by an official in 
India, such as the native languages and the laws 
and institutions of the country, because ambitious 
young men with good prospects of a career at home 
would not, on a mere chance of success in the com- 
petition, spend a year or two in studies that would 



302 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 129 

be useless in case of failure. The examination was 
therefore confined to the subjects ordinarily pursued 
at a university, leaving special training to be acquired 
after the selection was made; and the candidates 
have, in fact, been of excellent calibre. The system 
was applied later to the various departments of the 
English government, and is now in general use for 
recruiting the higher grade of permanent officials of 
the nation. 

The Dutch colonial office followed the opposite 
plan, examining the candidates upon the subjects 
they would need in Java, an arrangement which 
required them to study for a couple of years at the 
Indian Institute at Delft. But the class of men who 
did so was unsatisfactory, and after a careful inves- 
tigation, the plan was abandoned a dozen years ago. 

These examples show the advantages of a system 
which does not attempt to measure immediate fit- 
ness for the work to be done, but merely tests the 
general education and ability of young men who 
are expected to make their own way up the steps 
of the service by their usefulness after they have 
entered it. Few people would be rash enough to 
suggest that the English examinations should be 
copied here. For many reasons they are out of 
place. But it is not inconceivable that some 
method could be devised that would bring men into 
the public service young, would eliminate politics 
in their selection, and would offer them a prospect 
of a permanent career. That many ambitious and 
capable young men would be glad to seize the 
opportunity so offered no one who knows them well 



§ 129] The Recruiting of Experts 303 

will doubt. But first we must reach a conviction 
that we want them. If we recognize the need, the 
means will be found and the rest will follow. As 
Professor Goodnow said, in discussing the case of per- 
manent experts in the higher posts of the national 
service, "That this can be accomplished by any 
changes in the law may, perhaps, be doubted. 
That it will be accomplished, as soon as an educated 
and intelligent public opinion demands it, is a moral 
certainty." 1 

Many people feel that because popular govern- 
ment is new it must be lasting. They know it is 
a vital part of the spirit of the age, which they 
assume to be permanent. But that is the one thing 
the spirit of the age never is. It would not deserve 
its name if it were; and when any spirit of the age 
has become universally recognized, it is time to 
scan the horizon for signs of a new era. Whether 
popular government will endure or not depends 
upon its success in solving its problems, and among 
these none is more insistent than the question of 
its capacity both to use and to control experts, a 
question closely interwoven with the nature, the 
expression, and the limitations of public opinion. 

1 Politics and Administration, p. 121. 



Appendix A 

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1. Consenting to the initiative petition: 
2532 1739 

2. Accepting the resolution of the 

Great Council 

5233 3758 

Rejecting the initiative petition: 
4064 5917 

Accepting the project: 
5290 5280 

Rejecting the initiative petition: 
1767 3732 


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Init. 

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Obligatory voting at elections and popular votes 

Proportional representation in the election of the 
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325 



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rj 


CO 


a 




CC 


©* 


CO 




O^ 


a 


cc 






cc 


cr 


c 


0: 


r— 




OS r* or. 


CO 




a 


i— I 


c: 




GO 


IC 


T— 






CO CO *0 


GO ©< 


OS *0 i> 


^ ^ 




a 


OS 


c 




o 


^f 


r, ^ 






05 CO -* 


©< «3 






























co os co 


" © 




CO 


00 


"f 




b- 


i> 


" cc 






o ■* »c 


i> os 


©* CO r- 


©} 




i — 


1—1 


r— 




PH 


p— 


o 






i-H rH t— 


©* 


4? os «: 


05 




© 


«5 


OJ 




o 


a 


CO 






rH i— 1 IT; 


rH «) 


*C CO i> 


-f 




© 


co 


c 




o 


«; 


CO 






GO AO i> 


O i> 


© ©^ a 


^ i> 




»c 


OS 


1— 




iO 


a 


( -1- 






eo co^ ai 


os^ 00 






























«5 «5 r- 


" cc 




*3 


05 


»o 




© 


c 


" i> 






oo 05" J> 


1-^ -rp 


i-H ©* GO 


CO 




©) 


©* 


CO 




CO 


o 


T— 






GO CO CC 


©( H3 


rH © a 


H* 




c 


«5 


r— 




00 


1— 


»o 






^* O r- 


HH r-( 


00 i-t cc 


«3 




c 


CO 


'0 




cc 


c 


CO 






CO 05 ©i 


OS GO 


©^ go *o 


CO 




<■* 


CO 


cc 




CO 


;C 


n Tf 






OS 05^ CO 


r> 00^ 




























go" *0 cc 


T— 1 




o: 


©< 


©) 




o? 


cr 


" 05 






OS CO~ CC 


os" ©f 


^ CO Tf 


cc 




CO 


«5 


»0 




»o 


co 


CO 






^ «5 AC 


©* OS 


co co o: 


cc 




i> 


i—i 








"f 








CO CO OC 


©* "T? 


i> CO Tf 


05 




©J 


CO 








c 








H3 i> OJ 


©) co 


00 5< (^ 


^ tP 




cc 


rH 








r— 








CO^ CXD AC 


"^ 'R 


















' 










oo i> c 


" cc 




c 


r-H 








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of ©f CO 


GO OO" 


©* ©I CO 


©* 




CO 


CO 








CO 








CO CO CO 


GO CO 


I— I !— 1 1— 


l-H 




r— 


I— 1 








r— 








rH rH r- 


1—i T-( 


«H +J <4- 


*<- 




«4- 


«+H 






*z 


«4- 


s*- 






4J e+H e+- 


*4-( «4-< 


® '3 ^ 


<L 




0. 


CO 


~CL 




0) 


1 


CL 






• p a) a. 


CO CO 


Ph £ P3 p3 




PC 


PhPc 




tftf PC 






h5tie: 


PhPS 






6*H 




co 




tn 








CO 


i 














o 

CO 

a; 




X5 
o3 

Fh 
4-> 




4J 
3 








CO 


c3 

4J 

CO 
CO 






















o3 




T3 




'53 








CO 


8 






















■4-1 

H 

o 

a 






b 

4^> 
CO 




CD 
Fh 
i 

PI 
O 
Pi 


co 

4J 

'3 

CO 






CO 


u 

Oh 
CO 
H 

4J 










J 










_g 




P 




CU 


c3 


















'E 


ta 










n3 




> 








"o 


Fh 

o 










CO 


13 

§ 

3 

"Si 

PI -f 
.2 h 

1 - 

_d a 






02 




.5 


> 


,.2 


.3 






p 








Fh 


4 

4^ 

4- 

R 

c 
1 

c 

i 

1 

1 


1 

r- 
4- 

p 


CO 
Fh 

441 

X 

ta 

«4H 
O 

a 
.2 

1 

■ 1 

JS 


1 

4- 

R 
4- 
t/ 

1 

a 


o 

«44 

g 
'g 
"51 

44> 

*o3 

d 
.2 

c3 
O 

°> 

Pi 


P 

c 

F- 
C 

V 

EC 
4 

C 

c 


o 

Pi 

<v 

B 

<v 

g 

d 
o 

4J 

c3 


CO 
4J 
CO 

o 

CO 
H 
eg 

4-- 

'u 


o 

CO 

CO 

'0J3 

g 

'> 

"•oij 


* 

> 


V 

d 

X 
R 

4- 
> 

c 

R 

'0 

a. 

p 

R 

P 
■s R 

4- 


.2 

CO 

, — i 

J 

-§ 

CO 

3 

C3 


's 

-a 

+J 

CO 

o 
co 

CO 

4-J 

'o 




c 
,t 

'c 
c 

"r 

p 
c 

4- 

p 

§ 

a 
4- 
c 


1 

H £ 

I 

4- 

e 


CO O 

«> co 

F* a) 

O a 
a pi 

H t» CO 

•s| 

' 8 -J 

CO fl 
rP O 
4J CO 

PI 


«+H O C 


c 


o 


O 


**- 


O 
u 
0) 


3 
o 


4- 

a 

I 


T 

a 

i 


Pi 


p 




a J 


O O 


1—1 (— 1 I— 


R" 

hi 


o3 


a. 

F- 


o3 cc 


l— 1 


M 

=4^ 


c 

44 


o 


CJ 


M3 o3 r 


o3 o3 


QD °° ^ 

CO °° ^ r " 


10 


CO 




OS 
«3 i-J 








c 


t 


HH 

• co . 




CO £ 


1> ^ . 


8^ o > 

^' flj *s g 




° tl 




O Fh 


F^ 


T3 






• T 


o u 




b 1 


O >5 > 


c 


OS £ 

i— 1 W 




OS a3 


h^ 


M 




'c 


fj4_ 


OS o3 




.* C 


OS e? O 


fe 


p 


£ 




-* 








< 


5 

1 


rt S 






rl 


- 


~:> 


* 





326 



Appendix A 





GO rH 


*o ©* 


lO 


J> 


©* 


© 


a 


GO i-l 


o* *o 


GO 


© 


«5 


© 


a 


i> »o 


O Oi 


© 


CO 


GO 


«5 














W) 


»0 i—i 


© *o 


© 


©* 


i> 


-* 


< 


G< CO 


"* ©* 


©* 


©* 




I-H 


o 


i—i i—i 


o © 


b- 


© 


GO 


»o 


> 


© *o 


CD © 


© 


^* 


GO 


i> 


r* 


GO © 


J> «5 


GO 


©* 


*o 


GO 


—. 














GO r-t 


GO © 


© 


«3 


00" 


«5 


a 
i— i 


Tf* tJ< 


O* ^H 


CO 


CO 


-* 


©* 



51 



i-h £- 
t> ^ 
i> GO^ 
Of i-H 

© © 



T? I-H 

© "* 
c» © 

of ©" 

© © 



<v o o 









4) 4) 



oa 

TO 
>» 



02 O 

o ^ 






o X 



2 CO 
o 



TO 4J 



§^ 



o 






i—i j_> 



CO 

.2 w 



g 

o 



^ TO 



o -5 



6-g 



8 o 

> £ 

o 4> 



+3 4> 



£3 J3 

O -5 S 
&c o 

£ 1) £ 

TO ^ TO 



«.2 

■a g 

s 5 

4) ° 

o 

en 4) 
C > 
' 4> 



^ 4) 

03 _rj 

2 o 

to . 

03 £ 



° s 

TO ^ O 

* a ° a 



GO 



rd -o 



CO 
. GO ©* 

-o © . 

M OS ^D 

rH 1) 



Appendix A 



327 



CO 




pH CO 




CS 




CO 




cc 


rH 


»o 


GO 


00 




©? 


© 




OS 


a 


O CO 




'O 




© 




CO 


©* 


»o 


© 


^ 


© 


Tfl 


CO 


"3 


00 00 




OS 




00 




© 


^ 


© 


i> 


pH 


-* 


^ 






















go" 


o 


X ^ 




O 




© 




© 


*o 


00 


r- 


^ 


CO 


© 


I— 1 


rH 


pH 








CX 




<x 


rH 


©* 


r- 


pH 


PH 


rH 


i> 


CO 


pH OS 




l> 




to 




© 


© 


^ 


«; 


rH 


CO 


© 


©* 


I— 1 


i— ( to 




CO 




1— 1 




© 


00 


o^ 


oc 


W5 


© 


** 


t-^ 


f— 1 


t- ©* 




OS 




OS 




T— H 


©* 


«3 


■>* 


^ 


»o 


© 
























c©- 


o 


1—1 i> 




-? 




© 




i> 


»o 


W5 


© 


© 


J> 


CO 


1— 1 


©I 


©* PH 




i— i 




I-H 




CO 


TP 


«# 


©^ 


©< 


X 


©* 


CO 


©* 


^ CO 




b- 




-V 




© 


*o 


r^ 


to 


© 


oc 


CO 


© 


CO 


OS r? 




co 




rH 




X 


© 


oc 


CO 


© 


©J 


CO 


CO 


co 


CO to 




"* 




<* 




CO 


© 


GO 


^ 


pH 


©< 


© 
























I— 1 


1— 1 


i-h GO 




go" 




go" 




r- 


rH 


© 


©J 


©( 


©* 


© 


CO 


CO 


CO GO 




CO 




CO 




© 


© 


i> 


T* 


f 


-f 


CO 


00 




OS 




cs 








© 




i—{ 


©^ 






© 


CO 




<# 




** 








riP 




CVI 


© 






r-t 


1— 1 




CO 




CO 








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t3H 


©} 






» 




























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00 




00 








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r- 






^" 


CO 




GO 




CO 








CO 




<* 


^ 






»* 


I— 1 




I— 1 




1—* 








rH 




r-i 


r- 






pH 


ew 


=+H 


«4H «+H 




e+H 




«4-< 




=4- 


«4-H 


«4- 


e4- 


«+H 


=4- 


«H 


<d 


CD 


CD CD 




CD 




0. 




i 


CD 


CL 


CL 


CD 


l 


0) 


tf PhPhP^ 




pH 




« 




pel tf 


p: 


tftf 


tf 


p^ 








O 

o 




1 




o 






© 
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© 
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d 
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o 




o 




a; 






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co 
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CO 

CD 


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O 








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4-> 


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o 




cd 






© 
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£ 




en 


CO 




d 




a 




03 
CD 


CO 






CO 




d 

CD 




43 

«4-l 




co 4J 


=4-1 

o 






.3 




*"3 


=4-1 

o 






«4-H 
O 




a 

CD 




o 

co 
O 

w 

O 
fl 

# o 
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o3 
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"3 
<s 

bJD 
(-i 
O 
CD 
nd 


r 

C 

P 


o "-3 

2 «~ 

^ 2 
en p| 

• HH CO 

§j '5b 

■M cd 

03 CD 

s ^ 

*H O +-> 

1 d >> 

1 a a 

3 +* co 


ei 

_o 

Is 



d 

U 

o3 
W3 

.a 

o 

4-> 




5 

o 
ft 

CD 

pS 
o 

cd 
O 

d 

a 




CD 
CO 

p 

o 
d 
"■+3 

a3 

CO 

'd 

'§ 

03 
1 

■5 


^_C£ 

5 
'•t 

c 


o 
-d 
a 

co 
>s 
o3 
J 

ft 

«+H 
O 

co 

o3 
! co 

CD 


d 

o3 

d 

B 

d 

o3 

a 

o3 

.s 

T 

o 

•3 


d 

c 

C 

]> 
't 

a 

4 

«*- 

a 

^c 

4- 
& 

c 
'> 

1 


ir 
§ C 

-*- 

R 

i 

j 

D g 


d 

o3 

1 

o 
d 

03 
CD 

05 

d 
'S 

•c 

o 




tSJD 
o3 

d 

a 

d 

o3 

d 
.2 

d <l 

Jh -t- 

11 

Si 

CD 4- 


■» 


d 

o 


c 


J o ■£ 


3 
tf 


03 

o 

d 

CJ 

(-1 


c 


§ 


> 


»§ 


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o JG 


£ 


(3 


: £ £ 


£ 


!ft 

ft 




c ^ 


J 

X 


; t 




1 6 


: ^ ^ 


CT 




o3 


a 


3 o3 oj 


03 


3 


o3 


o3 


03 ■*" 


0, 


5 o3 o3 


t. 


o3 P 


h-; 


p- 


1 r-; r-5 P-: 




C/2 




pH* 


S ^ 


h^ 




J pJ KH 


e4_ 


p3 m 


© CO 




©* 










rH 

CO 






©^ 


rH <* 


> 
t 




PH ^ 


O . 


T 


5 T3 « 


t5 




nd 








'd 


rH »>s 


H ^ 


1^3 T3 






OS p| 


r- 


< r- 1 pj 


pH 




rH 




a 
O 




*-* 


cs 08 


© 5 


|MH 




© •© 


•-5 




3 
1-9 














^^ 


^^ 








M 3 





328 



Appendix A 







+j 






























CO 




t- 




c 




GO 




G* r- 




»0 






,5 




G* 




** 


-* 




G^ CC 




«B 


*J 




00 




7— 1 




o 


7— 1 




^ 


»c 




J> 


m 




fcfi 




























< 




i> 




K 




© 




CO GO 


i> 




t- 
























o 




> 




Ci 




C 




J> 




CC 


i> 


OS 


Jo 






GO 




-f 




o 




a 




05 


i> 




Ph 




fc^ 




c 




©^ 




cc 


c 




°1 






J^ 




r? 




J> 


^ 




^f 


^ 




go" 


1 


03 




1> 




,_ 




i> 




i-H C 




o 


ca -3 


0) 




i> 




c 




I— 1 




CC 


>^ 




»o 


"3b g 




GO 




cc 




80 




i> cc 




©^ 


o 

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go" 


cT 




c& c 




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1-1 




r~ 




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T— 


GJ 




G* 


U 8 




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ft+- 




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0) 




1 

PC 


£ 




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r— , 






H>J 

3 

09 

Fh 

oj 




5 


Fh 



Fh 




O 

o 

OJ 

+3 

CO 


oj 

S 3 


CO 

93 



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>sT3 

60 CI 

Fh ri 

03 * 
rj cy 








H 

CO 

4J 


CD 


*5 
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eg 




'co 


Fh 


Fh 








«4H 

o 

Fh 
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OJ 
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F- 


u 


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c 






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CO 

o 
p 

c3 
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o 

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o 

d 

t c 

d 

F- 


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CO 

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CO 

CJ 
d 

c3 


3 
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ft 

a 

CO 

PI 








ft 
P3 

CO 

CO 

H-> 

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d 
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9) 




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o 
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c 

CJ 


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u 




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o 

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F- 


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fl 


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eg 




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o 

CO 

eg 
M 


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rd 
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pi 

03 


P 
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o 

c 

1 


1 

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Fh 

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c 

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1— 
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u 

w 

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o 

X 

co 
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Fh 



an end to the gi 

and schismatic 

2 Densions . . . 


4 






1 

Fh 
fcO 

S3 


c3 
tO 


eg 


r 
4 


ri 


PI 


Pi 


b 


• g 


H 4-> 

3 


.1 SP 






O 
Fh 
Fh 

<3 


Fh 


> 


eg 


+3 

Fh 

CO 




-r 
Pi 

OJ 

< 


-5 



- 

H- 


co 
O 

H-J 
4- 
"E 


ft 
o 

■M 

-t-J 

"d 


l! 

^— ' «*H 






h-l 




— 




1-5 






1—1 


i—i 








co 








o 




0B 




G^ 


OB 




0) 




Q* °* 


** 


GO 




«■* a* 


»o 


i— i 




© _, 


i- * 




4J 




go rs 


GO 


>. 




Ci >s 


a 


>s 




C6 '*' 


01 m 




ja 




GO U 


X 






°° c? 


00 


og 




GO C3 
P 




r 


j 




1— < ft 

< 




- 
Ha 




"1 


i— i 


a 











Appendix A 



329 



©* to J> 

OS i> 00 

©^ "«* rH 

«5 of t> 



d c« 



^o 


■* 


OS 


CO 


©< 


OS 


OS 


co 


o 


to 


1— 1 


o 


CO 


CO 


OS 


CO 


o* 


GO 














CO 


^ 


i> 


t> 


o* 


I— ( 



.d * l - 



j— i to 
co CO 



CO r-< 

to o* 
cc to 



'd *d 4> cj 



4) 4) 



g3 

1 

d 



42 

d 
o 



4) 09 

ft ^2 

D oj 

^3 o 
43 



T3 ,3 V «m 



CO 

4> 
2 



S 9 rB 



c3 
-f-> 
4) 

J-4 

w 
4) 
43 
■t-J 

be 

d 



43 

o 



a 

X! 

4) .-a 

43 d 

4-> CO 

43 fe 

.22 § 



O O 




+^ d 


o 


. '■d 


4- 1 


T3 d 




d o 


"J 


cu w 


d 


S 2 

c3 43 


4) 


■P 


Bj 


In fl 


+5 




d 


88 >» 


o 

o 


u 4) 


, 


o d 




e +H (H 




. o 





d c3 fi 



4) 
bJD 

a; .a 

d T3 
S3 *£J 
M 42 

d « 

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cd 

h^3 
o^ 

3 4) 
cT 4) 



■3.-d 

03 a 



d d 

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2 ft 

42 4) 
( t-t 

e9 _ 

|| 

« .2 

4) ".£3 

4) dn 
^ 2 

r* 

■SB 

O 4J 

c3 o 

© * 
O 4) 

© &c 
to d 



t+-i c3 

O fH 

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o 



g M .S3 



d d 

4) c3 



& 4) 

d£ 
4) 
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4> d 
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s a 

g-s 



& pi 

a o 



.3 ce 



o> 



I""* —I 



t- ^ V , J »H 

^^t-^t-OSOOrli 
O k! © rd © 0* © rH 

os c os 5^ os .,os 
•t: -*h d 






-N ^ ^» '- , 

© . 2 CO . 

OS -3 OS 



•s ° 



330 



Appendix A 



O 
m 

u 

a 

H 

ft 

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334 



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CO 


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335 



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336 



Appendix A 





.5 


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338 



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356 



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S3}0A prfBA 




































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to 




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I-; 


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paja^siSaj 




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tion of the weight of br 
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the Synod of the Churc 
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Appendix A 



357 



r-4 H TjH 

CO © CO 



r-H O* 



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l-H ©* I— I I— I 



CO l-H 



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o 

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o3 






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4J 
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4) 4) 
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d <d 

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o3 
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4> 

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13 


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4) 


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o3 








a; 4> 
rd m 


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c 




d 


4) 

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O 


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a 


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4-2 


4) 
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o 

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d 


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o 


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o 


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d 

4) 

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d 
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a 

4) 


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o 


d 

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03 


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o3 T3 

4) d 


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Ph 
4> 




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c 




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d 


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o3 






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C/2 


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r^ 


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0) 


a 


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o3 


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'd 

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h- 1 


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r-( 


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3 











Appendix A 



361 











CO 




CO 




© 




CO 






^ 






co 




© 












CO 




r-4 




CO 




V5 




CO 






G* 






OS 




J> 












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«3 




«i 




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»Q 






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i—i 




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OS 




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«5 




co' 




GO 






© 






CO 




»d 












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i— I 




i— i 




i—i 






G* 






1—1 




l-H 












l-H 




CO 




G* 




o 




Q< 






*C 






fr- 




i—( 












© 




G* 




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o 




CO 






CO 






ee 




G* 












i> 




G< 




CO 




o 




CO 






© 






W5 




i> 












G^ 












































o 




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-^ 






GO 






© 




co 












CO 




I— 1 




o< 




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rH 






G* 






i— i 




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CO 




«5 




l> 




CO 




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CO 






© 




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o 




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T— 1 




G* 






GO 






OS 




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tP 






CO 






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to 




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ti 




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d 

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V 

1 


CO 


CO 




Fh 




V 




o 


i 




i 


CD 




CD 




4-J 


i 


e+H 


n 


CD 




CD M 


d 

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fee 

CD 




o 
d 

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O 

Fh 




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o 

CO 

CO 

CD 




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o3 

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0) 

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4-3 


CO 

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JH 

pi 

o 




3 
.2 

PI 


O 
PI 




5 

o 

Pi 

.2 
+3 


CO 
CD 

o 

Fh 


^d 




CD 

a 

d 

Fh 
CD 
> 


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o 

Fh 


o 
PI 

.2 

i 


Fh 

e3 

o 


5 




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CD 




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+-> 




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d 

,o 
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o3 


o 


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s ° 


3 




1 






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cu 


CD 


pj 


U 

CD 

«4H 


'43 

co 




b3 


t3 

CD 
rd 


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*+3 

_CD 


pd 

CD 

CO 


CD 
CD 




CD 

3 


CP ^h 


S 
d 

a 

a 

d 

H-J. 


rf 


CD 




CD 




Fh 

o 


CD 


.2 


co 

PI 


PI 

CD 
J 

'C 

CD 
d 
X 

CD 

~ci 
u 




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o 


co 

3 


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CD 


4-i 

03 


CD 

,d 


CD 
4-> 


^ 


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.0 
'o 


73 
o3 


CD fl 

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■i| 

^H CD 


F- 

CL 

C 

c 

F- 
a 
+• 
a 

F- 


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4-1 

<v 

o 

U d 

73 

Fh 

o 

4-> 

•a 


V 

9, 
y 

P 

a 

c 


d p 


PI 
CD 

a 

ti 

> § 


o 

•CO 

Fh 
CD 
JQ 

a 

CD 

a 




-5 

& 


ft 

O 
+^ 

CD 
Fh 

■4-a 




.2 

'o 
c» 

^> 


PI 

B 
PI 

o3 


CD 

4-3 

CD 

CO 

'> 

CD 
Fh 

O 

4-3 


03 

4-> 
CO 

CD 

m u 

tt) 

d 

> 

CD 


-5 

CD 

CO 

*> 
CD 
Fh 

O 
4-> 


t3 

CD 
Fh 

,d 

o 
"b 

N 

o 


d 

CD 
in 

Fh 

Ch 

CD 
U 

d 
_o 
'43 


4J 

d 

.2 
+j 

o3 

a 

CD 


«+H 

o 

d 

.2 
'-P 

CJ 

-2 

"CD 

4-> 

d 
pfl 


CD 
CD 

"3 

c 
d 
o 
a 

4-5 
"S 






«5 




CO 














t> 






CO 




© 
















r— 1 




G* M 














o> 






G* 


CO <» 












73 
l-H 




Si 








73 
M 










"»H 






■M 

cS 


os 5p 

< 













362 



Appendix A 



sa^oA pjp A 

' paia^stSai 
jo %uso jaj 


50.8 
50.4 

52.1 


61.0 
62.9 
69.3 


Jftrejq 10 pypA 
-ni jo ^H3D iaj 


22.5 
23.1 

19.1 

17.8 

15.3 

6.6 


4J 

ca 
U 

CO 

<p 

O 
> 


03 

= 

"3 

to 


27,724 
20,319 

33,147 

22,734 
22,406 
49,806 


O 
> 


21,565 
28,633 

17,464 

36,936 
39,076 
18,016 


73 

O 03 

I 5 


j— 1 
© 
©* 


Regis- 
tered 
Voters 


© 
GO 

© 


61 


Ref. 
Ref. 

Ref. 

Ref. 
Ref. 

Init. 


WD 

.9 

o 

"S 

O 
0> 

s 

GO 


Law on the capital towns of dis- 
tricts (increase in compensation 
thereto, etc.) 

Resolution for an agreement among 
the cantons to limit the security 
required in law suits 

Const, amend, to change the 

teachers in towns with more than 
10 000 neonle 


Const, amend, on the administra- 
tive union of school districts . . . 

Law on the formation, union, and 
separation of school districts . . . 

Init. to repeal the Act of 1897 which 
tolerated brothels 


( 


2 

ca 

2l 


1903 
Aug. 30 

Id. 

Id. 


1904 
Jan. 31 

Id. 

Id. 



Appendix A 



363 



« 






t- 






cc 




rf 




i> 




GO 






r-t 






Qi 




"*. ^ 


GO* 






© 






to 




CC 




i> 




i> 






t> 






CC 




»o 00* 


CO 






i> 






J> 




i> 




© 




© 






tJ< 






cc 




© "* 


CO 






© 






^ 




tT. 




GO 




© 






i> 






«: 




o © 


00 






i— 1 






»o 




rj 




W5 




© 






© 
r-i 






i> 




CO* 00* 


© 






GO 






cc 




ir 




o< 




©« 






*o 






^ 




© © 


*f< 






© 






a 




cc 




© 




O^ 






© 






GC 




l-H CO 


©^ 






■* 






«* 




»r 




GO 




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r-t 






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r-T 






«5 






r— 




r- 




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c 




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go 






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to 




er 




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TP 






r-t 






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O* 






c 




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i— i 






Q* 






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c 




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cp 






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PC 




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CL 




CP CP 


=4-1 


Ph 


t3 

a 




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CO 




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i 




CP 




CD 


1— 1 




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CD 




I 




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X 




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c3 




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Xi 




d 




co 


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o 




ts 


2 




co 




r3 




C3 




+3 


CD 

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i 


+-> 




'§ 


CO 


.2h " 


o 


co 




c5 




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o jd 




co 


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c3 • 

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03 

0) 

J5 • 


13 

co 

DO 

CD 


CD 




& 
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d 
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d 

03 

1 

o 

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«4-H 



cp 

CO 

a; 




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CO 

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d 
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d 

CP 
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d 

CP 
CD 

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d 

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co 

bJD 

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8 

CP 

X 




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+-> 

4-> 

pd 

.SP 


CD 

CO 

a 

CD 




13 
3 


d 
• d 

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o 


0) 

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CP 


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£ 


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ta 

6 


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f-l 
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f- 

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l 


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8 


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d 

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co 


3 
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CP 

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b£ 

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CO 


CD 

3 
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a, 


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a.| 

cp d 


4-> 

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CD 

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d 


d 

X 


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CL 
b 

t- 

t7 


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4-> 

is 


4- 

c 

X 


d 
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to 


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a 


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d 

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1 8 


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M 


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1— 1 


a 


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CO 




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CP 



364 



Appendix A 



S9}OA pij^A 












i> 






© 




1> 




GO 








I-H 


paja^s;3ai 
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est 

co 






CO 




CO 
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rH 
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%seo s^ojyeq 












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GO 


5jaB|q jo p;p3A 












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i— i 






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q 




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Ph 

o 
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c3 03 
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b- ^ 












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1-8 















Appendix A 



365 









r- 






OC 




c 










cc 






CC 




J> 








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cc 




CO 








cc 






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«+■ 




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a 






a. 




<v 








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tf 


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be 


d 




en 






IT 


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Appendix B 

Results of the General Referendum and 
Initiative in America 



368 



Appendix B 



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369 



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24 



370 



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Appendix B 



371 



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372 



Appendix B 





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Appendix B 



373 



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i— ( 


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GO 


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l-H 


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CO 


TF 


CO 


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CO 


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i> 


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Pi ^ 


p . 


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HU 


hH 


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1— I 


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Si 






^ o 



CO DO 

s ^ 

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w .22 

■ -3 



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t3 *d 

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bC * 

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CO 

■g ft 

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a 

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CO co 
CO 

ft -P 



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ft 3 



CO 

ftJ3 



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CO CO 

a a 






o p 

NH O 
CO « 

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9 3 



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co ci 

6C 

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4 & 

ft d 
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d 
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p 

P 0) 

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s| 



374 



Appendix B 



Sai;oA noi} 


CO 




l> 









M3 






rH 


® 




CO 


jo ^nao jaj 


CO 

GO 




«5 




06 




CO 

CO 






CO 


GO 
CO 




GO 


■u 


09 

cp 




CO 
CP 




CU 
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8 






c 


£ 

^ 









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o> 






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t- 


tal 


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O 











CO 


tx 




Q< 


CO 




0* 




i> 




CO 






CO 


^ 




1— 1 


o 




















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CO 




1-H 






05 


c 




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rH 








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pH 








i— i 









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CO 




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CO 




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CO 


GC 




GO 


CO 


Tp 




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VJ 


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O +3 

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u 

cp -73 

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a 

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03 

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cfl 

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1 

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pi 

0) 

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cp 

> 

u 

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B 



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a 

cu 




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6C 
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u 

a 

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0) 

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c3 
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CP 


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43 

CO 

n 

cu 




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Pi 

CD 


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c3 




J3 




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s 




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F-c 





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4-9 




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cp 

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p. 

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O 


O 

co 

C 
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9) 

M 
53 


P 
c 
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C 


CU cu 

+J 4J 

s .a 

a « 



Appendix B 



375 



00 o 



<^p co 
©< GO 



O CO 
CO ©* 



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CO 



0* 



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fc 




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i> 


wa 


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00 


«5 


-* 


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I-H 


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t> 


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of 


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CO 


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CO 




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Ph 


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0) 


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2 


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rJ2 cn 


e 

a3 



Cp o 

h 

d CP 

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p cn 

n >> 

W Bj 

Pi 

CP Ph 

o cp 

O en 

« s 



CP +J 
O 9^43 

B. 8 § 



o 

1 

f-i 

cp 

a 
a 

en 
cp 

> 

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n 

c3 
W) 
cp 

■3 

d 



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<*h cn 
cp 

d o3 

o a 

•43 cd 



a ° 



• is. 

I - s 

'43 o -d 
a3 +3 +j 



• d D 

i— i hJ 

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d fi 

cd a 
cp 'a 

^ d 

d a? 



^5 

d 

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jj .»H 



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bfl cn g g 

o ==1 g.g 



p3 

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c3 cp 

Ch 
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o ^ 

A d 

d 

^ 8 



a 
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I 2 

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eg J 

cn ° 
cp T3 

5 03 



cp a 

f 1 «^H 



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CP 

cp 



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d o 

cn cp 



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cu cn 



CP 

a 

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d 
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N 

•C cn 



WD * bC 



d 

8 

o3 

HJ CP 

ej q. 



376 



Appendix B 



Sai^oA noi^. 




i> 


CO 


<x 




-osp ye sja^oA 




© 


CO 


CO* 


jo }uao is j 




*o 


CO 


GO 


4J 










3 




o 


O 


O 






fc 


£ 


£ 


rt 














CO 


** 


©* 




« 


CO 


1—1 


O 


q 


*o 


"*! 


rH 


O 










r~ 


I— 1 


** 


1— 1 


Tj- 


i> 


«3 


«5 




i— 












>o 


©* 


1— I 


o 




i> 


©* 


«5 




"^ 


i> 


CO 




© 


-* 


05 






Tjt 


GO 


ex 






so 


©* 


,_, 


tn 




OS 


OS 


«3 


4) 




© 


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®l 


r* 




r- 1 


os" 


r-4 






GO 


rH 


<X 


Ch 










a> 










+j 










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=4-1 


e+H 


«H 


«3 




0) 


CD 


CD 


M 




ti 


tf 


ti 














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s 








60 5. 




jcl 








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*3 








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O 








J3 bfi 




Ph 








aj fl 












n -43 

■H.l 


DO 


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O 

a 








c3 X 

-0 

i.s 







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S3 




4) 




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*+h 


+j 




-q 




<U ^ 


O 


co 
PS 




«M 




-5 ° 


Pi 


O 




o 
o 

d 


S- 

c 

p 


aj 
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O 




CD 
CD 

+3 






s & 


rd 


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a, 


tp 


to 


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c 


S w 

3 a 


CO 

3 


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c 




& 


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02 




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a. 


1 




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8 




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w 


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t> 


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O 

Pi 

cr 
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CD 
CO 

CD 

^3 


la 
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'ft 

Cv 
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ea 

4-> 
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CD 

-t-> 

CM 




CO 

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g 

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CD 
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p 


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p{ 






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p. 




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O 


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Appendix B 



377 







r- 


00 








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DB 


CO 






I 


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1—1 




i> 


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c 


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1-H 






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J— 1 






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378 



Appendix B 





Sui^oa nop 




I-H 


i> 


OS l> OS rH 


CO 


rH 


© 




-oap q/e sia^'oA 




o* 


r> 


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GO 


OS 




jo ^uao jaj] 




X 


i> 


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00 


i> 


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GO 


«5 




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Appendix B 



379 





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Police Bill 





380 



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To introduce a general initiative for constitutional 

amendments and laws 

To subject all public officers, state and local, to recall 
All property given for education, and certain other 
funds, to be pledged for education, with provisions 
for investment, etc. ... 


To make women eligible for offices of school super- 
intendent or trustee, and notary public 

Amendment of provision about indictment for 
crime, depriving of property without due process 
of law, etc, 



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388 



Appendix B 



Sui^oa uoi} 

-D3J3 %V Sld^OA 

jo iTiao jaj 




CO r- 
00 J> 
00 GC 


CO 

CO 
00 


78.5 
76.2 

75.0 

75.0 


72.5 
72.4 

71.8 
70.9 


CO 


o o M o * «2 ^ o r> ain 


Total 


120,248 
106,215 

104,761 

104,100 

94,335 
91,638 

90,235 

90,201 
87,128 
87,029 

86,298 

85,252 


O 




63,564 

61,221 

50,779 

59,065 
41,504 

40,044 

33,943 
48,655 
46,301 

42,127 
99,002 






42,651 

43,540 

53,321 

35,270 
50,134 

50,191 

56,258 
38,473 
40,898 

44,171 
16,250 


Char- 
acter 




+3 +J ■< 

'3 '3 
i— i hh ^ 


4J<^4J-<^«+-3 -M +j 4-J ■£ +J << 4^ 

*3 • '3 • a* '3 '3 '3 '3 '3 . '3 


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cu *3 
%& 

£ S.I 

O o .s 


To give to cities and towns the exclusive right to 
regulate liquor licenses 

To introduce woman siiffra.fffi ......... 


To authorize branch insane asylums 

To transfer to the state the normal school at Mon- 
mouth 

Act relating to liability of employers in hazardous 
occu nations .......... 


To transfer to the state another normal school . . 
To transfer to the state a third normal school 
To provide for county regulation of county taxa- 
tion and abolish the poll tax 

To change the boundaries of two counties . . . 



Appendix B 



389 



i> ^ 



o o 
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390 



Appendix B 





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Appendix B 



391 



Sni^oA 

■ye s'jg^oA 
jo ^nao jaj 



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392 



Appendix B 



o 
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Appendix B 



393 



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To exempt from taxation all debts, public 
securities, and stocks, except bank stocks . 

To revise the inheritance taxes, with a slight 
increase, and extend exemption of charities 
to those incorporated elsewhere 

To fix the ratio of freight rates on carloads and 
smaller lots . 


To authorize counties to issue bonds for the 
construction of roads 

To abolish the state senate, introduce pro- 
portional representation in the legislature, 
all candidates for Governor to be ex officio 
members, no appropriations except proposed 
by Governor; to increase effect of referendum, 
etc 

To provide for graduated taxes on franchises, 
lands and natural resources exceeding $10,000; 
and to exempt from general taxation all per- 
sonal property and improvements on land . 



Appendix B 



395 



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Index 



Index 



Aargau page 

Results of referendum in 166, 311 

Results of initiative in 200, 311 

Advertisement 

This an age of . 57-59 

Arizona 

Referendum 

Adoption of 174 

Results of 368 

Initiative, results of 205, 368 

Arkansas 

Referendum 

Adoption of 174 

Results of '. 176, 370 

Initiative, results of 205, 370 

Athens 

Use of the lot in 47, 245 

Lack of experts in public life 264 

Bagehot, Walter 296, 297 

Basle, City 

Results of referendum in 315 

Basle, Rural 

Results of referendum in 167,185,186,318 

Results of initiative in 200, 318 

Benoist, Charles 121 

Bern 

Results of referendum in 165, 185, 186, 322 

Results of initiative in 200, 203, 322 

Boston 

Local referendum in 196-197 

Boss, the 

Natural history of 103 

A broker in private privileges 105 



402 Index 

Boss, the (continued) page 

Sources of his power 135, 137-138 

(See also Parties and Politicians) 

Brigham, A. D 288 

Brokers 

Need and influence of 60 

Politicians act as 61, 64, 67 

Bryce, James 7, 35, 37, 71, 104, 146 

Bureaucracy 

Dread of in America 106, 109, 270, 289 

Burke, Edmund 66, 124 

California 

Referendum 

Adoption of 174 

Results of 177-182, 183, 371 

Initiative, results of 205, 371 

Civil Service Reform 

Its limitation in America 107, 275-276, 300 

Examinations in England 301 

Colorado 

Referendum 

Adoption of 174 

Results of 183, 184, 189, 190, 372 

Initiative, results of 204, 206, 215, 372 

Commission 

City government by 285 

Its relation to use of experts 286 

Common Will 

Of Rousseau and public opinion 8 

Compromise 

Prejudice against 52, 63 

Consent 

As a basis of government 9 

And force 10-12 

Courts 

Power to hold statutes unconstitutional 9-10 

Constitutional Restraints 

Merits of 9-10, 44-45 

Corruption 

Causes of 104 

Forms of 134-135 



Index 403 

Creeds page 

How far opinions 16 

Cridge, Alfred D 211 

Croly, Herbert 103 

Democracy 

Slowly learned 38 

Meaning of 57 

Its fear of experts 270 

Desire 

And opinion 26 

Dicey, A. V 64 

Dickinson, G. Lowes 42 

Direct Primary. (See Primary, direct.) 

Dissent 

Freedom to express 37 

Dwpriez, Leon 123 

Elections 

How far they express opinion 25, 71 et seq., 91, 113 et seq., 137-139 

In Spain 113 

Private influences in 137 

England 

Theory of mandate 73 

And United States 76 

Difference in meaning of elections 76-79, 259 

Solidarity of parties .... 78-79,92,118-120,125-128,132,139 
Committees on private bills 248 

Experts 

Growing use of in industrial life 49, 272 

Lack of in Athens 264 

Lack of in Rome under the Republic 265 

Their use under the Empire 267 

In monarchies 268 

Their absence in democracies 270 

In English government 295, 297 

Need of in public life 49-50, 262, 271 

Little used in American public life 274, 282 

Use of in German cities 281 

Use of in English cities 281-282 

The municipal program 283 

Relation of commission government to 285 



404 Index 

Experts (continued) page 

Control of 289 

In public education 294 

Proper relation to lay superiors 291 et seq. 

Method of creating it 298 

Methods of recruiting 300 

In England 302 

In Holland 301 

Facts 

Knowledge of. * . 22-24 

As basis of opinion 22-24 

Difficulty in ascertaining 47 et seq. 

Examples 50 

Farrand, Max 118 

Force 

As a basis of government 11 

Ford, Henry J 70 

Freedom 

To express dissent 37 

To organize 39 

In religion 41-42 

Freeman, E. A 12 

Frontier 

Its effect on public life in America 109 

Galveston 

Plan of commission government 286 

Geneva 

Results of referendum in 167, 185, 186, 328 

Results of initiative in 201, 202, 328 

Goodnow, F. J 284, 303 

Grisons 

Results of referendum in 276, 330 

Results of initiative in 200, 330 

Habit 

Its loss of force 58 

Hadley, A. T 15 

Harmony 

Of principles a basis of opinion 20 



Index 405 

Harmony (continued) page 

Of interests 28-30 

Doctrine of 28-30 

Hart, A. B 104 

Headlam, James W 47, 245 

Hirschfeld, Otto 268 

Holman, Frederick V 213, 229 

Hoist, H. von 72 

Homogeneity 

Essential for public opinion 34-36 

Houston 

Plan of commission government 286 

Hughes, Governor 

His bill for direct primaries 150 

Idaho 

Referendum, adoption of 174 

Initiative 

Its nature 162, 198 

In Switzerland 

Its tendencies 201 

Its small use 202 

Results in the Swiss Confederation 199, 306 

In Aargau 200, 311 

In Bern 200, 203, 322 

In Geneva 201, 202, 328 

In Grisons 200, 330 

In Lucerne 200, 333 

In Rural Basle 200, 318 

In Schaffhausen 200, 336 

In Schwyz 201, 338 

In Solothurn 200, 341 

In St. Gall 201, 334 

In Thurgau 200, 347 

In Valais 200, 350 

In Vaud 185, 353 

In Zurich 200, 353 

In America 
Results in 

Arizona 205, 368 

Arkansas 205, 376 

California 205, 371 



406 Index 

Initiative (continued) page 

Colorado 204,206,215,372 

Maine 204, 376 

Missouri 204, 377 

Montana 204, 379 

New Mexico 205, 380 

Oklahoma 204, 381 

Oregon 203, 204, 206, 207-217, 384 

South Dakota 203,205,395 

Utah 398 

Laws enacted 205 

Proposals rejected 207 

Complex measures proposed 211 

How far an expression of public opinion . . . 209 et seq., 224-226 

Evidence from stability 216 

Defects of 217 

Is it public or private 221 

Class of measures suited for 231 

Not a panacea 233 

Intensity 

Of opinion 12-14 

Its effect 12-14 

Irreconcilables 

And public opinion 10-12, 32 

And race feeling 31 

Cause of 34 

Janissaries 17 

Johnson, L. J 224 

Jury 

A sample of the public 242 

Safeguards surrounding it 243 

Special juries 246 

Landsgemeinde 152, 164 

Legislatures 

Recent distrust of 130 

Its causes 131 

Tendency to play politics 131-133 

Local interests in 133, 143 

Private interests in 134, 137-139, 143 



Index 407 

Legislatures (continued) page 

Defects exaggerated 139, 141 

Remedies in United States negative 144-146 

Excessive restrictions in United States 145, 146 

Leupp, Francis E 292 

Lewis, Sir G. C 17, 50, 96, 296 

Lobbying 

Different kinds of 135-136 

Lodge,K.C 151 

Log-rolling 134 

Lot 

Use of in Athens 47, 245 

Use of in Venice 245 

Lowell, Francis C -. . . . 104, 119 

Lucerne 

Results of referendum in 168, 333 

Results of initiative in 200, 333 

Macdonald, J. R 158, 298 

MacGregor, Ford C 285, 286, 287 

Machine, the 

Its causes 140 

(See also, Politicians and Parties and Boss) 

Maine 

Referendum 

Adoption of 174 

Results of 182-183, 189, 376 

Initiative, results in 204, 376 

Maine, Sir H. S 3, 62, 65, 73 

Maitland, F. W 221 

Majority 

Not enough for public opinion 4-7 

Basis of their right to rule 9 

Artificial nature of 61, 68 

Mandate 

Theory of in England 73 

Massachusetts 

Results of constitutional referendum 171, 187-188 

The Luce Law 226 

Public hearings 250 

Its benefits 252 

Means, D. McG 104 



408 Index 

Michigan page 

Results of constitutional referendum 170, 188 

Minghetti, Marco 108 

Minority 

Duty to submit 11, 15, 44 

In religion 42 

Missouri 

Referendum, adoption of 174, 377 

Initiative, results in 204, 377 

Montana 

Referendum, adoption of 174, 379 

Initiative, results in 204, 379 

Municipal Government 

In Europe 278, 280 

In America 278-280, 282 

(See also Commission) 

Munro, W. B 281 

Mutual Confidence 

Lack of in America 141 

Nebraska 

Referendum, adoption of 174 

Nevada 

Referendum 

Adoption of 174 

Results 178, 379 

New Mexico 

Referendum 

Adoption of 174-189 

Results of 380 

Initiative, results in 205, 380 

Oberhaltzer, E. P 173, 187 

Oklahoma 

Referendum 

Adoption of : 174 

Results of 178-181, 182, 184, 381 

Initiative, results in 204, 381 

Opinion 

Not always rational 16, 18 

Real if part of believer's philosophy 19 



Index 409 

Opinion (continued) page 

Otherwise must be based on facts 22 

Opinion and desire 26 

(See also Public Opinion) 

Oregon 

Referendum 

Adoption of 174 

Use of emergency clause 176 

Results 178-179,182,189,190,227,384 

State pamphlet of measures 191-192 

Effect on legislation 229 

Initiative 

Adoption of 203,204 

Results in 206, 207-217, 384 

Organization 

Its political effect 39-40 

Distorts public opinion 86 et seq. 

d, M 104 



Parties 

Causes of 64 et seq., 101 

Organs for formulating opinions 66-67 

Frame the issues . 69 

Confuse the issues 71, 75 

Greater solidarity in England than in United States . . 76-79, 92 

Multiplicity in continental Europe 79 

Their nature 80 

Slow changes 81 

Causes of 81 

Their effect 82-84 

Cause a bias 86 

Cause false lines of division 88-90 

Distort public opinion 92 

Influence of extreme elements 93, 95 

Influence of moderate elements 93 

Prevent popular vagaries 96 

An obstacle to despotism 97 

Unscientific criticism 99-101 

Legislation by 102 

Argument for 144 

Dealing with private interests 158 



410 Index 

Parties (continued) page 

In municipal government 87 

Conventions in United States at first popular 140 

(See also Politicians and Boss) 

Pasteur, Louis 57 

People, the 

Can say only "Yes" or "No" 69, 91 

In America undertake too much 103,105-110,260 

Politicians 

As brokers 61 

Of public opinion 67 

Of private privileges 64 

Work through parties 64 

Cause of ... 103, 108 

Popular Interest 

In man greater than in measures 53 

Primaries, direct 68, 102, 149 

Cost of 151 

Private Bills 

In England 248 

Proportional Representation 122-124 

Public Hearings 

In America 249 

Practice of in Massachusetts 250 

Practice of in other states 254 

Public Officers 

Three kinds of 240 

Often combined 256 

Difficulty of selection 258 

Methods of selection 260 

Public Opinion 

Must be public 3 

Majority not enough 4-7 

Unanimity not required 7 

Does not include irreconcilables 12 

Case of the Southern States 5, 33 

Effect of race feeling 31 

Need of homogeneity 34-36 

Effect of intensity 12-14 

It involves freedom to express dissent 37 

And to organize 39 

It must be opinion 10 et seq. 



Index 411 

Public Opinion (continued) page 

Conditions essential for 28 et seq. 

Not necessarily rational 29 

How far must be based on fact 46 

Knowledge of facts difficult 47 et seq. 

Examples 50 

Limitation of in religion 41, 42 

In other matters 42, 44 

Uncertainty in predicting 53 

Distortion by parties 86 et seq., 92 

Methods of expressing 113 et seq. 

By elections 25, 71 et seq., 91 

Direct expression 152 et seq. 

By the referendum 159 et seq., 181 et seq., 190 

By the initiative 209 et seq., 224-226 

Evidence from stability 216 

Evils from failure to perceive its limits 142-144 

Why given effect 239 

Opinion by sample 242 

Need of impartiality 136 

(See Opinion, Representation) 



Race Feeling 31, 35 

Recall, the 147 

Referendum 

Compulsory and optional 164 

Reasons for 155 

Distrust of legislature 155 

Separation of issues 157 

Criticisms of 156 

In England 157, 158 

How far an expression of public opinion 

159 et seq., 181 et seq., 190, 224-226 

Its effect negative 162 

Results in Switzerland not radical 168 

In the Confederation 165, 306 

In Aargau 166, 186, 311 

In Bern 165, 185, 186, 322 

In Geneva 167, 185, 186, 328 

In Grisons 167, 330 

In Lucerne 168, 333 



412 Index 

Referendum (continued) page 

In Rural Basle 167, 185, 186, 318 

In Schaffhausen 167, 186, 336 

In Schwyz 167, 186, 338 

In Solothurn 167, 185, 341 

In St. Gall 167, 186, 334 

In Thurgau 166, 186, 347 

In Valais 167, 185, 350 

In Vaud 168, 185, 353 

In Zurich 166,185,186 

Its use in America 169 et seq. 

On Constitution changes 169-170, 187 

Results in Michigan 170, 188 

Results in Massachusetts 171, 187-188 

On special acts 171 

On ordinary laws 173, 188 et seq. 

Use of emergency clause 174 

Results in Arizona 176, 368 

Arkansas 176, 370 

California 177, 182, 183, 371 

Colorado 177, 183, 184, 189, 190, 372 

Maine 178, 182, 183, 189, 376 

Missouri 174, 204-377 

Montana 178, 379 

Nebraska 174 

Nevada 178, 379 

New Mexico 178, 189, 380 

Oklahoma 178, 181, 381 

Oregon 178,182,189,190,191-192,384 

South Dakota 179, 180, 183, 189, 190, 395 

Utah 398 

Number of laws rejected 176 

Character of laws rejected 180 

Smallness of the vote cast 184-191 

Fines for not voting 191 

State pamphlet of measures 192 

The local referendum 

Its meaning 193-194 

Its advantages 195 

Size of vote in Boston 196-197 

Delay sometimes harmful 226 

Effect on the legislation 228-230 



Index 413 

Referendum (continued) page 

Class of measures suited for 231 

Not a panacea 233 

Reinsch, Paul 156, 249, 254, 255 

Representation 

Of the nation and of constituencies 115-117 

In England 117-120, 125 

In the United States 117-120,125 

Of interests 121 

Theories of delegation and personal judgment 124-128 

Former faith in representation 129 

Recent distrust of 130 

Three kinds of 240 

Often combined 256 

By sample 242 

The jury 242 

Rotation in office 243 

Use of the lot 244 

Selected samples 246 

Use of in public affairs 247 

Private bill committees in England 248 

Public hearings in America 249 

Practice of in Massachusetts 250 

Practice of in other states 254 

Difficulty of selecting officers 258 

(See also Legislatures) 

Rohmer, Friedrich 65 

Rome 

Lack of experts under the Republic 265 

Their rise under the Empire 267 

Rotation in Office 

Its object 106, 243 

Rousseau, J. J 8, 28, 87 

Ryan, Chief Justice 261 

St. Gall 

Results of referendum in 167, 186, 334 

Results of initiative in 201, 334 

Sample 

Public opinion by 242 

(See Representation) 



414 Index 

Schaffhausen , page 

Results of referendum in 167, 185, 186, 336 

Results of initiative in 200, 336 

Schwyz 

Results of referendum in 167, 186, 338 

Results of initiative in 201, 338 

Shams 

Use of .3-4 

In parties 89 

Social Compact 8, 9 

Solothurn 

Results of referendum in 167, 185, 341 

Results of initiative in 200, 341 

South Dakota 
Referendum 

Adoption of 174 

Use of emergency clause 174-175 

Results 179-181,183,189,190,395 

Effect on legislation 228 

Initiative, results of 203, 205, 395 

Special Legislation 

Its evils in America 107, 119, 143 

Log-rolling 133 

Forms of corruption 134-135 

Amount of in United States 146 

Attempts to restrict 145 

In England 144 

Private bill procedure in England 248 

Sumner, Charles 262 

Swiss Confederation 

Results of referendum in 165, 186, 306 

Results of initiative in 199, 306 

Tarde, Gabriel 26, 30, 37, 65 

Thurgau 

Results of referendum in 166, 185, 347 

Results of initiative in 200, 347 

Town Meeting 152 

Its merits 153 

Unanimity 

Not needed for public opinion 7 



Index 415 

United States page 

And England 

Difference in meaning of elections 76-79, 259 

Differences of opinion within its parties 80, 118-120, 125-128, 132, 140 
(See also Parties, Special Legislation, Referendum, Initiative, 
Experts, etc.) 

IT Ren, W. S 229 

Utah 

Referendum not in effect 398 

Votes in Constitutional Amendments 398 

Valais 

Results of referendum in 167, 185, 186, 350 

Results of initiative in 200, 350 

Vaud 

Results of referendum in 168, 185, 353 

Results of initiative in 353 

Von Hoist, H. (See Hoist, H. von.) 

Wallas, Graham 43 

Washington 

Referendum, adoption of 174 

Wendell, Barrett 32 

Zurich 

Results of referendum in 185, 186, 353 

Fines for not voting 191 

Results of initiative in 200, 353 



RAILROADS, RATES AND REGULATION 

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